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INTRODUCTION 
Politik, politisch. along with the complex of 
philosophems that are usually aligned with such terms--
freedom. power. class. law. praxis. etc.--are words that 
Heidegger hardly ever uses. Das Wesen des politischen. 
Was ist das, die Politik? are the titles of books 
Heidegger never wrote. Why? Perhaps for the same reasons 
that make him highly suspicious of words such as "ethics," 
"logic," or "physics'": 
Even such names as "logic,'' "ethics," and "physics" 
begin to flourish only when original thinking comes to 
an end. During the time of their greatness the Greeks 
thought without such headings. 1 
Like these words, then. the word "politics" would need to 
be avoided, for such names are the result and the work of 
a metaphysical thinking the very existence of which marks 
a certain distance from originary and authentic thinking. 
Such words lead to an understanding of philosophy as 
science and anthropology. As such. they inevitably lead 
1
• Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" in Basic 
Writings. ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and 
Row. 1977), p. 195-96. 
1 
to a concealment and an oblivion of the Sache selbst, viz. 
the question of Being. Insofar as they obliterate the 
Sache they are to be submitted to the Destruktion or the 
Abbau Heidegger speaks of in Being and Time. Politics 
would most need deconstruction. The use of the word 
itself would need to be "avoided" in philosophy. 
Hence no political philosophy. no politology or 
golitische Wissenschaf~ in Heidegger's work. Does this 
mean. then, that the question concerning politics is 
totally absent from the Heideggerian text? Does this mean 
that Heidegger had no "interest" in the question of 
politics? It has often been thought so. But then: what 
needs to be thought of Heidegger's decisively poli~ical 
and politically decisive engagement in nazism? What about 
the political in Heidegger. which is to say: what about 
Heidegger's politics; but also: what about the political 
dimension of Heidegger's thinking? 
If there are no texts by Heidegger on the issue of 
politics, the question of how this issue can even be 
addressed properly has to be raised. Is it even 
legitimate to attempt to raise the question from a 
Heideggerian perspective? To this objection the following 
answer can be brought forward: first of all, if it is 
indeed true that there are no texts explicitely devoted to 
the question of politics--if, in other words. there is no 
"political" philosophy in Heidegger--, there are valuable 
2 
and decisive indications of political implications 
disseminated throughout Heidegger's texts; but, most of 
all. perhaps a way of thinking the question of politics in 
a radical and essential manner can be retrieved from the 
Heideggerian text. 
In order to properly locate textually the question 
concerning politics, a reading of "The Question Concerning 
Technology" is imperative. This text constitutes the 
horizon within which the question can be formulated in the 
most adequate way. The question concerning technology is 
to be addressed in terms of essence. Now, the essence of 
technology is, according to Heidegger. "nothing 
technological," 2 for technology is a mode of bringing-
forth [Hervorbrinqen], of poiesis. As such, it is 
grounded in revealing [Entberqen]: its essence is grounded 
in the essence of truth. Hence technology is not mere 
instrumentality. a mere means to scientific or practical 
ends. 
The word "technology" is rooted in the Greek 
techne. Techne, in Greek. is the name for what we 
understand today by technique or technology. viz. the 
activities and the skills (the "know-how") of a craftsman 
or a producer. But techne also names the arts of the mind 
2
. "Die Frage nach der Technik." in Vortraqe und 
Aufsatze (Pfullingen: GUnther Neske, 1954); trans. by 
William Lovitt: "The Question Concerning Technology." in 
Basic Writings, p. 287. 
3 
and the fine arts. In both cases, the central activity 
involved is the bringing-forth, the poiesis of something. 
But does this allow for the conclusion that the essential 
characteristic of techne as the origin of modern 
technology lies indeed in production or manufacturing? 
This would perhaps be the case if Heidegger had not 
retrieved from the Greek techne another determination that 
makes it totally impossible for us to situate the essence 
of technology in production, and that is techne as 
episteme. Techne would be another name for episteme, both 
words defining knowing in the widest sense. But to know 
for the Greeks does not mean to gather a certain amount of 
knowledge in what should ideally become a "universal 
knowing." Rather. to know means "to be entirely at home 
in something, to understand and be expert in it." 3 Hence 
techne is not only a way of producing, of making or 
manipulating something. It is also and above all a way of 
opening up a space--whether for an understanding of 
something, the making of a Zuhandene or the creating of an 
artwork. As an opening up, techne is essentially a 
revealing and hence a mode of truth as aletheia. 
Thus if technology is essentially techne, then it 
too is a mode of aletheuein, of revealing. But technology 
does not reveal beings the way Greek poiesis did. The 
bringing-forth of technology is of a different kind: 
3 Ibid., p. 294. 
4 
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology 
has the character of a setting-upon [StellenJ. in the 
sense of a challenging-forth [HerausfordernJ. Such 
challenging happens in that the energy concealed in 
nature is unlocked. what is unlocked is transformed, 
what is transformed is stored up. what is stored up 
is. in turn. distributed. and what is distributed is 
switched about ever anew. Unlocking. transforming, 
storing. distributing, and switching about are ways of 
revealing. 4 
But for this setting-upon to take place a specific 
kind of unconcealment is required: beings have to appear 
as that which can be unlocked. transformed. stored up, 
etc. In other words. beings have to stand as that which 
can constantly be called upon. Heidegger calls such a 
standing Bestand. "standing-reserve". This word 
designates "nothing less than the way in which everything 
presences that is wrought upon by the revealing that 
challenges."~ And Heidegger draws an immediate and 
decisive consequence: "Whatever stands by in the sense of 
standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as 
object." What is decisive in technology is that the 
subject/object opposition is overcome. Specifically, the 
opposition is drawn to its most extreme possibilities. 
Beings no longer stand before us, are no longer ob-jects 
or Gegen-stande. Rather. they appear as raw material. as 
standing-reserve, i.e., as that which can be called upon 
Ibid., p. 297-98. 
Ibid .. 298. 
5 
or used at any time and without reserve. Man himself is 
no longer a subject facing a world envisaged as object--he 
has become the great exploiter of nature. 
But, says Heidegger, "man does not have control 
over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the 
real shows itself or withdraws." 6 Does this mean that man 
too belongs within the standing-reserve? If man, in 
exploiting the energies of nature. merely responds to the 
demand of a kind of Unverboqenheit, then he too must 
belong to the standing-reserve. But this belonging to. or 
rather within the standing-reserve does not make of man a 
Bestand. For man is the being who orders nature, even 
though the unconcealment, within which the ordering 
essentially unfolds, is not the work of man. In ordering 
and exploiting nature man merely responds to the call of 
unconcealment: 
When man, investigating, observing. pursues nature as 
an area of his own conceiving, he has already been 
claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to 
approach nature as an object of research, until even 
the object disappears into the objectlessness of 
standing-reserve. 7 
This way of Unverbogenheit which compel ls man to order the 
self-revealing as standing-reserve Heidegger calls Ge-
ste 11. 
6 Ibid. , 299. 
? Ibid. , 300. 
6 
Physis, nature. designated in Ancient Greece the 
whole of being. As such, it included the physical world 
as well as human activities, whether practical or 
epistemic. Among these activities. the bios politikos 
held a major part. Now, if the political life is as 
essential today as it was in Ancient Greece, and if the 
Ge-stell does indeed govern the whole of beings, then 
politics too must be ruled by technology. Ge-stell 
governs "objectified nature, culture maintained in motion, 
ruled politics" (my italics) . 8 To think the question 
concerning politics today would amount to thinking the way 
in which politics is ruled by technology. And just as 
Heidegger inquires into the question of the essence of 
technology, so, in wanting to raise the question 
concerning politics, we would have to inquire into the 
question of the essence of politics. Such an essence can 
be named the political: in moving from the plural 
substantive (politics) to the nominalized adjective (the 
political) one points to the essence of politics, i.e., to 
something that would allow "politics" and yet would differ 
from it. The very displacement from a problematic of 
"politics"--which inevitably leads to a kind of 
"politology" or "political philosophy"--to a problematic 
of the political indicates a distance separating the 
8
• "Ueberwindung der Metaphysik," in Vortraqe und 
Aufsatze. 
7 
conditions of possibility for a Heideggerian understanding 
of the polis or the "community" from the traditional 
attempts to ground the polis in either reason, freedom, 
the will. etc. However valuable and useful such attempts 
may be. they do not concern the essence of politics. A 
Heideggerian approach to the political is inevitably 
linked to a deconstructionist approach to the politics of 
the subject, and to think the political according to its 
essence forces us into a thinking where the traditional 
notions of "freedom", "reason", "spirit", "subject" are no 
longer operative. 
Hence to pose the question concerning politics in 
terms of essence perhaps forces one into admitting that. 
in the same way the essence of technology is nothing 
technological, so the essence of politics is nothing 
"political." The issue then becomes to know what the 
political consists in. Specifically, the issue is to know 
how the political can allow for politics. how the essence 
of politics can open the space for the political life, 
while itself remaining withdrawn from this very space--
how, in other words, the "presencing" of politics would 
always be linked to a certain "absencing": how the essence 
of politics is connected to the essence of truth as 
unconcealment. 
And in asking about the political today, one must 
also ask what it means for politics to be under the sway 
8 
of technology. How can technology and politics, Ge-stell 
and the political, be thought together? What is the 
political horizon of our time? One can say with Hannah 
Arendt that this horizon or this togetherness is 
totalitarianism. But one can go further and assert that 
totalitarianism is not only the political horizon of our 
time, but also the most general horizon of our time, 
insofar as the politics of our century has gathered--and 
keeps on gathering--the most extreme possibilities of 
technology. Or, to put it differently: if technology 
indeed marks the completion and the closure of 
metaphysics, politics has marked throughout this century 
the most extreme realization and completion of 
metaphysics. Everything happens as though metaphysics had 
been realized in and as politics. Such a realization 
Heidegger would have failed to acknowledge--even though. 
of course, such an acknowledgment would have been 
impossible without Heidegger's thinking--, thereby perhaps 
rendering his political engagement possible. Here, 
perhaps, lies Heidegger's fault. 
Hence politics today would perhaps most signify 
the end or the closure of metaphysics. Politics today 
would mark the closure of the political as such. So that 
one primarily needs to ask what this closure consists in, 
how it unfolds. One needs to think this closure, to ask 
Whether it does not constitute the very essence of 
9 
· but an essence that would remain withdrawn from politics, 
the "political game.'' allowing this game in the very 
movement of its retreat. In other words, it is a matter 
of asking whether. just as being is withdrawn and 
concealed in the understanding of the world as will to 
power, so likewise the essence of the political is 
withdrawn from politics, yet allows its very totalitarian 
presence. And if this retreat is what is proper 
(eiqentlich) to the political. if. in other words, the 
political consists in this movement of Ziehen and 
Entziehen, then one might want to conclude that what has 
withdrawn never actually occurred, never really happened--
was never an event. And yet, from its very sheltering 
(Verberqunq), this would never cease to occur and to 
happen to us. This would occur and reach us from its 
unattainable Ort. This owning, this Ereiqnis would be 
constituted in a movement of disowning, of Enteiqnis. The 
retreat of the political would never "happen" as retreat, 
and yet nothing--no policy. no politics, no history--could 
happen without it. So that a certain presence would be 
made possible only through a certain absence or absencing. 
The Zug of the Ent-zuq·would be the tension or the strife 
of such a movement. 
Truth as unconcealment would be at the very core 
of the problem. The political itself would be a mode of 
Ynverbogenheit. Like the Ge-stell, which is both a Her-
10 
.§._tellen and a Dar-stellen, a producing and a presenting. 
the political would be a poiesis. a way of revealing. And 
the way in which beings are revealed today in politics can 
be called "totalitarianism." even though in the present 
context this word does not serve exclusively to designate 
the so-called politically "totalitarian" regimes. The 
very possibility of modern politics, i.e., of 
"totalitarianism" in a Heideggerian sense (and that is in 
a metaphysically determined sense), is based on the 
understanding of nature. including man, as Bestand. In 
the word "totalitarianism," then, one would need to 
understand, of course, the politically determined regimes-
-the emblematic figures of which are Nazism and Stalinism. 
Hence in speaking of the general horizon of our time as 
being stamped by these two "events." we wish to insist on 
the demand that the question of the political life, of the 
"being-in-common," of the community, be raised anew. In 
light of these events, one needs to ask: what does it mean 
to live in common after Auschwitz or the Gulag? What does 
it mean for men to live together after these events? But 
our understanding of totalitarianism is also an attempt to 
point beyond these human practices to something that 
exceeds human activity and that yet renders it possible as 
the ''political" activity which it is. In other words, 
totalitarianism is to be thought as a mode of revealing in 
~hich man is considered as Bestand. So that 
11 
"totalitarianism'.' would also designate the way in which 
is being ruled today. even in political regimes politics 
that are not "totalitarian." 
From a metaphysical perspective. then, there would 
be a certain belonging-together of the so-called 
totalitarian regimes and the so-called democracies. 
First, in the sense that very often democracies define 
themselves in mere opposition to totalitarian regimes. as 
though the two belonged together in their very opposition, 
as though democracy were the Other of totalitarianism. 
But most of all in the sense that the two belong together 
in a ground that Heidegger calls Bestand. One can indeed 
wonder whether our democracies are not submitted to forms 
of totalitarianism that would be more subtle, less evident 
and less painful. less directly and evidently violent. 
surely less murderous. One would then need to undertsand 
the notion of totalitarianism not so much in terms of the 
exercise of political power. but in terms of our everyday 
being-in-common, ruled by a technology that would define 
the community in terms of what Lyotard calls a "totality 
in search of its most performative unity." 9 Such a 
totality is one within which man would no longer appear as 
the being standing into the open, relating himself to 
Being, but as Bestand, i.e., as a performing unity (as 
9 J. F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne (Paris: 
Minuit, 1979), p. 102-103. 
12 
gpima.1 laborans). as a reality which can be altered. 
destroyed or even created (in genetic manipulations for 
instance). And this may be what Heidegger points to when 
he writes: 
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man 
even as object, but exclusively as standing-reserve, 
and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but 
the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to 
the very brink of a precipitous fall, that is, he 
comes to the point where he himself will have to be 
taken as standing-reserve (my italics). 10 
Heidegger is right in saying that the Ge-stell is "the 
supreme danger." Even more so, perhaps, than what he 
actually thought. For in reading these lines, how can one 
not think primarily of the way in which man has been--and 
still is--enclosed. ordered. enframed, in structures 
(camps, prisons, ghettos, etc.) which always signify the 
impossibility of man's existence? How can one not think 
of the way in which man, in those structures, is only 
considered as standing-reserve, whether as labor force, 
guinea-pig or raw material? It is only insofar as man 
reaches the point where he considers himself in the same 
way he has come to consider a river or a field, i.e., as 
standing-reserve, that inventing something like a gas 
chamber becomes possible. To envisage man as Bestand is 
already to prepare the way to the possibility of his own 
death or of the loss of his essence. Politics today. 
10 
"The Question Concerning Technology," p. 308. 
13 
it is grounded on an implicit understanding of insofar as 
a s Bestand and of man as animal laborans, defines beings 
l·n terms of a working totality, in terms of itself 
performativity and of market value: it has been completed 
in the social-technological. 
But where danger is, grows 
The saving power also ... 
What Heidegger says about these lines by Holderlin 
is most appropriate for the political. "To ~. says 
Heidegger, is to fetch something home into its essence, in 
order to bring the essence for the first time into its 
genuine appearing."11 And thus, in the same way "the 
essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of 
the saving power," so the essence of politics, insofar as 
it harbors the supreme danger, must also harbor in itself 
the growth of the saving power. From a Heideggerian 
perspective, therefore, "to save" politics would be to 
retrieve its essence and to bring this essence into its 
genuine appearing. 
Hence this text will be primarily concerned with a 
move into the essence. Specifically, it will be a matter 
of tracing out, patiently and carefully, the path through 
Which Heidegger's thinking is engaged. Such path will 
eventually lead us into an understanding of the essence of 
11 Ibid. 
14 
politics as techne. and specifically as poetry in the 
sense of Dichtung. Paradoxically, perhaps, the question 
of the political will inevitably lead us into a reading of 
Holderlin. At this point. it will also be a matter of 
radically calling into question Heidegger's enterprise, 
i.e., both the move to the so-called "essence" as such and 
the determination of the essence as poetry or myth. 
Specifically. it will be a matter of calling into question 
the very possibility of a univocal and poetic essence of 
the political, and of asking whether politics does not 
resist the move to the essence. whether politics can exist 
outside the plurality of words and deeds in which and as 
which it unfolds. 
These few introductory remarks should suffice to 
show what constitutes the specificity of the work one is 
about to be engaged in. and to what extent such work 
differs from the plurality of "texts" (books. essays, 
articles. interviews) so far devoted to the question of 
politics in Heidegger. Generally speaking. there are 
almost no commentaries that consider the possibility of a 
political thinking in Heidegger seriously. Specifically, 
these commentaries are more engaged in an external 
critique of Heidegger's involvement in nazism (Heidegger's 
"politics") than in an internal thinking of how the 
question of the political would need to be phrased from a 
15 
Heideggerian perspective. Even though we believe that 
readings engaged in tracing out some of Heidegger's 
ideological reflexes can be illuminating and even 
necessary, even though Heidegger's politics can in no way 
be separated from his thinking in general, and 
specifically from his political thinking, we do not think 
that such readings will ever get to the heart of 
Heidegger's thinking and political engagement. Indeed. 
such readings remain decisively withdrawn and hence closed 
off from the inner logic of Heidegger's thought. Thus, 
even though, in the end, the pages that are to come will 
be very critical and questioning with regard to 
Heidegger's political thinking, they will nonetheless 
differ from the objections and the criticisms formulated 
by so many thinkers, whether of marxist inspiration--
Adorno, 12 Lukacs, 13 Marcuse14 or Bourdieu1 e--or of any 
12
• Adorno, Theodor W, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, Zur 
deutschen Ideoloqie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964); 
"Martin Heidegger und die Politik," in Merkur (Stuttgart, 
Heft 10, n° 235, 1921). 
13 Lukacs, G., Die Zerstorunq der Vernunft, Berlin. 
1955. 
14 Marcuse, Herbert, "Beitrage zur eine 
Phanomenologie des historischen Materialismus," in 
Phil osophische Heft, I (1928) , 45-68: "Heidegger's 
Politics: An Interview," in The Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal, n° 6 (Winter, 1977), 28-40. 
1 e. Bourdieu, Pierre, "L'ontologie politique de 
Martin Heidegger," in Actes de la recherche en sciences 
sociales, V-VI (1975). p. 109-156. 
16 
other philosophical inspiration--Lowith. 16 Poggeler,1 7 
Schwan. 18 In spite of their different orientations and 
purposes, none of these texts are actually involved in 
tracing out what we have come to call the question of the 
essence (in a Heideggerian sense) of politics. 
However, there are a few exceptions to this general rule. 
the most remarkable of which is Lacoue-Labarthe, whose 
work we shall very often refer to and whose analyses will 
be of the greatest help. More recently, Derrida's De 
l'esprit19 also deals with the inner paths and textual 
itineraries of Heidegger's thought. As such. this text 
can also be very illuminating. 
16 Lowith. Karl. "The Political Implications of 
Heidegger's Existentialism," Wollin ed. NGC, 117-134; 
Heidegger: Denker in dlirftiger Zeit (Gottingen: Vandenhock 
& Ruprecht. 1960). 
17
• Poggeler Otto, Philosophie und Politik bei 
Heidegger (Freiburg-Mlinchen: Alber Verlag. 1972). 
18
. Schwan A .. Die Politische Philosophie im Denken 
Heideqgers CKoln: Ordo Politicus, 1965). 
19
. J. Derrida. De l'esprit (Paris: Galilee, 1987). 
17 
CHAPTER ONE 
Into the essence 
The way into the essence is long and obscure. 
Almost like a descent into Hades. It is not explicitly 
inscribed in the Heideggerian text. Hence it needs to be 
traced out in what could be considered a winding textual 
itinerary. Or perhaps even more as a whirling, as a 
cirling of circles where each determination of essence 
would re-unfold in a new determination. 
(A) 
The reasons for Heidegger's political engagement 
are usually found in what is considered his most 
political--i.e., politicized--text, viz. "The Rectoral 
Address." 1 The Address, then, might best express 
Heidegger's political "ideas," if not "philosophy". After 
the rectorate period, and that is also after the 
1 "The Self-Assertion of the German University: 
Address, Delivered on the Solemn Assumption of the 
Rectorate of the University Freiburg." English 
translation by Karsten Harries in Review of Metaphysics 38 
(March 1985): 470-480. Henceforth RR. 
18 
frightening proclamations of 1933-34 2 • Heidegger might 
have withdrawn from the political life and devoted himself 
exclusively to teaching. Yet on the contrary the years 
following the rectorate were for Heidegger a long 
Auseinandersetzunq with National-Socialism, so much so 
that his withdrawal from all kinds of political activities 
were at the same time a radical (re)engagement into the 
question of the political. 3 Thus the most explicitly 
political text ("The Rectoral Address") is perhaps not the 
most decisive one in terms of Heidegger's political 
thinking. The Address is perhaps not political at all, 
even though it is the actual locus of a truly political 
compromise and of the support of a very specific politics. 
For if--as Heidegger will insist after 1934--the political 
is tied to the Greek notion of polis, the polis. in turn, 
has nothing to do with the political, or rather with 
politics. This does not mean that there is a radical 
change in thematics and vocabulary between the 1933 text 
and the texts following. On the contrary. What is said 
in the Rectoral Adress is maintained for the most part. 
2 Specifically the proclamation "To the memory of 
Albert Leo Schlageter" (May 26, 1933), the call to "The 
working service" (June 20, 1933), and the "Call to the 
plebisci t of November 12, 1933''. 
3
• The credit for this insight should go to Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe, whose writings inspired the comments that 
follow. See La Fiction du politigue (Paris: Christian 
Bourgois Editeur, 1987) and specifically "La Transcendence 
finit dans la politique," in L' Imitation des modernes 
(Paris: Galilee, 1986). 
19 
The major themes and notions at work in the Address 
reappear in the later texts. And yet. there are a few 
slight but decisive changes, a few shifts in intonation 
and tone that constitute a decisive move away from what 
Heidegger himself would perhaps call the "fundamental 
tone" of the Address. In other words, there is a move 
away from the climate or the atmosphere of the Address, 
even though the concern for the same problematics remains 
operative. 
What is this general climate? What are these main 
problematics? The climate is born out of the historical 
and political situation of Germany and by Heidegger's own 
philosophical situation. The time is a time of Not, of 
distress. Of a twofold distress. First, the distress 
points to the total collapse of· what was once lived as the 
dream of a world hegemony: since the end of the First 
World War. not only was Germany weakened and to an extent 
humiliated politically, but it was also undergoing what 
was perhaps the worst and most extended crisis the West 
had yet undergone. The collapse was not only political, 
i.e., social and institutional. but also spiritual. 
Second,--and the two dimensions of the distress are of 
course related--Germany was undergoing its first serious 
crisis of the advanced industrial economy, i.e., of what 
Marx would call the Capital and of what Heidegger would 
call the world of technology. 
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This general collapse actually meant the non-
existence of Germany and radically put into question the 
very possibility of the existence of a German people--a 
possibility that was perhaps the major stake of German 
thought and art in general throughout the Nineteenth 
century. But it could also have meant--and this. of 
course. was Heidegger's view--that the German people d1d 
not yet correspond to their proper and for some reason 
concealed essence. Since the German people is the 
"philosophical people" par excellence, 4 --that is. the 
people whose essence lies in philosophy or in science~--it 
must answer to its essence. At this point. perhaps. 
Heidegger's thinking meets the actuality of his time: 
Heidegger actually becomes politically involved in the 
distress of his time. Heidegger engages himself in 
politics. for he sees in the outburst of National-
Socialism the unique possibility and the desire to bring 
the German people before their essence. 
4 Such a statement will always--from the early 30's 
to the Spiegel interview--remain at the level of 
assertion. It will never be questioned nor toned down. 
In the name of what. from what privileged standpoint can 
such a claim be made? And what is the point of making it? 
There is perhaps in Heidegger's naive and simplistic 
statement an ideological overdetermination which, from the 
very beginning. both enabled him to join a movement which 
itself asserted a certain German superiority and prevented 
him from thinking about the dangers of such an assertion. 
l5. We recall that in the speculative vocabulary, 
philosophy in its completion is science (Wissenschaft) and 
knowing (Wissen). 
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Heidegger's contribution to the ongoing movement 
is the contribution of science. His voice. like the 
unified and homogeneous voice of Germany, is led and 
sustained by science. It is the voice of the essence and 
the voice that wills the essence. Science must be the 
true Ftihrer of Germany. Science must guide and enlighten 
the will of the people as well as the decisions of the 
politicians. Heidegger writes. as the most insistent and 
persistent message of the "Address": " ... science must 
become the fundamental happening of our spiritual-popular 
existence [unseres geistiq-volklichen DaseinsJ ." 6 Even 
though the forces of "earth and blood"--which duplicate 
the famous ideologem of Blut und Boden--are mentioned. 
even though. then. an open support of the Nazi ideology is 
inscribed in the text. the people are nonetheless 
determined as historical-spiritual and their essence is 
defined in terms of science or knowing. 
Hence the decisive question. viz. the political 
question. i.e .• the question through which the people as a 
whole are brought before their essence. is to know what 
the true ruling principle is. Who for what) leads whom 
and toward what. i.e .• in the name of what. is the issue. 
What and where is the hegemony. from where does the 
hegemony take its power. such is the question. Heidegger 
is quite clear: 
6 RR. 474. 
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The assumption of the rectorate is the commitment to 
the spiritual leadership (Ftihrunq] of this institution 
of higher learning [hohe Schule]. The following of 
teachers and students awakens and grows strong only 
from a true and joint rootedness in the essence of the 
German university. This essence. however, gains 
clarity, rank. and power only when first of all and at 
all times the leaders are themselves led--led by that 
unyielding spiritual mission that forces the fate of 
the German people to bear the stamp of its history. 7 
In other words, the Flihrung of the university is itself 
led by a higher principle. the FUhrunq of the FUhrung. 
viz. the spiritual mission. Heidegger himself, then, the 
leader of the university, is such only insofar as he 
accepts--and resolutely wills--to be led by the spiritual 
mission of the people. The Flihrer himself, Adolf Hitler, 
would be a true leader only insofar as he woulq most be 
led by the spiritual mission of the German people. From 
the very outset, then, a certain subordination of the 
political order is asserted. The political itself must be 
submitted to the essence of the German people, viz. the 
spiritual mission. But where is such a mission realized 
if not in the university, to the extent that the 
university is rooted in science? What the "Address" first 
asserts, then,--and it literally does so in the title--is 
the self-assertion--and that is also the auto-nomy--of the 
German university, along with its guiding or leading role 
in the political sphere. Self-, here, means independent 
? RR, 470. 
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of any political directives and according to the essence 
of science. Thereby one sees that the part of illusion in 
Heidegger's address is not to be neglected, for the 
university was never considered by the Nazis as as an 
autonomous and politically leading power. Rather, the 
university (like all the other "cultural" and "spiritual" 
institutions of the State) was to be "politicized." 
But what is the spiritual mission Heidegger speaJrn 
of? Heidegger himself formulates the question: "Do we 
know about this spiritual mission?" 6 This question, 
perhaps, is the guiding question of the Address and 
constitutes the major thread into the question of the 
political. The answer is: 
The self-assertion of the German university is the 
primordial, shared will to its essence. We 
understand the German university as the "high" school 
that. grounded in science, by means of science 
educates and disciplines the leaders and guardians of 
the fate of the German people. The will to the 
essence of the German university is the will to 
science as will to the historical mission of the 
German people as a people that knows itself in its 
state. Together, science and German fate must come to 
power in this will to essence. 9 
A few remarks about the "tone" of the passage 
first need to be made. The general tone or climate of 
this passage--and of the address as a whole--is clearly 
Nietzschean. "Will", "power", but also "decision" or 
e Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 471. 
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"battle" (Kampf) are words that appear throughout 
Heidegger's discourse and around which the truly political 
engagement circles. As we all know, the Nietzschean 
vocabulary inspired--or rather, was put to work by--the 
Nazi ideology. Even though these words did not harbour 
the same meaning for Heidegger as for the Nazis, the fact 
remains that the very use of such a vocabulary in the 
politically overdetermined situation signified both a 
support of the ideology at work and an indelible 
compromising of its major theses. It is not a mere 
accident, then, if Heidegger, soon after the rectorate 
period, will abandon the Nietzschean climate within which 
his philosophy was still caught, and engage himself in 
what he came to call his Auseinandersetzung with 
Nietzsche's thought. Nor is it an accident if the move 
away from Nietzsche also corresponded to an increasing 
dialogue with the "thinking poetry" of Holderlin. the 
major stake of which. as will later be shown, was 
political. 
But the question of the present moment is to know 
what the "spiritual mission" of the people consists in. 
Heidegger's answer is quite straightforward: The mission 
of the German people is science. That by which the German 
people is determined in its essence, that by which it 
becomes truly historical is science. The Auftraq of the 
German people, i.e., that by which it is guided or led, 
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conunanded and destined is science. Wissenschaf.t, then, is 
that without which there can be no German people as such, 
no history and no politics. It is the very condition of 
possibility of the existence of Germany as Volk. Its 
essence. To be essentially what it is. the German people 
must will, must be devoted to and strive for nothing but 
science: " ... science must become the fundamental happening 
of our spiritual existence as a people." 10 
But what is science? What about the "essence" of 
science? Once again, Heidegger's answer is 
straightforward: science is 11 knowing 11 or "philosophy": 
"All science is philosophy. whether it knows it and wills 
it--or not." 11 But such is the case only insofar as that 
which determines all sciences in their essence is the 
"beginning" of the West, and that is the "setting out" or 
the "breaking open" (Aufbruch) of Greek philosophy. 
Philosophy, science, is itself defined a few pages later 
as "the questioning holding of one's ground in the midst 
of the ever self-concealing of what is."12 In the setting 
out of Greek philosophy, "for the first time, western man 
. 
raises himself up from a popular base and. by virtue of 
his language, stands up to the totality of what is. which 
l.O Ibid.' 474. 
i 1 Ibid., 472. 
12 Ibid., 474. 
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he questions and conceives as the being that it is."i 3 
Science. in other words, is nothing but the 
radicalization of the existence of man in the world. It 
is nothing but the radicalization of what Being and Time 
calls the "ek-sistence" or the "transcendence" of Dasein. 
What the Rectoral Address does, then, is a mere re-
assertion of one of Being and Time's fundamental theses. 
The Address is perfectly consistent with Heidegger's other 
texts--both with the preceding and the following ones14 : 
in it, it is nothing but a matter of philosophy, of its 
role and its essence. But for the slightest twist, the 
Address could be considered as operating at the level of 
all the other "purely" philosophical texts. This twist 
lies in the fact that, unlike what is said in Sein und 
Zeit, the Dasein Heidegger speaks of here is related to a 
specific people, a people which, moreover. is 
1 3 Ibid., 471-72. 
14 In "What is Metaphysics?". for example, Heidegger 
writes: "Man--one being among others--"pursues science". 
In this "pursuit" nothing less transpires than the 
irruption [Einbruch. this time, and not Aufbruch] by one 
being called "man" into the whole of beings, indeed in 
such a way that in and through this irruption beings break 
open and show what they are and how they are." (Basic 
Writings, 96) 
In "On the Essence of Truth", Heidegger writes: "Ek-
sistence is ... exposure to the diclosedness of beings as 
such ... The ek-sistence of historical man begins at that 
moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stand 
with regard to the unconcealment of beings by asking: what 
are beings? ... The primordial disclosure of being as a 
whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the 
beginning of western history are the same ... (Ibid .• 128-
29) 
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~taphysicallY privileged over other people. The German 
people is the "metaphysical people" par excellence. But 
to say this is tantamount to saying, according to the 
essence of science that has been unfolded so far, that the 
German people is more radically ek-sistent than others, 
that it stands more radically before the totality of what 
· This displacement--or perhaps only this placing--of lS. 
fundamental ontology into the political is a decisive move 
that perhaps undermines and disrupts the very notion of 
fundamental ontology. For how can a Dasein ek-sist more 
radically on the basis of a common relation to beings and 
in the sharing of a specific language, and no longer on 
the basis of the elements that defined "resoluteness" in 
Being and Time? Is Heidegger's unquestioned Germano-logo-
centrism that which primarily enabled his political 
engagement--or at least that whiGh could not stop it? 
The move from Being and Time to the Rectoral 
Address is not the move from a Dasein thought outside an 
historical and political framework to the historicizing 
and the politicizing of Dasein. The sections on 
"Temporality and Historicality" in Being and Time clearly 
thematize the historico-political dimension of Dasein and 
the possiblity of an authentic Being-with-one-another: 
... if fateful Dasein [Dasein is fateful insofar as it 
is free for its own death, i.e., insofar as it 
comports itself resolutely to its owrunost 
possibility], as Being-in-the-world, exists 
essentially in Being-with-Others, its historizing is a 
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co-historizing [ein Mitgeschehenl and is 
determinative for it as destiny [GeschickJ. This is 
how we designate the historizing of the community, of 
a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself 
together out of individual fates, any more than Being-
with-one-another can be conceived as the occuring 
together of several subjects. 
But the question, then, is to know how the destiny. the 
community or the people is constituted. The passage 
continues: 
our fates have already been guided in advance, in our 
Being with one another in the same world and in our 
resoluteness for definite possiblities. Only in 
communication [i.e. in language] and in struggling 
[i.e. in the struggle in the midst of beings] does the 
power of destiny become free. 1 ~ 
The key word here is "world", for the world is the space 
of the struggle in the midst of beings and the space 
within which apeople comes to be through language. The 
world is the space of science or philosophy. So that the 
emergence of the political--the emergence of a destiny and 
a community or a people--is rooted in Dasein's 
fundamental attitude in front of beings, viz. science. In 
Being and Time already. then. the independence or the 
primacy of the metaphysical over the political was 
asserted. 
But there was no primacy or privileging of Germany 
as a people. There were no allusions, such as there will 
be in Introduction to Metaphysics, to the German people as 
the "metaphysical people" or to Germany as the "center" or 
sz 384. 
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the "heart" of the West. 
Where, then, does the Germano-logo-centrism come 
from? Why, in other words, does the spiritual mission--
the will for science--fall upon the German people? Why, 
after the Greeks, do the Germans have to take up and 
represent the destiny of the West? Where does the 
privilege come from? There is, perhaps, not much that can 
be said about it. For nowhere can an explanation be found 
in Heidegger's texts. The question is perhaps an 
impossible one, primarily because it seems that the 
privilege of the German people--and that is primarily of 
the German language--was itself never an issue for 
Heidegger. The problem of the move from a philosophical 
or metaphysical privilege to the dedication to a certain 
politics was never an issue. But could it have been an 
issue? Is it not the very characteristic of the 
metaphysical to be overdetermined by the political? But 
then: do metaphysics and politics belong together, in a 
way that Heidegger would have not sufficiently 
acknowledged--viz. essentially? And yet, at the same 
time, who besides Heidegger would have pointed more 
adamantly to this belonging-together? And was not 
Heidegger unable to think--and that is to put into 
question--his political engagement precisely because of 
his own metaphysical convictions, preferences, 
commitments--presuppositions? Precisely because of his 
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subordination of the political to the philosophical? And 
then. would Heidegger's "case" be exemplary in that it 
would show how the political is always dominant, most of 
all. perhaps. when it is ignored or merely submitted to 
another order--the philosophical order? 
So. once again. one is faced with the question of 
philosophy, of science and knowing. With the question of 
the "spiritual mission" which the Germans would need to 
take up to become a true people, an authentic community. 
What is the essence of knowing? To inquire into the 
essence of knowing is, according to Heidegger, to inquire 
into the original and hence decisive experience of 
knowing, and that is the Greek experience. Heidegger 
writes, in what is perhaps the central passage of the 
whole address: 
Here we want to regain for Q1!!: being [Daseinl two 
distinguishing properties of the original Greek 
essence of science. 
Among the Greeks an old story went around that 
Prometheus had been the first philosopher. Aeschylus 
has this Prometheus utter a saying that expresses the 
essence of knowing. 
techne d'anankes asthenestera makro (Prom. 514, 
ed. Wi 1.) 
"Knowing. however, is far weaker than necessity." 
This is to say: all knowing about things has always 
already been delivered up to overpowering fate and 
fails before it. 
Just because of this, knowing must develop its 
highest defiance; called forth by such defiance, all 
the power of the hiddenness of what is must first 
arise for knowing really to fail. Just in this way, 
what is opens itself in its unfathomable 
~nalterability and lends knowing its truth. 
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Encountering this Greek saying about the creative 
impotence of knowing, one likes to find here all too 
readily the prototype of a knowing based purely on 
itself, while in fact such knowing has forgotten its 
own essence, this knowing is interpreted for us as the 
"theoretical" attitude--but what do the Greeks mean by 
theoria? One says: pure contemplation; which remains 
bound only to the thing in question and to all it is 
and demands. This contemplative behavior--and here 
one appeals to the Greeks--is said to be pursued for 
its own sake. But this appeal is mistaken. For one 
thing, "theory" is not pursued for its own sake, but 
only in the passion to remain close to and hard 
pressed by what is as such. But, for another, the 
Greeks struggled precisely to conceive and to enact 
this contemplative questioning as one, indeed as the 
highest mode of energeia, of man's "being-at-work." 
They were not concerned to assimilate practice to 
theory; quite the reverse: theory was to be understood 
as itself the highest realization [Verwirklichunq] of 
genuine practice. For the Greeks science is not a 
"cultural good," but the innermost determining center 
of all that binds human being to people and state. 16 
By quoting the passage in its entirety one is able to show 
how the Lraditionally distinguished--if not merely 
opposed--notions of techne, praxis and theoria are thought 
together in Heidegger's text, in such a way that the 
political itself gets essentially defined through these 
notions. 
The first crucial thing to note with regard to the 
passage is that "Science" or "knowing"--and that is 
"philosophy"--means techne. To define techne as knowing--
and that is essentially as philosohy as a standing firmly 
in the midst of beings--is to take this notion away from 
its purely "technical" determinations. In techne, it is 
:1.6 RR, 472-73. 
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not a matter of actualizing skills with a view to the 
making of an artifact. It is rather a matter of theoria, 
which is itself defined as "the passion to remain close to 
and hard pressed by what is as such." Theoria too is 
taken away from its usual abstract and merely 
contemplative determinations. For man theoria is a mode 
of energeia, of being-at-work: in theoria something is 
actually realized or "put into work" (the word Heidegger 
uses is Verwirklichung). Praxis itself--the political 
notion par excellence--is being put into work in theoria. 
so that the political itself--the existence of a people 
and a state or a polis--is through and through 
"technical." Knowing or techne--i.e. the combat against 
the power of Being, the combat through which a relation to 
what is in general and a disclosedness of beings, as well 
as the opening up of possibilities for a historical Dasein 
are rendered possible--is itself praxical: it is the very 
condition of possibility or the essence of the political 
as such. To put it abruptly and in terms that are not 
specifically Heideggerian: the philosophical--or the 
metaphysical: Dasein's being-in-the-world--and the 
political are contemporaneous or co-originary. 
( B) 
At this point the reading of the Rectoral Address 
must be interrupted. But the investigation into the 
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intimate--and in a way abysmal--relation between techne 
and the political is only beginning. Indeed, one is now 
about to be engaged into another circle. 
one may recall the general or traditional thesis 
concerning Heidegger's engagement in National-Socialism, 
as well as his rupture. After he resigned from the 
Rectorate, Heidegger might have withdrawn from political 
life: since he had come to politics through the 
university, it would have been natural that he also leave 
politics when he was no longer at the head of the 
university. Having left the front of the political stage, 
he might have devoted himself entirely to problems of 
"pure" philosophy. 
But then what are we to think of the declaration 
he made to the two journalists from the Spiegel who were 
questioning him about his politics? The statement reads: 
After I resigned from the Rectorate, I limited myself 
to my task as a professor. In the summer semester of 
1934, I held a lecture course on "logic." The 
following semester. 1934-35, I held my first lecture 
course on Holderlin [on the hymns "Germanien" and "der 
Rhein"}. In 1936 began the courses on Nietzsche. All 
those who could hear heard that what was at issue was 
a confrontation [Auseinandersetzungl with national-
social ism. 
During this period, Heidegger also delivered his course 
Introduction to Metaphysics (1935)(the culminating point 
of which is a discussion of the famous chorus from 
Sophocles' Antigone), the different versions of The Origin 
34 
t he work of Art (1936), as well as the other Holderlin of 
-
"der Ister" and "Andenken." iectures on 
Following these historical remarks, two set of 
questions need to be raised: 
1 . Is Heidegger's statement concerning his 
Auseinandersetzung with national-socialism to be taken 
seriously? In other words. do the texts and lectures 
following 1934 engage a debate--indeed a philosohical one-
-with national-socialism, and thus necessarily with the 
question of the political? 
2. If so, how can this be related to the fact that all the 
lecture courses. from 1934 to the end of the war. focus on 
the question of art, and specifically on the question of 
poetry or Dichtunq--whether in Sophocles or in Holderlin? 
How, in other words, did the question of the political 
come to be formulated in connection with the question of 
art and poetry? How did the question of the poetic become 
the central question of--and here one must hear the double 
genetive--the political? 
If the question concerning art were a question of 
aesthetics, as it has been in the whole history of 
philosophy; if, in other words. the question of art were a 
question concerning the "beautiful" and the imitation or 
mimesis of the beautiful--then surely it would have very 
little to do with the question of the political as it has 
been formulated so far. This does not mean that it would 
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have nothing to do with the question of the political as 
such. on the contrary. It would perhaps have very much 
to do with Nazism and with the way this movement, through 
the mouth of Hitler or Goebbels, considered politics as 
the highest form of art: as the true artwork. 17 But 
Heidegger's thinking about art is precisely engaged in an 
attempt to free art from aesthetics. In art. the 
beautiful is not primarily what is at issue. The 
discourse about art is not primarily a discourse about the 
beautiful. At least if the beautiful is a matter of 
judgment, specifically of judgment of taste. 
But what is art? And how can we talk about art? 
Art, in its essence, is techne. Techne does not mean--at 
least not primarily--"art". It does not designate any 
kind of making, whether poietic (craft) or artistic. 
Rather, techne--as shown in the Rectoral Address--means 
knowing. This determination will remain throughout 
Heidegger's publishing career. In "The Question 
Concerning Technology" (1954), for example, Heidegger 
writes: 
From earliest times until Plato the word techne is 
linked with the word episteme. Both terms are words 
17 See, for example, the pages devoted to the 
question of art in Mein Kampf, or the letter Goebbels 
wrote Wilhelm Furtwangler and that was published in the 
newspaper Lokal-Anzeiqer on April 11, 1933: see also the 
article published in the Volkischer Beobachter (April, 24, 
1936) entitled "Art as the Ground for the Creative Power 
in Politics." 
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for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be 
entirely at home in something, to understand and be an 
expert in it.ie 
And closer to the Rectoral Address, in a politically 
decisive text, viz. in Introduction to Metaphysics, he 
writes: "Techne--which denotes neither art (Kunst) nor 
technology (Technik) but a 'knowing' ('Wissen')." 19 Or 
again, in the same text: "Techne means neither art nor 
skill, to say nothing of technique in the modern sense. 
we translate techne by 'knowing. '" 20 
But what is ''knowing"? What is "knowledge"? The 
first part of the Introduction provides a preliminary 
sketch: knowledge, says Heidegger in a somewhat enigmatic 
way, is that in which "the norms and hierarchies are set," 
that "in which and from which a people comprehends and 
fulfills its Dasein in the historical-spiritual world (in 
der qeschichtlich-qeistigen Welt)." 21 A little further: 
But to know means: to be able to stand in the truth. 
Truth is the manifestness of beings. To know is 
accordingly the ability to stand [stehen] in the 
manifestness of beings, to endure it [bestehen]. 
Merely to have information, however 
abundant. is not to know ... for to know means to be 
able to learn ... Ability to learn presu.pposes ability 
to question. To question is the willing-to-know 
:i.e Basic Writings, p. 294. 
19
• Einftihrunq in die Metaphysik (TUbingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 1987), p. 13. Henceforth EM. 
20 EM. 122. 
21 Ibid. • 8. 
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analyzed above: the resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit] 
to be able to stand in the openness of beings. 2 2 
If we now wish to gather the different 
determinations of knowing in order to delineate its 
essence. we can say that knowing is a mode of existing in-
-of standing out unto~-unconcealment in that it is 
precisely defined as the ability to stand in the open of 
what is manifested, and in such a way as to determine the 
historical-spiritual Dasein of a people. Once again, 
then, the very possibility of the political is being 
ordered to the emergence of knowing or philosophy, i.e., 
to the ability "to stand in the openness of beings." 
But how does such knowing essentially unfold? 
What does it mean. "to stand in the oppenness of beings"? 
In Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger decides to trace 
out this unfolding in the great Greek beginning, and 
specifically in the first chorus from Sophocles' Antigone. 
This (viz. the recourse to Greek poetry) is the crucial 
move. The Introduction initiates the political way into 
poetry. There is a decisive move, for from the 
Introduction onward, there will be a privilege--a 
political privilege--of the "artistic" and specifically of 
the poetic over the "forces of work" and the "forces of 
combat," also of "blood and earth"--the more directly 
"political" forces. Why such a move? Why such a 
22 Ibid., 16-17. 
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privilege? Again, the answer is a matter of essence. The 
move is a move toward the essence of knowing or techne; 
the privilege of the poetic is a privilege of essence. 
Beginning with the Introduction, the word techne will 
progressively and decisively be reoriented in the 
direction of art. 
Techne, then. also--and more and more--means 
"art". Why? First of all because, as a mode of 
aletheuein or unconcealing, it is necessarily a mode of 
poiein, which Heidegger translates as herstellen (pro-
ducing) or hervor-brinqen (bringing-forth). Second--and 
this point depends on the first one--because, as a mode of 
standing amid beings in the way of mastery or domination, 
techne is necessary to the poiesis or making· of the pieces 
of equipment and artifacts. But if making or producing is 
a mode of knowing, the highest mode of techne is, 
according to the Greeks, poetry, i.e., the pro-ducing or 
bringing-forth of something through language. 
In his reading of Sophocles' Antigone, Heidegger 
is concerned with tracing out the originary and essential 
meaning of knowing in the Greek world. Hence Heidegger is 
engaged in a historical (qeschichtlich) reading, i.e., a 
reading which itself can be decisive for the opening of 
our own future: "Only the most radical historical 
knowledge can make us aware of our extraordinary tasks and 
preserve us from a new wave of mere restoration and 
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uncreative imitation." 23 A "radical historical" knowl 
is a knowledge which reaches the very root of history as 
the origin that marks the essential unfolding of 
knowledge. Thus a radical knowledge is a knowledge 
situated in the "destinal" outburst marked by the great 
·Greek beginning. Only in standing in the originary 
destiny can there be a future for the German Dasein. It 
is in this sense that one needs to understand Heidegger's 
statement according to which only the radical historical 
knowing can "make us aware of our extraordinary tasks." 
This sentence constitutes perhaps the whole of Heidegger's 
truly political vision as well as his historical ambition 
for Germany as Volk. The destiny of the German Dasein can 
only be opened up from the Greek destiny understood as 
Geschick. On this particular point, then, there is no 
difference from the Rectoral Address. The difference lies 
perhaps in the fact that now (in 1935), in order to free 
11
.Q..ill: [i.e., "we" the German people] extraordinary tasks," 
Heidegger resorts to the analysis of Greek historical 
knowledge, i.e., of techn& and of its most unconcealing 
form: poiesis--poetry: 
... we shall now consult a thinking poetry [ein 
denkerisches Denken] of the Greeks and particularly 
that poetry in which the Being and (the corresponding) 
Dasein of the Greeks was in the truest sense created: 
23 EM 96. 
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the tragedy.24 
The tragedy Heidegger focuses on is Sophocles' 
Antigone. Specifically, Heidegger's analysis bears on the 
h 2!5 first c orus. The chorus, according to Heidegger, 
provides an answer to the question "who is man?" and not 
to the metaphysical question, viz. "what is man?" The 
question, then, is not metaphysical but historical--and 
that is always, for Heidegger, political. 
What does the chorus say? 
It starts off by evoking the deinon, which 
Heidegger translates by das Unheimliche, the uncanny. 
Polla ta deina becomes: vielfaltig das Unheimliche, 
manifold the uncanny, which can also be translated--but 
none of these substitutes are quite satiRfying--as the 
strange, the dis-quieting, the extra-ordinary, the dis-
orienting, the monstruous, etc. Heidegger then moves on 
to define the deinon as the terrible (das Furchtbare), in 
the sense--and here Heidegger plays with the semantic 
field of walten (to rule, to dominate, to be violent to)--
of "the overpowering power [das Uberwaltiqende Walten] 
which compels panic fear, true anxiety as well as the 
collected, silent awe that vibrates in itself."26 So 
24 EM, 112. 
2 !5 See Appendix for full quotation of Heidegger's 
translation of the chorus. 
2e. Ibid., 114-15. 
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d th - - i· - where the overpowering or the essent i a 1 that--an 15 ~ 
violence of power is contained--the Unheimliche is to be 
understood as "that which casts us out of the 'homely,• 
cg.a§. HeimischeJ the customary, familiar, secure." 27 
The Unheimliche thus defined (or re-defined), 
- this overpowering [Uberwaltigunq] or originary 1 . e. , 
violence [Gewalttatiqkeitl is nothing other than what 
"What is Metaphysics?" depicted as the incommensurability 
of Being or nothing. In relation to such uncanniness, man 
is determined as to deinotaton, das Unheimlicheres, the 
strangest or most uncanny. Such is "the basic trait of 
the human essence," and not some "particular attribute of 
man. as though he were also something else." 26 Such is 
man's basic trait, precisely insofar as the tragic saying 
about man does not speak of man but of Dasein. and that is 
in such a way as to encompass "the extreme limits and 
abrupt abysses of his being."29 
Now if man, in his essence--and the essence of 
man, in this context. is indeed the non-human or the human 
under erasure--is das Unheimlicheres, the reason is 
twofold. 
First of all,--and here the Introduction is in 
2 7 Ibid .. 115-116. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 114. 
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f t accordance with what is said about Dasein's per ec 
Scendence beyond beings in "What is Metaphysics?"--man tr an 
"departs from. flees from the limits which at first and 
for the most part are customary and familiar to him. 1130 
Hence man can be defined as "the violent one," i.e .. as 
the one who "surpasses" the limits of the familiar, and 
"indeed precisely in the direction of the uncanny in the 
sense of the overpowering." In other words, the violence 
of the strangest of all is perpetrated against the 
strangeness of Being and, as a result, originates a 
polemos, a Kampf--a struggle: "We shall fully appreciate 
this phenomenon of strangeness only if we experience the 
power of appearance and the struggle with it as an 
essential part of Dasein." 
Second, insofar as man is "the violent one," he 
perpetrates violence against the overpowering--i.e., 
against being or nothing--, he "gathers" it and "lets it 
into the open," into manifestness. into appearance. In 
other words. man is the being--indeed an extraordinary 
one--which lets being (nothing) be. Man is the being by 
which that which essentially withdraws and resists 
presentation is brought to the fore and presented. In and 
through man as Da-sein, Being is there. 
Consequently. insofar as man is defined as the un-
canny. insofar as the paths he opens up amid beings are 
30 Ibid., 116. 
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stamped by exile, are a-poria. it is not surprising that 
"the point at which all these paths meet," the "ground and 
place of man's Dasein"--in other words, what the Greeks 
called the polis and which tends to designate "the there. 
wherein and as which the Dasein is as historical" 31--is 
itself defined as a-polis. i.e .. as the place which would 
not provide man with the quietness or the way (poros) by 
which he would comfortably dwell in the midst of beings. 
The true polis is "the place of history, in which, out of 
which, and for which history happens [Geschichte 
qeschieht] ."32 Now that which happens according to the 
truly historical destiny is Being. And to free a place 
for Being, to give Being its 'there' implies to let man 
essentially unfold as das Unheimlicheres. 
What does this essential unfolding consist in? 
How does Being come to manifest itself in the uncanny? 
Such questions, i.e., such historical questions--and not 
historiographical, anthropological or ethnological 
questions--are answered in the chorus from Antigone. For 
in this tragedy it is a matter of "a poetic project of 
man's Being, drawn from its extreme possibilities and 
31 Ibid., 117. 
32 The question of the polis--and that is, of 
course, the question of the political--will become 
increasingly important in Heidegger's texts. Both in the 
Parmenides lecture course (WS 1942-43) and in the "der 
Ister" lecture course (SS 1942) Heidegger devotes extended 
analyses to the question. We shall return to this 
question further on. 
44 
limits." 33 And these are the possibilities and the limits 
evoked in the chorus, inasmuch as they constitute the 
world and the place of man as Dasein. 
What are those possibilities and limits? There is 
the overpowering power of the sea. violent and wild. with 
which man collides. There is the earth in its 
undestroyable ruling, which man transforms and shapes, 
thereby revealing his own violence. There are the living 
creatures which live in the sea and on the earth and which 
suffer the overpowering power of nature, whereas man 
"casts his snares and nets," "snatches the living 
creatures out of their order, shuts them up in his pens 
and enclosures." 3 4 
Hence the sea, the earth and the sky define the world 
within which man essentially unfolds as the deinotaton. 
Thus it is not a matter of describing "nature" as we 
usually understand it; nor is it a matter of tracing out 
the "evolution" of man in such nature. Rather, it is a 
matter of the world from which man essentially unfolds as 
what it is, viz. as Dasein. 
Likewise, when the chorus comes to characterize 
man, it is not a matter of enumerating the qualities and 
the faculties of this being, but of grasping it in its 
most extreme possibilities. It is not by accident, then, 
33 EM 119. 
34 Ibid . , 118 . 
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that language. understanding. Stimmunq, passion and 
building are mentioned as belonging essentially to man and 
as being inherently violent. All these characterizations 
are not "faculties" that man would possess and that he 
would use so as to break out into beings. Man does not 
possess such powers. Rather, such powers possess man: in 
and through them, man happens as who he is--as a 
historical being. Hence these powers belong essentially 
and in the strictest sense to man, and yet man is most 
remote from his essence when he believes he possesses or 
has invented these powers: "How could man ever have 
invented the power which pervades [durchwaltet] him. which 
alone enables him to be a man?" 3 15 
In the Durchwaltiqung, then. man's being is at 
issue. Why? What characterizes this Durchwaltigung? In 
what sense is it different than the Umwaltiqung proper to 
the overpowering power man suffers and with which he 
collides? Durch-walten literally means to rule through, 
to per-vade. In the Umwaltiqunq, man is dominated in such 
a way that the overpowering power encircles man in an 
environing world, in an Umwelt, and so both "oppresses" 
[bedrangt] him and "inf lames" [befeuert] him. The 
Durchwaltiqunq, on the other hand, goes and runs through 
man, and so reveals him as who he is. Indeed, man comes 
to be who he is in the Durchwaltiqunq, i.e .. in the 
315 Ibid. , 120 .. 
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. 1 nee of language and of poetic saying, in the violence v10 e 
of thought and in the violence of the building or founding 
of the Qolis. In other words, man finds himself only in 
the violence of this Durchwaltiqung, which is itself 
essentially an opening up by which beings are uncovered as 
such. In the Durchwaltiqung, then, the manifestness of 
beings in the open and of the place proper to the Being of 
man is at issue. Only in the ruling which per-vades man 
and carries him in this very pervading can man--or Dasein-
-find the 'there' of his Being. 'Illis 'there' is defined 
as an essential belonging together of poetic saying--the 
primal form of poiesis--, of thinking and of the founding 
of polis. 'Ille three dimensions are rooted in the 
Durchwa 1 ti guJJ.9:.. 
In comparison with the Rectoral Address, there is 
a certain displacement of the field proper to the 
political. 'Illis displacement is itself a political move--
a move away from the 1933 engagement. Indeed, the 
discourse about the political--about what Heidegger calls 
the polis--is now completely void of both the Nietzschean 
vocabulary ("will," "power," "decision," etc.) and the 
JUngerian vocabulary (particularly the thematic of the 
worker), both of which were very much at play in the 
Address. 'Ille forces of "knowing" are no longer mentioned 
alongside the "working" and the "military" forces. 'Ille 
political is now totally and exclusively ordered· to 
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knowing. to techn~. At this point. techn~--and that is 
Dasein's Being-in-the-world--is defined in terms of three 
essential elements: poetry, thought. polis. The three 
seem to be co-originary. Unlike what has been suggested 
earlier, the possibility of the polis does not seem to be 
grounded primarily and essentially in poetry. Poetry is 
mentioned alongside thinking and the polis, and even if 
the three are essentially thought together. poetry is not 
explicitly said to be the essence of the polis. Yet the 
polis is revealed in its essence through a poetic saying 
which is said to be a "thinking poetry." Hence poetry. 
thinking and the political seem to be inextricably bound 
together. Yet so far nothing has been said about the 
nature of the bond. 
It is at this point in the analysis of Sophocles' 
poetic saying. i.e .. in the last stanza which. according 
to Heidegger. "brings everything that has been said so far 
in its inner unity," that Heidegger's analysis of techne 
as Wissen is completed. Thus everything happens as if the 
whole of the poetic saying would converge on this 
"machination," this machanoen which Heidegger interprets 
as techne. If the passage did not focus on the question 
of art, it would merely repeat what was said in "The 
Rectoral Addresss": 
Knowledge is the ability to put into work [das Ins-
Werk-setzen-konnen] the Being of any particular being. 
The Greeks called art in the true sense and the work 
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of art techne, because art is what most immediately 
brings being (i.e. the being that stands there in 
itself) to stand, stabilizes it in something present 
(the work). The work of art is a work not primarily 
because it is wrought [gewirktJ, made, but because it 
brings about [er-wirkt] Being in a being. Here, to 
bring about means to bring into the work; and in the 
work. the emerging power, physis, comes to 
shine. It is through the work of art as being Being 
[das seiende-Sein] that everything else that appears 
and is to be found is first confirmed and made 
accessible, explicable, and understandable g_.§. being or 
not being. 
Because art in a pre-eminent sense brings Being to 
stand and to shine in the work as a being, it may be 
regarded as the pure and simple ability to put to work 
[Ins-Werken-setzen-konnen], as techne. The putting-
into-work is an opening that brings Being about in the 
being. This superior, actualizing opening [erwikende 
Eroffnen] and keeping open is knowledge. The passion 
of knowledge is questioning. Art is knowledge and 
therefore techne.36 
As Lacoue-Labarthe brilliantly points out, 37 the 
decisive (i.e. the politically decisive) shift from the 
Rectoral Address to the Introduction--and that is the 
shift to the question of art--is accomplished in the 
tenuous and yet crucial move from the problematic of the 
"Being at work" [gm Werk seinJ to the problematic of the 
"putting into work." It is in this slight and yet 
decisive shift that the question of art first appears. 
Lacoue-Labarthe writes: 
If, as certain texts of 1933 might suggest.--
particularly "The Call to the Service of Work" (or any 
particular passage of the Address)--Heidegger's 
36 Ibid., 122. 
37
• Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe. L'imitation des Modernes 
(Paris: Galilee, 1986), p. 191. 
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"political" discourse was ever supported by an 
ontology of work and of the Worker, such 
ontology has now disappeared without a trace. 36 
The move to the question of art would then primarily be a 
political move, i.e .. a move away from a "politicized" 
discourse into a problematic through which the question of 
the political would be engaged anew. 
What is crucial in the passage quoted from 
Heidegger is that everything comes to focus on the 
question of the "work," specifically of the "putting [or 
bringing] (in} to· (the) work." The passage anticipates in 
a very condensed way what will be unfolded in "The Origin 
of the Work of Art" {1935/36). There. the question of art 
takes another decisive turn--a turn which will eventually 
bring Heidegger to his very political reading of 
Holderlin. 
( c) 
Once again. the question is a question of essence. 
Of another essence. Also of another circle. A circle 
rendered even more complex by the fact that "The Origin" 
is itself presented as a circle, more specifically as a 
circling within the circle. 
The analyses to follow will henceforth be engaged 
in tracing out as economically as possible the main lines 
3 e Ibid. 
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of "The Origin." The hinge on which the whole of "The 
turns is the essential connection between art and origin" 
truth. The fundamental and decisive conclusion of the 
text is that art is das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit, 
i.e., truth's putting itself to work. into the work--
truth's putting itself to work in putting itself into the 
work of art. 
But how? How does truth happen in art? How is 
art a happening of truth? Heidegger takes the "example" 
(but is it really an example?} of a pair of peasant shoes. 
specifically of the shoes as depicted in Van Gogh's 
paintings. The paintings depict a piece of equipment, 
viz. a pair of shoes. How does the piece of equipment 
manifest its equipmental character? How does it stand in 
its use? Heidegger insists that the shoes are peasant 
shoes. What the paintings would reveal, then, would be a 
piece of equipment in a very specific use, in a very 
precise environment. Indeed, the shoes as depicted by Van 
Gogh point to the "t;!arth" on which they tread daily. They 
also disclose the "world" of the peasant woman, viz. the 
world of labour, of the walks across the fields, but also 
of impending birth, of the necessity to withstand want, of 
threatening death. As Heidegger puts it: 
This equipment belongs to the earth and is protected 
in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this 
protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its 
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resting-within-itself [lnsichruhen] .39 
In other words, the shoes do not simply "belong" to world 
and earth in the artwork, like any other thing would. 
Rather, the shoes allow world and earth to be there for 
the peasant woman. 
Heidegger now reflects on what has happened in the 
course of the description of the pair of shoes. In 
describing the shoes, one did not go to the shoes but one 
brought the shoes toward oneself by means of a painting. 
In so doing, one revealed the truth of the pair of shoes. 
The artwork is that which enabled us to know what shoes 
are "in truth." But in this process. it is not only the 
essence of equipment that has come to light. The essence 
of art itself is also manifested. Art revealed itself in 
its disclosive power. Art itself is a happening of truth. 
Specifically, art is truth's putting itself (in)to (the) 
work. 
But what is truth? Truth in "The Origin of the 
Work of Art" is rethought as aletheia, as the happening of 
clearing and concealing which first makes it possible for 
beings to come to presence. "The Origin" is thus to be 
thought in the wake of the rigorous determinations of 
truth developed in "On the Essence of Truth." Art is not 
39
. "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann. 1950), p. 23. 
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truth itself but a happening of truth. It is only one of 
the ways in which truth--as the strife or the polemos of 
clearing and unconcealing--happens. But how does it 
happen? How does truth's putting itself into the work 
happen? 
In art truth happens as the strife (Streit) 
between world and earth. In other words, in art the 
(essential) strife between clearing and concealing happens 
as the strife between world and earth. It is important to 
note at this point that the strife that is essential to 
truth is different from the strife proper to art. The 
strife between clearing and concealing happens in art only 
insofar as the work of art brings the strife between world 
and earth into play. How does the strife in art occur? 
In order for the work to show itself as it is in 
itself--i.e. in its "pure self-subsistence" [reines 
Insichstehen]--and not in relation to something else (as 
in thecase of a piece of equipment). the work has to open 
up a world: 
Where does a work belong? The work belongs, as 
work, uniquely within the realm that is opened up by 
itself. For the work-being of the work is present in, 
and only in, such opening up.4° 
The world is that which first lets beings be, lets them 
come to presence: "By the opening up of a world, all 
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gain their lingering and hastening, their things 
remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits."41 In 
the opening up of a world, men themselves find their place 
and can stand in the midst of beings as an historical 
Dasein. The world opened up by the work of art is a 
happening that never ceases to happen, an Ereignis--i.e. 
the very possibility of a history and a destiny: the 
possibility of the political as such. This is perhaps 
most clear in the description Heidegger gives of the Greek 
temple, in which the world continues to "world": 
It is the temple-work that first fits together and at 
the same time gathers around itself the unity of those 
paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster 
and blessing, victory and disgrace. endurance and 
decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. 
The all-governing expanse of this open relational 
context is the world of this historical people. Only 
from and in this expanse does the people first return 
to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation. 42 
The description of the temple continues, yet in a 
new paragraph: 
Standing there, the building rests on the rocky 
ground .... Standing there, the building holds its 
ground against the storm raging above it ... 
After the description of the world, Heidegger moves to the 
earth. As though, in the movement of his description, 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. , 31. 
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Heidegger wanted to show that world and earth belong 
together. that they cannot be mentioned separately, that 
they call and respond to each other. that they are both 
equally rooted in the work, in the temple. 
The earth the Greeks called physis, which 
Heidegger translates as Aufqehen. emergence. Earth is 
"that to which, in the course of emergence [i.e. in the 
process of physis] everything emergent is as such brought 
back and sheltered.'"43 The earth is that which shelters 
or harbours [birqt] things in such a way as to secure and 
conceal them at the same time. As such, earth resists 
disclosedness, it withdraws from openness or 
unconcealment. 
How is the work of art related to world and earth? 
In each case, the relation is reciprocal. As regards 
world, the artwork stands within the world, and yet the 
world is opened up by the artwork. Heidegger expresses 
this connection in terms of an Aufstellunq, of a setting-
up: the artwork is set up within the world, and yet the 
artwork itself sets up a world by a gathering 
(Versammlung) of different relations CBezUge) in which man 
gets the shape (Gestalt) of his destiny. Likewise, as 
regards earth, the artwork is set forth (hergestellt), 
produced from earth by virtue of its being made out of 
some earthly material. But in being set forth from earth, 
43 Ibid. 
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the work of art is being set back into earth in such a way 
as to set forth earth. 
Hence the setting up of world and the setting 
forth of earth belong together in the work of art. Their 
unity constitutes the Insichstehen of the work of art. 
But what kind of unity is this? How do world and earth 
belong together? They belong together in opposition or 
essential strife, i.e., in polemos: 
... the relation between world and earth does not 
wither away into the empty unity of opposites 
unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting 
upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-
opening, it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, 
however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to 
draw the world into itself and keep it there. The 
opposition of world and earth is a strife. 44 
Insofar as world is that which is opened up, that within 
which beings can come to presence, it is striving with the 
sheltering and the withdrawal proper to earth. Likewise, 
earth, as Zurilckbergen, strives to shelter and withhold 
world within itself. Neither world nor earth can give the 
other up without giving itself up. Strife strives for 
strife. and it is only in strife that world and earth are 
revealed as such. 
Truth, then, happens in the work of art as the 
strife of world and earth. The work of art is a being 
that is brought forth or pro-duced so as to establish 
44 HW 37. 
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truth as the strife of world and earth. But the work of 
art is not first brought forth so as to then establish or 
set truth. Rather, in being brought forth, the work of 
art becomes the setting for truth and is itself set into 
truth. Hence the bringing-forth [Hervorbrinqen] of the 
work and the setting [Stellen] of truth are actually the 
same. To name this sameness--which is nothing other than 
the very essence of art--and the complex of determinations 
attached to it, Heidegger uses the word Gestalt, which 
anticipates the word Heidegger will later use to define 
the essence of art and technology, viz. Gestell. The 
Gestalt--the meaning of which is lost if translated 
without reserve as shape or fiqure--gathers all the 
determinations of ''The Origin." In such a word one has to 
hear the result of the setting [Stellen] of truth in the 
work--a setting which includes the play of Aufstellen 
(setting up a world/being set up in a world) and 
Herstellen (setting forth earth/being set forth out of 
earth). The Stellen or the reciprocal play of the 
Aufstellen and the Herstellen in the work of art is said 
to be a Feststellen, a setting firm. 
Now in the Addendum to "The Origin of the Work of 
Art" the Stellen is interpreted as thesis--as 
Hervorbrinqen--, which is itself a mode of poiesis.4~ So 
4~ "We must think of 'to set' [stellen] in the sense 
of thesis ... The Greek 'putting' [Setzen] means placing, as 
for instance, letting a statue be set up. It means 
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l·n the end. the bringing-forth of the work or the that, 
setting of truth as strife in the Gestalt is poiesis in 
the originary sense. That poiesis that is equated with 
the thesis or the Stellen Heidegger calls Dichtung--
poetry (in an originary sense). Techne, then. or what 
Heidegger calls Wissen. is essentially poiesis, Dichtung. 
poetry--i.e. a setting of truth into a bringing-forth: 
The word techne denotes a mode of knowing. To know 
means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, 
which means to apprehend what is present, as such. 
For Greek thought the nature of knowing consists in 
aletheia, that is. in the uncovering of beings. It 
supports and guides all comportment towards beings. 
Techne, as knowledge experienced in the Greek manner, 
is a bringing forth of beings in that it brings forth 
present beings as such beings out of concealedness and 
specifically into the unconcealedness of their 
appearance. 46 
The shift toward an "artistic" understanding of techne is 
now confirmed. for techne is now essentially defined as 
Hervorbrinqen. and that is as poiesis, as poetry in the 
originary sense--as a happening of truth. Truth happens 
in art as poetry: "All art. as letting the advent of the 
truth of beings happen. is as such essentially poetry 
[Dichtung]" (HW 59). The political too, then, insofar as 
it is essentially submitted to knowledge, would primarily 
laying. laying down an oblation. Placing and laying have 
the sense of bringing here into the unconcealed, bringing 
forth into what is present. that is, letting or causing to 
lie forth." 
46
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be a matter of poetry. 
But what about this Dichtung? To what extent is 
it a question of poetry in such poiesis? To say that all 
art is essentially Dichtung is not tantamount to 
attributing "poetry" (Poesie) as an artform a privilege 
that would result from an "artistic" axiology in which 
poetry would hold the highest position. Rather, it means 
that art, insofar as it is considered in its essence, and 
that is insofar as it essentially unfolds as art, is 
poetry in the originary sense. All art, whether pictural. 
sculptural, architectural, etc., is poetry, poiesis, a 
bringing-forth of the work of truth. 
Yet' Heidegger insists that the linguistic form of 
Dichtung, viz. Poesie, has a certain privilege among the 
arts. But again, this privilege has nothing to do with 
artistic "taste"; it is not an aesthetic judgment. The 
privilege is a privilege of essence. For language as such 
is essentially and originarily poetic: language is what 
first opens up the clearing, so that "where there is no 
language. as in the being of stone, plant and animals, 
there is also no openness of what is." 47 Where there is 
no language, where there is not the gift (the es qibt) of 
language, there is also no openness for beings, no world: 
no happening of being, no Ereignis. Being 'gives' itself 
as the gift of language. as and in the being (but is it a 
47 HW 60. 
59 
;Q._eilJQ?) by which the whole of beings is opened up. All 
arts. and that is techne as a whole, are ordered to the 
primary and originary emerging of language as Dichtung. 
All arts take place, are brought forth in the space opened 
up by language. 
It is in that sense that one has to understand 
Heidegger when he writes in the "Letter on Humanism" that 
"language is the house of Being.'' or when he takes up the 
line by Holderlin which reads "poetically man dwells." 
Man dwells poetically insofar as he finds the Da- of his 
historical Da-sein in Dichtung. It is of the utmost 
importance to emphasize the fact that the whole discussion 
of "The Origin of the Work of Art" culminates in an 
analysis of art in its essence--i.e. poetry--in connection 
with the possibility of history and destiny. The ultimate 
stake of "The Origin" is identical with the stake of the 
analysis of the chorus from Antigone in Introduction to 
Metaphysics and with the stake of the Rectoral Address: in 
each case, it is a matter of defining the essence of 
techne as knowing, and that is as the way in which beings 
as a whole are disclosed to a historical Dasein. 
But the essence of knowing has now taken a new 
turn. Everything that was credited to the sole knowing 
and to its "will" and "power" in the "political" discourse 
of 1933 is now, in 1935. attributed to poetry and art, to 
art as poetry. But the project remains quite the same. 
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It is still a matter of giving a people the possibility of 
setting up a world and of initiating a history from the 
opening up of beings as a whole in language: 
Whenever art happens--that is, whenever there is a 
beginning--a thrust enters history, history either 
begins or starts over again ... History is the 
transporting of a people into its appointed task as 
entrance into that people's endowment (HW 64). 
Art, poetry, is now what Heidegger used to call in 1933 
the spiritual-historical existence of a people. Art is 
historicity or historicality itself, and that is the very 
possibility of the political, if the polis is indeed "the 
historical place, the there in which, out of which, and 
for which history happens"48 : "Art is history in the 
essential sense that it grounds history" (HW 64). 
But where does this grounding power come from? 
Where does the political power of poetry come from? 
Insofar as language-- and that is the saying (das Sagen) 
in its poematic project, i.e., in its capacity to say 
world and earth in their strife--is what first opens up a 
world and a destiny for a historical Dasein, the 
possibility of that people's essence and acting is 
grounded in language. In other words, poetry can be said 
to be supremely and essentially historical or political in 
that in the space it opens up language speaks itself 
originarily. Art. Being and History (the political) 
48
• EM 117. 
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belong together. The history of art is also the history 
of Being, that is the history of thought--whether 
metaphysical or pre-metaphysical. Hence Heidegger can 
write: 
Always when beings as a whole demand, as beings 
themselves, a grounding in openess, art attains to its 
historical essence as foundation. This foundation 
happened in the West for the first time in Greece. 
What was in the future to be called Being was set into 
work, setting the standard. Beings as a whole thus 
opened up were then transformed into beings in the 
sense of God's creation. This happened in the 
62 
Middle Ages. This kind of being was again transformed · 
at the beginning and in the course of the modern age. 
Beings became objects that could be controled and seen 
through by calculation. At each time a new and 
essential world arose. At each time the openness of 
beings had to be established in beings themselves, by 
the setting-firm [Fest-stellenJ of truth in figure 
[Gestalt]. At each time there happened 
unconcealedness of what is. Unconcealedness sets 
itself into work, a setting which is accomplished by 
art (HW 62-63). 
It is perhaps in this passage that the necessary link 
between art, truth as aletheia and history is most 
explicitly inscribed. History--and by history one has to 
understand the emergence of a relation to beings as a 
whole such that the entire domain of man's dwelling on 
earth, viz. his Gods, his thinkers, his rulers, his 
science, in short his polis, is determined by such a 
relation--emerges when art happens, when truth puts itself 
(in)to (the) work. 
In 1933 Heidegger dreamt of such a new beginning. 
But this world lacked the only thing that could provide it 
with such a beginning (such an Anfang) and constitute it 
as a true world, viz. an art, a Dichtunq, a Sorache. Not 
that such an art did not exist. But the poet whose saying 
continues to stand as the future of the Germans was never 
quite recognized. It was never actually considered as 
Germany's truly historical and political power. 
Holderlin--and these are the last words of "The Origin of 
the Work of Art," words that indeed concentrate the whole 
of Heidegger's political ambition for Germany--is the poet 
"whose work still confronts the Germans as a test to be 
stood." These closing words open up the necessity of a 
reading of Holderlin in which Heidegger will be engaged 
for some twenty years. This reading will confirm the 
movement sketched out so far, viz. a withdrawal from the 
political--that is from the political life--into the 
essence of the political, specifically into the poetic 
saying of Holderlin as the poet of the Germans. 
(D) 
But before engaging oneself in the reading of the pieces 
on Holderlin, it is necessary to consider the texts in 
which the political is most explicitly related to its 
essence, viz. to truth and art. In Introduction to 
Metaphysics, Heidegger only devoted a page to the question 
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of the polis, without relating it explicitly to the 
essence of techne and truth. We recall that in the 1935 
text we were only able to po.int to what seemed to be an 
inextricable bond between the polis and techne as the 
happening of truth in poetry. But the nature of the link 
remained unclarified, because the essence of techne was 
itself being clarified. And through the reading of "The 
Origin of the Work of Art," the essence of knowing or 
techne was revealed as poetry, as Dichtung. How, then, do 
techne, truth and the polis belong together? 
In at least two different texts of the same 
period. one of which constitutes a re-reading of the 
chorus from Antigone in connection with Holderlin (which 
in itself says very much about the political discourse 
Heidegger is trying to articulate), Heidegger devotes 
analyses to the question of the polis, and that is to the 
question of the essence of the political. These texts are 
the lecture courses gathered under the title Holderlin's 
Hvmne "der Ister" (SS 1942) and Parmenides (WS 1942/43). 
The polis too is a happening of truth, 
essentially. But techne and the polis belong together as 
happenings of truth. The polis is not a happening of 
truth alongside other unconnected modes of happening of 
truth. Techne and polis are grounded in truth as 
aletheia. Or, to put it in German terms--but this 
translation is a translation back into the Greek world, 
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back into the essence of what is meant by polis, techne. 
aletheia--, Wissen and polis (and much would need to be 
said about the untranslatability of this word) are 
grounded in truth as Unverbogenheit. The translation of 
the Greek into German is the very problem of the 
political. For "the political" is itself a translation--
indeed an historical translation--of its essence. viz. the 
QOlis. In the move from the Greek polis to the City or 
the modern State, and hence to the discourse about "the 
political," what gets lost and forgotten is the polis 
itself. What is lost or forgotten, in other words, is the 
fundamental experience through which the polis appeared as 
what it is--as a happening of truth as aletheia. 
The political today would still be grounded in 
truth; it would still be a happening of truth. But truth 
itself is no ·longer experienced as unconcealement. 
Rather, it is experienced as technology, as a mode of 
techne (of knowing) that has no longer anything to do with 
the essence of techne, viz. poetry. To name the essence 
of technology as well as the essence of techne, Heidegger 
will use the word Ge-stell, a word that points both to the 
essence and to that which remains most remote from the 
essence. 
How, then, does truth happen in the Greek polis? 
And how does truth happen in the modern State? 
In the 1942/43 lecture course on H5lderlin. 
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Heidegger writes: 
The 12olis does not let itself be "politically'' 
determined. Hence the polis ... is not a "political" 
concept. 49 
The £Olis, and that is the essence of the political, is 
itself nothing "political." But what is it, then? It 
primarily refers to an activity, to a verb. specifically 
to the verb pelein, which Heidegger translates as regen, 
to arise, to emerge:~0 
The word pelein is old and means: to arise, to come 
forth, to find and observe one's place and one's 
abode. Pelein is, in Homer and Hesiod, the current 
word for einai, which we translate by "being" [ ... ) 
Pelein: to spring up and come forth (auf- und 
hervorkommen] out of oneself, and thus to 
become present (anwesen] (GA 53, 88-89). 
Hence pelein means to come to presence, to come forth into 
the open of the clearing and there to find one's place in 
the midst of beings. The polis, then, becomes the place 
or the there--the Da---of historical Da-sein. But man can 
have a polis--can become historical--only to the extent 
that he can experience the pelein of beings, i.e., only 
insofar as he can relate himself to the truth of beings. 
49
• Martin Heidegger, Holderlins Hymne "Der Ister," 
Gesamtausgabe 53 (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1984), p. 99. Henceforth GA 53. 
~ 0 . Heidegger's translation of the first two lines of 
the chorus from Antigone reads: 
Vielfaltig das Unheimliche,· nichts doch 
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Uber den Menschen hinaus Unheimlicheres ragend sich regt. 
is said to have the polis as the place of his 
:Man 
historical essence only insofar as he is the only being 
the mode of Being of which lies in its relation to beings 
as beings. and that is to the truth of Being: 
Man is put in the place of his historical abode, in 
the polis. because he and he alone can relate himself 
to beings as beings, to beings in their unconcealment 
and concealment ... (GA 53. 108) 
The polis is now explicitly defined as the pivot 
or the whirl around which everything revolves. It is 
defined as the place within which the unconcealment of 
beings can take place. In other words, it is defined as 
the place of the happening of the truth of beings. And 
hence also as the place of techne. Techne as knowing, and 
that is Dasein's mode of Being in the midst of beings. 
always occurs from within the polis. So the polis and 
techne or philosophy belong together. The polis is always 
grounded on the relation of a people to the truth of 
beings. The polis is essentially "technical," and that is 
essentially poetic: the essence of the political is 
nothing political. The polis is the place in which techne 
can unfold in its essence and a people be gathered in this 
essence and hence become historical. 
In §6 of the Parmenides.~ 1 which, to a certain 
~ 1 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, Gesamtausqabe 54 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982). Henceforth 
GA 54. 
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extent. constitutes a reading of Plato's Republic, 
Heidegger tries to show how intertwined the notions of 
QOlis. mythes (and that is Dichtung or Sage) and aletheia 
are. Heidegger's "political" discourse has now come to 
focus on Plato, specifically on the necessary connection 
between the Republic as a discourse about the polis and 
the mythoi that are told at the beginning of book VII--· 
often considered as the most important book of the whole 
dialogue--and at the very end of the dialogue itself. 
With respect to the very strategic occurences of these 
'myths,• the question is: How is it that, in its most 
decisive moments, a discourse about the polis must turn to 
myths? What about the mythic in the political? 
Everything happens as though the very essence of the polis 
could unfold only in and through mythoi, in and through 
poetic sayings. 
Before he even considers the essential belonging 
together of aletheia, mythes and polis, Heidegger sets out 
to sketch the privileged link between aletheia as 
Unverbogenheit and the mythos as Sagen. Mythos alone--and 
that is precisely not logos in the sense of "discourse"--
can say the "origin," viz. truth as aletheia. Why? 
Because the mythes is the original or originary saying, 
the saying of the beginning (anfanglicher Sagen) that 
corresponds to the origin (Ursprung) . The logos proper to 
Philosophy, on the other hand, insofar as it is 
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metaphysical, would already be somewhat remote from the 
origin. For metaphysics and its history are precisely the 
move by which truth as aletheia is progressively 
"translated" as "correctness." and that is as that which 
is opposed to "falsehood" {das Falsche). Philosophical 
discourse is precisely the mark of "the transformation of 
the essence of truth" (der Wesenswandel der Wahrheit), and 
that is the shift from truth understood as aletheia, as a 
complex play of concealment and unconcealment, to truth 
understood as the rectitude of the gaze. The difference 
between thought and poetry (Denken und Dichten) on the one 
hand. and metaphysics on the other hand lies in this 
shift. 
Such a shift is most clearly enacted in Plato. 
Thus, if there is to be a resurgence of the origin in what 
constitutes the initial gesture of metaphysics, and that 
is in the determination of truth as that which is most 
unconcealed, as that which can shine forth in the midst of 
beings--in other words as idea or eidos, as the 'looks' 
(Aussehen) of a being: as absolute presence--, then such 
resurgence will not occur through the rigour of 
philosophical discourse but rather through the thinking 
substance of the mythos. 
One now understands how mythos and aletheia, Sagen 
and Unverbogenheit essentially belong together. One might 
also understand why, at the very end of metaphysics, in a 
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time of distress. nothing can be expected from 
"philosophy" and why Dichtunq alone--specifically 
Holderlin's Dichtung--can show us the way to the origin. 
But if the belonging together of mythos and aletheia now 
seems established, the connection with the polis remains 
unclarified. What, then, about the connection between 
aletheia, mythes and polis? 
First. there is in Plato's text a connection that 
could be considered as external. As we suggested earlier. 
the mythos from which Heidegger retrieves Plato's doctrine 
of truth is to be found in one of the central books of the 
Politeia. specifically at the very beginning of book VII. 
Now the dialogue as a whole is oriented towards a 
discussion of the polis. Why, then a mythos about 
aletheia in book VII and a muthos partly about lethe in 
book X? How are we to articulate the connection between 
the Politeia as a whole and the myths about aletheia and 
lethe? 
Second, if there is to be an essential connection 
between aletheia, mythos and polis in the Greek world, one 
might presume that the notions of polis and mythos will 
undergo the same radical re-determining the notion of 
aletheia undergoes in the Heideggerian text. Hence the 
essential connection would not be thought in terms of what 
we understand today by truth (i.e. correctness). myth 
(i.e. a me're tale, a fictitious story) and the political 
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(i.e. that which is related to the modern state). The 
modern conception of the state is as remote from the Greek 
Q_oli.§. as the modern conception of truth is remote from the 
Greek aletheia: 
The difference between the modern state, the Roman res 
publica and the Greek polis is, with respect to its 
essence, the same as the difference between the modern 
essence of truth. the Roman rectitude and the Greek 
aletheia (GA 54, 132). 
The two points we have sketched out are closely 
intertwined in Heidegger's analysis of the poli~ in 
Plato's Politeia. Although Heidegger's reading bears 
primarily on Plato, he extends his conclusions about the 
polis to the whole of the Greek experience of the 
political. And such extension. as will later be shown, 
raises serious questions.~ 2 
The connection Heidegger draws between the polis 
and aletheia seems to be a mere assertion, a thesis that 
he would need not bother arguing. Heidegger writes: 
... the essence of the Greek polis is grounded in the 
essence of aletheia. This connection between aletheia 
and polis must also be presumed, and not necessarily 
grasped, on the basis of a simple consideration. For 
if truth as unconcealment determines all beings in 
their presencing [Anwesenheit] (and for the Greeks 
this means in their Being). then the polis too, and it 
above all, must stand through aletheia in the sphere 
of this determination ... (GA 54. 132) 
See chapter 3. 
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so far. the connection between aletheia and the polis is 
merely posited: the connection must be presumed, the polis 
too must stand, etc. But it remains unclear why the 
connection must be presumed. Now Heidegger provides a 
short explanation at the very end of the sentence quoted 
above, but this explanation will get unfolded in the 
following paragraph. The understanding of the connection 
is primarily based on the understanding of the polis: 
... if however the polis means this: that in which the 
humanity of the Greeks has the center [die Mitte] of 
its Being. 
Hence the essential belonging together of the 
polis and aletheia depends on the understanding one has of 
what the Greek experience of the polis was. It is here 
defined in terms of spatiality, in terms of whereness and 
not of whatness. There is at play a certain displacement 
of the way in which to conceive the polis. For the polis 
no longer answers the question "what is man?" Man is no 
longer "a political animal." Rather, the polis answers 
the question that bears on the whereness of man. Where is 
man? Where is man's Being? In the polis. The polis is 
the Da- of Dasein. Man stands in the polis as in the 
center of his Being. 
The polis becomes the place within which which man 
is related to beings in their unconcealment, the place 
within which he dwells as a historical being. The polis 
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appears in its essential connection with the truth of 
Being: 
What is the polis? When we bring an essential insight 
into the Greek experience of the essence of Being and 
truth--an essential insight that illuminates 
everything--then the word itself gives us the right 
indication. Polis is the polos, the pivot, the place 
around which, in a peculiar way, revolves everything 
which appeared to the Greeks in beings. The pivot is 
the place towards which every being turned so 
that it shows in the region of this place what 
application and involvement it has with Being. 
As this place. the pivot le the being in its 
Being appear accordingly in the whole of its 
involvement. The pivot neither makes nor creates the 
being in its Being, but as the pivot it is the site of 
the unconcealedness of beings in the whole. The polis 
is the essence of the place, so we speak of the 
regional place of the historical dwelling of Greek 
humanity. Because the polis always lets the whole of 
beings come forward in the unconcealedness of its 
involvement in some way or another, the polis is 
essentially related to the Being of beings. Between 
polis and Being an original relation rules (GA 54, 
132-33) . 
From the outset, it is crucial to note that the oolis is 
defined in terms of its "original relation" to Being, •:t.nd 
not in terms of the web of interconnections and 
interactions between the members of the polis. Such 
interactions would be primarily guided by a founding 
relation of the community to Being. In that regard, there 
is a continuity between the 1942/43 lecture course and the 
Rectoral address: the authentic leader of the community is 
the one who is himself led by the guidance of an essential 
and original relation to Being. It is only insofar as 
beings as a whole are governed by the same relation to 
73 
Being that a polis can exist as a relational and praxical 
totality. Without an original and founding relation to 
Being, there can be no political or praxical life. Hence 
the polis is not primarily the result of a communitarian 
gathering. of a social contract or a revolution. Rather, 
the polis is primarily the space within which the truth of 
beings can occur.~3 
In the paragraph that immediately follows. 
Heidegger proceeds to bind together even more decisively 
the polis and Being. Just as the opposite or counter-
essence (Gegenwesen) of truth, i.e. lethe, belongs 
essentially to truth as aletheia, so the polis unfolds as 
its counter-essence and non-essence (Un-wesen), viz. as&.= 
polis and hypsipolis. In binding the polis with aletheia 
in such a way, Heidegger introduces--or rather 
reintroduces--the major determinations of the polis 
thematized in section IV of Introduction to Metaphysics 
along with the determinations of truth thematized in "On 
~3 . To admit an essential and original relation 
between the polis and Being is already to admit that what 
was once posited as the privileged relation of Being to 
time is now, to say the least, put into question, if not 
radically disrupted. For if the polis, as "the essence of 
the place," is indeed the horizon within which truth as 
unconcealment occurs originally, then the question of time 
appears as merely derivative. In the last chapter, we 
shall attempt to show how the question of the political 
can also be considered, in more promising terms, from the 
project of fundamental ontology. specifically from the 
ecstatic structure of Dasein. In such an attempt, it will 
be a matter of putting the emphasis on the connection 
between time and community. 
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the Essence of Truth" and in "The Origin of the Work of 
Art." Heidegger writes: 
Now if, as the word indicates, the strifely essence 
belongs to aletheia, and if the strifely [das 
Streithafte] appears also in the opposite of the 
Verstellenl54 and the forgetting [Vergessen], then all 
extreme counter-essence and hence all non-essence of 
the unconcealed and of beings, i.e., nonbeing 
[das Unseiende] in the manifoldness of its counter-
essence, must rule in the polis as the place of the 
essence of man. Here. the original ground for each 
phenomenon. which Jacob Burckhardt first presented in 
the fullness of its scope and manifoldness, is 
concealed: it is the frightening, the horrible, the 
disastrous that belong to the Greek polis. This is 
the ascent and the fall of man in the historical 
place of his essence--hypsipolis, apolis--: by far 
exceeding the place. deprived of the place is how 
Sophocles (Antigone) names man. It is not a 
coincidence if this word defines man in the Greek 
tragedy. For the possibility and the necessity of the 
"tragedy" itself springs from the sole ground of the 
strifely essence of aletheia (GA 54, 133-34). 
Thus man is defined as apolis, as being without a place. 
Yet this apolis belongs together with the polis. The two 
belong together in their very opposition. The place of 
man cannot be thought separately from his being thrown out 
of the place into the monstruous, the unresting. This 
constant and necessary dis-placement, dis-locating, this 
throwness into the unfamiliar is precisely the place of 
man. Thus we see how the major themes of "On the Essence 
of Truth" (truth as strife) and Introduction to 
!5 4 Verstellen: "disarranging, putting one thing in 
the place of another, hence obstructing, disguising, 
counterfeiting" (John Sallis, Delimitations--Phenomenology 
and the End of Metaphysics [Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1986], p. 183. 
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Metaphysics !the Walten and the Uberwaltigung of the 
Unheimliche) are now intertwined in a political 
problematic. Indeed, just as the strife appears as the 
essential trait of truth in "On the Essence of Truth," so, 
here, the polis is its counter-essence and non-essence. 
The polis is itself the place of the ruling (Walten) of 
this extreme tension between essence and counter-essence, 
being and non-being. concealment and unconcealment. It is 
the place of the essential strife between the overpowering 
power of physis, which throws man out of a place, and the 
"technical" mode of Being of man. by which man finds a 
place in the midst of physis. 
But what is perhaps most important and radically 
new in thi~ passage is the essential connection that is 
explicitly drawn between Greek tragedy--and that is Greek 
poetry--, the polis and aletheia. What is at stake in 
what Heidegger says is the essential belonging together of 
truth, of language as poetry and of the political. This 
belonging together is rooted in a primal experience of 
truth. The experience of truth of an historical people 
commands both a specific relation to language and a 
specific relation to the polis. If the essence of truth 
is experienced as aletheia, then the relation to the 
Political, and that is also to the discourse about the 
Political, will be totally different from the essence of 
truth experienced as Ge-stell. Hence it is not a 
76 
coincidence, as Heidegger points out, if the essence of 
the political emerges in Ancient Greece through tragedy. 
There is a certain "necessity" attached to the very 
existence of tragedy in Ancient Greece: tragedy is the 
discourse, or rather the saying that is best able to 
recapture the ground from which the polis essentially 
unfolds. viz. aletheia. Like the polis understood as the 
essence of the place of man, and that is also as its 
counter-essence, tragedy itself "springs from the sole 
ground of the strifely essence of aletheia." Philosophy, 
on the other hand, would be unable to say the essence of 
the political, for it is itself the result of the shift or 
the change--the Wandlunq--of the essence of truth. 
Heidegger does not say more about Greek tragedy in 
its connection with truth and the polis. Yet the 
indications he gives constitute a decisive continuation of 
the discussion of Introduction to Metaphysics, in the 
sense that they emphasize a connection that remained 
somewhat unclarified in 1935. Moreover, these indications 
also serve to prepare the way to Heidegger's reading or 
re-reading of Plato's Republic. 
The Republic is often considered Plato's most 
important dialogue, the dialogue that would most reveal 
Plato's "philosophy." Plato also marks the beginning of 
Philosophy, and that is, for Heidegger, the decisive 
transformation in the essence of truth. What. then. about 
77 
the rise of metaphysics in its relation to the political? 
How is it that philosophy emerges and becomes an explicit 
stake in a discourse about the polis? What needs to 
thought of the co-emergence of the philosophical and the 
political? 
The Republic could be said to be (still) ''Greek" 
to the extent that it would be grounded in some way in 
that which defines the very essence of Greekhood, and that 
is the experience of truth as aletheia. And yet. if that 
text also marks the beginning of philosophy, it is also a 
decisive move away from such an experience. Hence the 
Republic would remain in a way undecided between 
philosophy and non-philosophy. In the very elaboration of 
the beginning of metaphysics, the trace of non-philosophy 
would be retained. in a most concealed way. Similarly, in 
what is presented as a "philosophical" discourse--as a 
logos--about the polis, the Greek experience of the polis 
would still be at play. The connection between aletheia 
and the polis would still be operative, not in the logos 
of the text but rather in the mvthoi told at certain 
strategic moments of the dialogue. In the mythoi or the 
mythic the essence of truth and hence of the polis would 
be recaptured. 
Such is the project in which Heidegger is engaged: 
to show how the mythic dimension in the Republic still 
retains the essential Greek experience of the polis. 
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Specifically. Heidegger is engaged in showing how a 
in which the essence of truth as aletheia is virtually 
presupposed occupies the very center of the Politeia, thus 
governing the logic of the entire political discourse. 
According to Heidegger, the "allegory" of the 
cave--the myth that is perhaps most referred to and most 
commented upon in philosophy--is itself to be related to 
the closing myth of the dialogue, viz. the myth of Er. 
The two myths belong together, for what is at stake in 
both of them is the essence of aletheia in its essential 
strife with its counter-essence. The dialogue as a whole 
would be contained in the space of the two reciprocally 
responding myths, so that the question of the political 
would itself be attached to the myths about aletheia and 
lethe. The discourse about the polis would unfold in the 
space delimited by the myths about truth. 
The polis would unfold in the space broached by 
the strife between lethe and aletheia. The polis arises, 
man becomes historical when he comports himself to this 
extreme tension and takes it up in its very violence, 
actually conforming himself (sich fliqend) to its order 
(Fug)!'.5!'.5, Such a free co.nformity, such a voluntary and 
~~ 'Order' is only one possible translation of the 
German Fuq which, as Manheim points out in a note of his 
translation of Introduction to Metaphysics, "does not 
occur in modern literary German" (p. 160). The meaning of 
the word in Heidegger's vocabulary is actually threefold: 
it is understood first as "joint and framework (Fuqe und 
Gefliqe); second as decree, dispensation, a directive that 
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active submission. Heidegger c;:il ls FUgsan:J.keit, which is 
the German for dikaiosyne. This word, Heidegger says, 
means "the emergence (das Aufqehen) of the essence of man 
in the order and his standing within the order, dike" 
(137). Dike, which is usually translated as "justice." is 
indeed the explicit stake of the Politeia. From the very 
start, the opening discussion between Socrates and 
Cephalus bears upon "justice." But this word which. for 
us Romans and Christians, is a juridical and political 
notion, actually points, according to Heidegger, to that 
which constitutes the essence of the polis, viz. the 
strifely joint between lethe and aletheia in which man is 
to dwell. Once again, Heidegger attempts to trace a 
notion that is constitutive of our juridical and political 
modernity back to its essential origin--an origin which is 
not itself political. Rather. it points to an experience 
of truth as aletheia that remains most remote from us: 
To interpret dike out of modern justice and Roman 
iustitia is as impossible as to interpret the polis 
out of the Modern State or the Roman~ publica. 
Dike as the order that orders man in the relations 
(Verhaltnisse] of his comportment finds its essence 
out of its bearing (Bezuq] to aletheia, but in no way 
is dike determined by and through its relation to the 
Polis (142-43). 
Rather, it is dike, and specifically dike in its 
the overpowering imposes on its reign; finally, as the 
governing structure (das fliqende Gefliqe) which compels 
adaptation (EinfUgung) and compliance (Sichfliqen)" 
llntroduction to Metaphysics. 123). 
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relation to techne that determines the polis. Heidegger 
is more explicit about such a connection in his commentary 
on the chorus from Antigone in Introduction to 
Metaphysics. In this passage, dike is considered in its 
essential and originary relation to techne. The violence 
that man uses against the overpowering power of physis is 
techne. Man is the being with techn~. i.e .. the being 
which, by means of this essence, is the strangest and most 
violent among beings. But the violence proper to the 
overpowering power of physis or Being is called dike. The 
two forms of deinon are in opposition or strife, and the 
polis is the place of such strife. The strife recalls the 
play of strifes described in "The Origin of the Work of 
Art." Like the work of art. the polis is a happening of 
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truth. In the polis, man bursts forth against dike 
through techne: man sets himself against physis, and in 
setting himself against it brings it forth, discloses it 
in a world, in his world: in the polis. In turn, physis 
as dike is the overpowering that disposes (verfilgt) of all 
techne. In spite of techne, man can never master physis, 
for physis is both the power that always exceeds the power 
of man. the power that unsettles man and throws him away 
from his place, and the power that is self-concealing and 
self-sheltering, the power that emerges only in 
withdrawing. But it is crucial to note that man as such 
happens in the strife between techne and dike. In such 
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strife, man essentially happens as political. The 
political as such, and that is primarily the polis. 
emerges from out of the conflict between techne and dike. 
The QOlis is the place in which and as which the strife 
between techne and dike occurs. 
Heidegger is now in a position· to gather in a most 
condensed passage all the determinations related to the 
essence of the polis: 
Because the polis is the where as which and in which 
the order (Fug) is unconcealed and concealed [sich 
entbirqt und verbirgt], because the polis is the way 
in which the unconcealing and concealing of the 
ordering takes place, so that in this taking place the 
historical man specifically comes to its essence and 
non-essence, such is the reason why we call the polis, 
in which the Being of man in its relation to beings as 
a whole is being gathered, the essence of the 
place of historical man (141-42). 
The passage indicates the complex of determinations in 
which the polis is caught. Indeed the polis, in its 
whereness. is essentially related to the way in which dike 
occurs as a strife between concealment and unconcealment. 
Only in this strife can man come to his essence, which is 
to say, because of the very structure of the strife, to 
his non-essence. What is at stake in such a relation is 
precisely the possibility of historicity, the possibility 
of the political as such, if what is meant by polis is the 
place within which man can unfold according to his 
essence, and that is according to his essential relation 
to Being as aletheia. Because of the strifely character 
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of aletheia on which the polis is grounded. the oolis 
reveals itself in its counter-essence, and that is 
essentially in its dis-placing and placelessness 
(JD'psipolis, apolis): in his relation to beings as a 
~hole, man finds his place in being thrown out of a place, 
in being without a place. The proper place of man is 
always his own negation or counter-essence. The essence 
of the place is a certain placelessness. a certain retreat 
from the place--a retreat that indeed constitutes the 
place from its very dis-placement. The essence of the 
2olis is always concealed but also sheltered and secured 
in its non-essence. In the polis, man is essentially 
related to the truth of beings as aletheia. For the man 
of the Greek polis, the polis is nothing but the place 
within which the totality of beings can emerge according 
to their self-secluding and self-sheltering essence. The 
saying which fits such experience of the polis is the 
mythos--whether in the form of tragedy (Sophocles) or 
dialogue (Plato). With Plato, the Greek world comes to 
its completion: through a conception of truth as idea or 
eidos, the essence of truth is progressively preparing the 
way to truth as homoiosis. Simultaneously, the 
Philosophical discourse is taking over the more concealed 
and veiling mode of saying--the mythos--which is more akin 
to the essence of truth. As a consequence of such 
transformation, the experience of the political becomes a 
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matter of "justice" and management of public affairs, and 
the discourse about the polis is no longer to be found in 
poetry as Dichtung but in a mode of discourse named 
"philosophy." 
Here we are, then, back to our opening and guiding 
hypothesis: the essence of the political is its very 
retreat. For if the polis appears only in and as its 
counter-essence. if. in other words. the polis is always 
also a-polis. its presence being also its unavoidable 
absencing, then the political is always withdrawn, 
withheld. secured--essentially. To say that the essence 
of the political is essentially withdrawn is to say that 
the political as such is articulated as withdrawal. Hence 
the "esse·nce" of the political is not something that would 
need to be recaptured or recovered in the depths of time 
lost: it is not something that once took place as a unique 
event and then faded away. disappeared into the depths of 
history. Rather, the essence of the political, as 
essence. never ceased to govern the political. The 
essence is a happening, an Ereiqnis that never ceases to 
happen, even today, perhaps most of all today. And we 
have to wonder whether the political would not resemble 
the words of language Heidegger speaks of in the 
Parmenides volume: 
We ought not think that the words of language 
initially possess pure fundamental meanings, and that 
with the passage of time the latter get lost and 
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become deformed. fundamental root meani 
remains quite concealed and appears only in what one 
calls the 'derivative' (31). 
With respect to the political. the 'derivative' could be 
politics, even though the derivative has become the 
dominant and the all pervasive. But like the meaning of 
words. the political did not get effaced in the course of 
time. through use or misuse. Rather. the essence of the 
political would always already be effaced. concealed, 
apparent only in politics. only in what is grounded in the 
essence of truth as Ge-stell. 
Because our time is most remote from the essence 
of truth as its counter-essence; because technology 
governs the way in which beings as a whole become manifest 
for us--and that is as beings merely present, merely 
ready-to-hand, and not as beings that come out of 
concealment--. the political too remains most remote from 
its essence, and that is from its counter-essence. And it 
is insofar as the political today is most remote from the 
Polis that, just as Heidegger speaks of the "end" or the 
"closure" of metaphysics, so we can speak of the closure 
of the political. But to speak of the end or the closure 
of the political is not to acknowledge a terminal point 
(today? tomorrow? or was it yesterday?) at which the 
political would cease. Rather, it is a matter of 
acknowledging how, together with the philosophical, the 
political is now gathered in its most extreme 
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possibilities. It is a matter of acknowledging how the 
total and global presence of beings, and that is the 
~
negation of ~he essentially withdrawing and concealing 
dimension of Being is at the same time the very condition 
of possibility for the overwhelming and totalitarian 
presence of the political. The 'State.' according to 
Heidegger. is the ultimate, i.e., the completed form of 
~he political. The state is the political form that fits 
the necessity for man to rule over beings as a whole. It 
is the form that corresponds to the epoch of technology. 
In the midst of beings, man is fully aware of himself and 
of his absolute and total ascendancy over beings. And the 
State is the place within which man can comport himself 
with beings and with men according to technology as a mode 
of truth. With technology, the political has become 
"unquestionable" (fraqlose). To the unquestionableness of 
the political in its modern form Heidegger opposes the 
FragwUrdigkeit (that which is question worthy, that which 
is called into question), the fragility of the Greek 
polis. The political today belongs together with the 
totalitarian tendency of technology. As Heidegger puts 
it: "The unquestionableness of the 'political' and its 
totality belong together."!5 6 But this unquestionability 
or indisputability of the political whole, of the total 
politics and the political totality is not the result. as 
!56 GA 53, 118. 
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"naive minds" (naive Gemi..iter-) could figure, of the 
"fortuitous will of dictators."!57 Rather, it is the 
re~ult of the history of the essence of truth. Hence the 
total penetration of the political--and that is its 
totalitarian presence--is not the deed of Hitler, 
Mussolini or Stalin. It is not a question of names and 
individuals. Rather, it is a question of destiny, of 
Geschick: the 'decision' (which is not a matter of free 
will) was made long ago; the fear and trembling which 
animated our Century could be heard long before the actual 
events. The events were long since destined, not as a 
fate or a fatality. but as a metaphysically extreme 
possibility. And the political today marks perhaps the 
most extreme possibility of metaphysics. the possibility 
in which and as which metaphysics exhausts itself. The 
political today will have perhaps marked an end with airs 
of funerary mask, of terror. of fire and ashes. 
!5? Ibid. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Holderlin and the Future of Germany 
H5lderlin. der Dichter, 
dessen Werk zu bestehen den 
Deutschen noch bevorsteht ... 
Martin Heidegger. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. 
The previous chapter brings us to the question of 
poetry (Dichtung) as the central question of the 
political. Poetry is not the expression of the political, 
it is not the way in which the political expresses itself, 
reaches out of itself in words. Such would be the case if 
poetry were essentially concerned with "expressing" 
something--whether feelings. lived experiences or inner 
realities. Such would be the case. then. if the political 
were to exist first in itself and then in words. Rather. 
the political arises in and through language as poetry. 
The words of poetry are not that in which the political is 
translated. but that in which it emerges as such. To say 
that the political .s!.§. such emerges in language 
(essentially determined as poetry) is to draw an essential 
and necessary connection between the two dimensions, the 
belonging together of which, as we have seen, lies in 
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truth as unconcealment. 
(A) 
But what is the essence of poetry, if poetry is 
such as to let the political emerge as such? To answer 
this question, it is necessary. according to Heidegger. to 
turn to the poet whose poetry poeticizes the essence of 
poetry. Such a poet is Holderlin 1 . To poeticize 
(dichten) is to show, to render something manifest in a 
specific saying. In that sense, poetry is most akin to 
the language of the Gods as Holderlin understands it: 
und Winke sind 
Von Alters her die Sprache der Gotter 2 
Poetry is not the "expression" or the "translation" of the 
1 anguage of the Gods into "human" 1 anguage. In poetry. it 
is not a matter of interpreting and of bringing into 
language an esoteric "message" of the Gods. Rather. it is 
a matter of "echoing" in the people the signs that come 
from the Gods. 3 It is important to emphasize the fact 
1 Thus I shall henceforth be engaged in a close 
reading of Heidegger's pieces on Holderlin, specifically 
of Holderlin's Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein" 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980), 
Gesamtausgabe 39. Henceforth GA 39. 
2 Friedrich Holderlin, "Rousseau," lines 39-40. 
3 See Martin Heidegger, Holderlins Hvmnen 
"Germanien" und "der Rhein" (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann. 1980), 32: "Poetry is the echoing of those 
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that Hei::leggar uses the word "echo" to point to the 
specific activity of the poet, for if the word "echo" 
indeed carri~s a sense of derivation or secondarity in 
comparison to the more originary and primary sense of the 
showing of the Gods, it nonetheless escapes the merely 
mimetic dimension that would be present in words such as 
"copy". "image". "expression". "translation", etc. The 
showing of the poet is such as to let Dasein of a 
people be in the dimension of the signs of the Gods. It 
is a showing by which the Gods become manifest in their 
showing dimension. In the showing of the poet. what is 
brought about is the very showing of the Gods as showing. 
But such Winken is essentially different from a mere 
Zeichen, a mere showing that would consist in pointing to 
something or bringing someone's attention to something. 
Such Winken is not obvious. The words in poetry are not 
"signs" or signifiers that refer to a signified that would 
itself lie somewhere, secured and self-sufficient. Words 
are rather essentially active and productive, poietic: in 
the movement of their Winken something becomes manifest. 
More: Something is actually instituted. 
But what is instituted? The answer is: Being. Or 
rather: Being in the historical existence of a people. 
Since Being is that which alw,ays already is. that which 
signs in the people (das Weiterwinken dieser Winke in das 
Volk)." 
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remains. the saying of the poet can only institute Being 
in a specific language, can put it to work in language, in 
such a way as to institute it in the historical existence 
of a people. The existence of a p~ople is actually 
instituted in and through language, in and through the 
poietic activity of the poet. Hence poetry is the 
"origine.ry language of ;1 people" [Ursprache eines Volkes]. 
But why poetry? Why poetry more than philosophy, 
for example? How is it that language. and more 
specifically poetry, is essentially related to man's 
historical and political Dasein? And if the essence of 
poetry indeed lies, as Heidegger suggests, in the fact 
that it exposes the Dasein of man to the whole of beings, 
the question remains to know how a "construction of 
language" 4 --what Holderlin calls a "dialogue" CGesprach)!5-
-can actually take up such an original task. How can 
language in the form of poetry. and that is in the form of 
what is traditionally considered as a mode of pure 
discourse, actually institute Being, in such a way that 
the Dasein of a people would essentially be related to 
Being in this very institution? 
Why, then, is the poetic privileged over any other 
Martin Heidegger, GA 39, 59. 
Viel hat erfahren der Mensch. 
Der Himmlischen viele genannt, 
Seit ein Gesprach wir sind 
Und horen konnen voneinander. 
Holderlin--IV, 343. 
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- 1 ") kind of anguage: Because it is not a form of exoression 
of language among other forms of language. but rather the 
very essence of language, and that is the very way in 
which language essentially unfolds as language. Poetry is 
the primary, originary mode of language. Language as we 
conceive of it in our average, ordinary understanding is 
nothing but a derivative mode of this primordial and more 
essential mode. Language as a mode of expression--
whether in its ordinary and most corru~on form. viz. in 
"idle talk", or in its more unusual and sophisticated 
form. viz. in philosophical discourse--is already a 
"fallen" mode of language, i.e .. a mode that is already 
situated at a certain distance from the essence of 
language. Language in its essence is not expression. For 
to express something through words, it would first be 
necessary for man to possess language as something ready-
to-hand. Now language in its essence is not something 
that can be possessed, and hence used or even manipulated. 
Such uselesness, or rather the impossibility of putting 
language to work in such a way that it would manifest the 
inner life of a subject is what is revealed in poetry as 
Dichtunq. Poetry alone .. as Heidegger puts it, accounts 
for the fact that "we do not possess language, but 
language possesses us. for better or for worse." 6 
But to say that language possesses us is 
6 GA 39. 23. 
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tantamount to saying that we are always already caught 
in language, thrown into language, in such a way that our 
essential relation to beings, and to the Being of beings, 
is always, from the very outset, a relation of language. 
Thus to think language in its essence is to think it in 
its necessary and primary relation to Being. In the act 
of poeticizing the poet takes up this essential relation 
to Being, brings it to language, to a specific language i~ 
which Being as such is instituted. In the poetizing act 
of the poet there is a specific instituting, a specific 
initiating of Being, and not only an "expression" of 
Being. 
In a way, poetry says nothing but the fact that 
man is in language. In other words, the Being of man, the 
Sein of Dasein is held by language. Insofar as man is 
held by language, he is the there of Being. Language is 
the disclosedness of Being: in language the unconcealment 
of beings--i.e., the originary unconcealment along with 
its immediate and simultaneous covering-up--is completed. 
There is a world, i.e., there is manifestation or coming 
into being--in other words, fhere is Being--only insofar 
as there is language. The world can "world" for man only 
insofar as man dwells within language. Without language, 
man would be like an animal. "poor in world" (weltarm), or 
93 
1n:e a plant. "without a world" (weltlosl 7 : His relation 
to the world would no longer be a relation to Being in its 
unconcealment. He would no longer be exposed to the whole 
of beings, to the violence and the strangeness of beings. 
Nor would he any longer be exposed to the threat of non-
being, a threat that essentially belongs to Being. He 
would no longer take up, institute and shelter the 
overpowering power of physis. He would be without a 
history or a destiny: 
Wherever language is not encountered, as in animals 
and plants, there is, in spite of life, no opening of 
Being and hence no Non-being (Nichtsein] and no 
emptiness of nothingness. Plants and animals stand 
below all of this, for they are ruled solely by blind 
desires and frantic flights. The world rules solely 
where language is encountered. Only where the world 
is encountered, and that is where language is 
encountered, the supreme danger also is encountered. 
the danger par excellence, i.e., the threat of 
non-being upon Being as such (GA 39, 62). 
Through language, then. man becomes "the witness 
of Being." In language man supports Being and responds to 
Being. Man is, literally, responsive to and responsible 
of Being. Hence to be the witness of Being is to be 
active in the midst of the very strifely character of 
Being. In such witnessing. it is a matter of taking up 
the unconcealment of beings, in such a way that Being 
7 See Heidegger's winter semester 1929/30 lecture 
course (Gesamtausqabe 29/30, p. 276 ff.) and Introduction 
to Metaphysics (p. 34); see also Jacques Derrida's 
discussion of the issue in Del' Esprit--Heidegq~r et la 
Question (Paris: Galilee, 1987). 
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itself would be instituted in language. and would yet 
remain threatened by non-being in the very taking up of 
Being. In other words, in instituting Being, it is also a 
matter of instituting and keeping open the very threat of 
Being. and of dwelling within this threat. Such dwelling, 
as will later be seen, can be understood as supremely 
political. 
The danger linked to poetry is twofold. On the 
one hand, there is a danger that belongs to the very 
essence of poetry as the taking up in language of Being in 
its relation to its counter-essence, viz. non-being. Such 
taking up--what Heidegger calls "the danger of the 
essence" (and one must hear the double genetive)--is the 
most difficult and delicate task. Such a danger. 
according to Heidegger, is expressed.in H6lderlin's 
statement according to which "language is the most 
dangerous of all goods." 0 But on the other hand, this 
activity of the poet, this instituting and initiating 
moment is doomed to fall (verfallen): sooner or later, it 
is doomed to being perverted, covered-up, obliterated in 
ordinary discourse. Hence there is a different type of 
danger, a danger which, from the very outset, threatens 
the essence of poetry. What is a matter of Anfang. of 
radical beginning in poetry is progressively but 
inevitably doomed to fall into the familiar and almost 
e Friedrich H6lderlin, Fragment 13, IV, 246. 
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tr1VlctJ. domain of ordinary discourse. Such :alling 
belongs to the very essence of language. even though it 
constantly threatens the most powerful and disclosive 
dimension of language. viz. poetry. The counter-essence 
of language, viz. that which, from the beginning, 
undermines the essence of language. belongs essentially to 
language. From the very start. the uncanny or unfamiliar 
essence of language is always about to fall into its 
counter-essence, into its own negation: 
But the poetic saying falls [verfallt], it becomes 
"prose", first in the true sense, and then in the bad 
sense, and finally becomes idle talk [Gerede]. The 
scientific conception of language and the philosophy 
of language start off from this daily use of language 
and hence from its fallen form, and thus consider 
"poetry'' as an exception to the rule. Everything 
stands on its head (GA 39, 64). 
For the most part we--and that is "we" Westerners--today--
and that is at a time when the Gods have fled--live in 
fallen language. 11 We" today are perhaps most remote from 
the essence of language. and that is from the very 
possibility of an authentic history and an authentic 
destiny, if poetry is indeed the "primary language 
[Ursprache] of a people." We today would then be most 
endangered, most threatened by counter-essence. 
But where danger is, grows 
The saving power also. 
Indeed, the "necessary domination" of the counter-
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e~sence can in turn be thought of as an impulse to assert 
anew the essence of which the counter-essence is Cnon-
dialectical) contradiction. At the time when the Gods 
have fled and when the earth remains without any Gods, at 
the time, then, of what Holderlin calls the Not, there is 
still a space for a saying that would indicate such 
distress and that would prepare the way for the coming of 
new Gods. Even at the most remote point of proximity frcm 
the origin and the essence of language lies the 
possibility of a radically new beginning. Even in the 
most fallen language lies the possibility of historicity, 
i.e .. of a future that would be the destiny of a people. 
Such possibility, according to Heidegger, lies in the 
Dichtung of Holderlin. Hence the very possibility of a 
future, the possibility of history and of actuality lies 
primarily in language as poetry. But to say this does not 
mean that poetry constitutes a program or a project for 
history, a program that would then need to be 'applied' to 
the 'concrete world', as though poetry were something 
abstract that would require its own translation into 
concrete terms. Rather, it means that poetry, insofar as 
it is Dichtung and not mere Poesie, essentially unfolds as 
Geschichte, and not as mere Historie. This, in turn, 
means that an essential connection is made between 
language as poetry and the very possibility of history and 
destiny: 
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The poetic is the fundamental joint [das GrundgefUgel 
of the historical Dasein, and that means: language as 
such constitutes the original essence [das 
ursprlingliche Wesen] of the historical Being of man. 
The essence of the Being of man cannot first be 
defined and then, afterwards and in addition. be 
granted with language. Rather. the original 
essence of his Being is language itself (GA 39. 67-
68) . 
In poetry language as such happens. La 
comes into being. Such happening is supremely historical. 
for it is also the happening of man in time. the coming 
into being of an historical Dasein. The coming into being 
of language is the beginning of the historical time proper 
to man. In the coming into being of language man comes. 
literally. to be: ·The Being of man, specifically the Being 
of a historical Dasein, occurs in language. The poet is 
the one who institutes Being. who brings it to language. 
to the language of a specific historical Dasein. In 
bringing Being to language, the poet places Being in the 
Dasein of a people. In inscribing Being in the language 
of a people, the poet actually opens up the very 
historicity of the people, the very space and time within 
which the people will become historical. In that sense, 
the saying of the poet is grounding. And the destiny--and 
that is also the grandeur--of the people will depend on 
whether it will remain within the sending of the poet's 
saying. or whether it will progressively close off what 
was once opened up by the poet, viz. the totality of 
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the Gods. the earth. men. history. 
Throughout, then, the question of history and the 
question of the political as essentially linked to 
history, will be a matter of language. specifically a 
matter of language as poetry, and, of poetry as it 
essentially unfolds in Holderlin's saying. 
( B) 
all essential and great 
things could arise only 
because man had a homeland 
and because he was rooted in a tradition. 
--Martin Heidegger, "Interview" with Der Spiegel. 
The emergence of the political in poetry is always 
the emergence of a specific epoch of history, the 
beginning of a new historical (geschichtlich) time in a 
specific Dichtung. According to Introduction to 
Metaphysics, the essence of the Greek polis is determined 
in Sophocles' Antigone. But where is the essence of 
Germany--and that is, for Heidegger. of the West--
determined? Who is the poet whose saying is such as to 
reveal the historical-political situation of the West as 
well as its destiny? The answer is: Holderlin. Holderlin 
is the poet through whom Heidegger addresses the question 
of the historical-political situation of Germany at the 
end of metaphysics. 
Heidegger began to lecture on Holderlin in the 
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Winter semester of 1934-35. right after he resigned from 
the Rectorate. Through an incessant reading of Holderlin, 
from 1934 to the end of the war. Heidegger will be 
concerned with coming to grips with the historial-
political reality of his time, and that is with what he 
will later call--all too carelessly and simplistically--
the emergence of technology through ''l'l.mericanism" and 
"Sovietism." But during that same period, Heidegger will 
also be concerned with thinking the historical and 
political situation in which Germany was caught. 
Specifically, he will be engaged in an Auseinandersetzunq 
with his 1933-34 political involvement and statements as 
well as with Nazism as a whole. His writings of the time 
constitute a move away from politics into the question of 
the political, essentially defined as withdrawal. 
Heidegger will be concerned with thematizing the retreat 
of the political, that is both the withdrawal from 
politics and the retreat of the political (the political 
that essentially withdraws). Such a confrontation remains 
for the most part implicit (although it is sometimes made 
explicit) and operates at the level of Geschichtlichkeit. 
But it is also total, in the sense that it engages the 
totality of Heidegger's thinking. 
In the Winter semester of 1934-35, Heidegger 
lectured on Holderlin's hymns, "Germanien" and "der 
~ 11 9 fil)e1_n . The context of this lecture course was 
politically very determined--if not overdetermined: 
Heidegger had just resigned from his Rectorate and the 
lecture course on two of Holderlin's hymns seem to mark 
the break with all kinds of political engagement or 
responsibility. After 1934, everything happens as if 
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Heidegger had definitively withdrawn from politics and had 
devot himself to problems of "pure philosophy" and 
"poetry". Yet this withdrawal from politics is 
essentially linked to Heidegger's reading of Holderlin. 
Furthermore, I beljeve Heidegger's reading of Holderlin to 
be a way of reengaging the question of the political, in a 
way that puts not only his own engagement into question. 
but also the very way in which the political is being 
thought and lived, whether in America, in the Soviet Union 
or in Germany. 10 Throughout, Heidegger's reading of 
9
. See appendix for full quotation of the hymns. 
10 If, in Heidegger's view, America and the Soviet 
Union can indeed be thought together, it seems, on the 
other hand, that Germany (i.e. the essence of Germany) is 
conceived of as the only possible future of the West. To 
the extent that Germany, along with Ancient Greece, is the 
country of the "metaphysical language" as well as the 
"center of the West", it cannot be thought together with 
Americanism and Sovietism. The privilege of Germany will 
remain unquestioned in Heidegger, and much will need to be 
said about such a privilege (see chap. 3). Yet the 
Holderlin lectures constitute an attempt to think the 
essence of the political outside the political framework 
of the Nazi period. Even though these lectures reassert 
in a way the privilege of Germany over any other 
"country"--and that is over any other language--, they do 
so in a way that radically undermines the metaphysics of 
National-Socialism. 
HBlderlin will be truly--even though often al!u8ively and 
cryptically--historical and political. 
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The 1934-35 lecture course opens up what we 
believe to be Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with the 
political reality of his time. The choice of Holderlin is 
not merely incidental. Indeed. for Heidegger Holderlin is 
the national poet, i.e .. the poet fer whom the f in.1 l staJ.:e 
of his Gedicht is the possibility of a history and a 
destiny for the German people. The very consideration of 
Holderlin's poetry in such terms already calls into 
question the legitimacy of the Nazi regime: to pose the 
problem of the possibility of a destiny and. an authentic 
or proper history that would be heralded in Holderlin's 
poetry is already to deny the political reality of the 
time any kind of legitimacy. From the very outset, in the 
"Preliminary Remark" of the 1934-35 lecture course. 
Heidegger speaks of Holderlin as "the poet who still 
confronts the Germans as a test to be stood" and whose 
work "still deprived of time and space has already 
exceeded our historizing/historical bustling activity 
[unser historisches Getue] and grounded the beginning of 
another history." 11 To speak in such terms is to submit, 
almost explicitly, the political reality of Hitler's 
Germany to a higher historical and destinal possibility, a 
possibility contained in a poet's saying. This is made 
11 GA 39, 1. 
even more explicit in the fol lowing sta.terr.ent. where t";;e 
"we" Heidegger uses seems to involve the totality of the 
German people, and hence where the "we" seems to be 
historical (geschichtlich): 
We do not wish to conform Holderlin to our time. On 
the contrary, we wish to submit ourselves as well as 
those to come to the poet's measure [MaJ3 J (GA 39. 4 i . 
To bring the totality of a people's desti~y ~nder the 
saying of a single poet is perhaps "naive", "unrealistic" 
and "elitist"--although the matter will appear to be much 
more complicated than what such terms seem to indicate. 
But at the same time, it is also the manifestation of a 
thinking engaged in an attempt to think the political and 
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the possibility of an authentic German history outside the 
ideological framework imposed by the Nazis. It is, for 
• 
example. an attempt to think the relation between poetry 
and the possibility of history outside of the biological 
framework: 
The writer Kolbenheyer says: "Poetry is a biological 
function necessary to the people." Little 
understanding is required to note that this also holds 
true for digestion, which is also a biological 
function necessary to the people .... When Spengler 
defines poetry as the expression of the soul proper to 
each culture, it also holds true for the 
making of bicycles and automobiles .... From the very 
start. such definiton brings the concept of poetry to 
a domain that excludes the slightest possibility of 
grasping the essence. All of this is so hopelessly 
dull ... (GA 39, 27) 
Heidegger's reading of Holderlin is engaged in an 
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of the poet. This does not mean that Heidegger's approach 
to Holderlin is "historical." On the contrary. It is not 
a matter of reading Holderlin with a view to contributing 
to the history of literature and to Holderlinian 
scholarship. Rather. it is a matter of indicating the 
historical dimension. and tha~ is t essentially destinal 
dimension of Holderlin's poetry. So that, in the end. it 
is not a matter of situating Holderlin in his time. but of 
situating ourselves in the horizon of the radically new 
saying of the poet, a saying which. in its very founding. 
exceeds our time. In other words, to read Holderlin 
seriously, i.e., to read Holderlin as the poet of the 
future of Germany. one is required to undergo a radical 
transformation. In such a reading, one is no longer 
allowed to trace the poems back to Holderlin's time. and 
to show how they "illustrate" that time. In other words. 
if one wishes to read Holderlin seriously with Heidegger, 
one cannot read him as a romantic author. Rather, one is 
required to call into question the actuality of our time, 
in the name of the radically new measure that Holderlin 
institutes. For us, readers of Holderlin, it is a matter 
of thinking the new historical beginning initiated in 
Holderlin's poetry. For the German people, it is a matter 
of "broaching its actuality." 12 Hence such reading is far 
12 GA 39, 213. 
e •han a reading mor "' 
t would be merely pleasurable or 
informative. What is at stake here is the future of 
~ 
Germany and of the West. The stake. then, is both 
historical and political. It is both a matter of 
identifying the time in which we live and of thinking 
whether this time is open to a future. What is our time? 
And what is t:-,e new "measure" that Hol lin would 
institute? 
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The sixth section of the 1934- lecture course is 
devoted to these questions. The section is entitled: "The 
determination of the 'We' from the horizon of the question 
of time," and consists in a commentary of the line of 
Germanien which reads: 
... none of us knows what is happening to him (V. 271 
The 'We' that is operative here corresponds, according to 
Heidegger, to the question "Who are we?" and not to the 
question "What are we?" 13 The 'who' of man is privileged 
over his 'what', and the difference is temporal. What is 
essential is to know what time the 'We' refers to: 
But the 'us' and the 'we' the poet speaks of here, are 
they the people of yesterday, the Germans of 1801? Or 
should those of 1934 also be included? Or does 
Holderlin mean the Germans of 1980? Or even those who 
are without a year? What chronology is referred to 
13 One recalls that the question of th~ 'who' of man 
also governed Heidegger's reading of the chorus from 
Antigone in Introduction to Metaphysics. The question is 
the same, but the time has changed. 
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here, and what is the time which is in poetry (GA 
49)? 
Furthermore, .the time of the 'we'. and that is the time of 
a people. is essentially different from the time of the 
'I'. the individual time. Where does the difference lie? 
The title of Sa--"The measurable time of the individual 
and the original time of the people"--provides ·v·<llu.able 
indications. There is a certain dissyrrunetry in the title 
itself. On the one hand. the time of the individual would 
be measurable; it would be the time for which we would 
have a measure. On the other hand, the original time of 
the people is not said to be measurable. It is only said 
to be "original." Unlike the time of the individual. the 
time of the origin would be unmeasurable. Or rather. we 
would lack a measure to evaluate the time of the origin. 
Why? How does the original time flee from measurable 
time. from chronology? 
In the original time of the people, something 
radically new, something "initial" (anfanqlich) is 
instituted. Insofar as this time is radically new. it is 
the transgression and the negation of all the standards, 
the laws, the measures. The time of the origin is a time 
that originates. As such, it is its own law (Gesetz), its 
own positing (Setzung), its own measure (MaB). It is the 
founding of a new beginning, a founding that involves 
violence against its own time. This new beginning is such 
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as to escape all measure. all grasping: it only opens t 
abyss of its self-positing and institutes the violence of 
its law. 
Such instituting is the privilege of the 
"creators" (die Schaffenden). They are primarily the 
poets, 14 and then the thinkers and the State founders: 
The historical Dasein of a people--its rise. its pe 
its fall--originates in poetry. From the latter 
[arises] authentic knowing, in the sense of 
philosophy. And from these two, the actnalization of 
the Dasein of a people as a people through the State--
politics originates (GA 39, 51). · 
The creators "ground (qrUnden) the historical existence of 
a people," and this grounding constitutes its own 
justification (BegrUndunq). The grounding act of the 
creator is self-grounding. and the measure or the 
justification of such grounding cannot be found outside 
the act itself. Such is the contradiction which the 
creators originate: Insofar as they are founders. they set 
new standards and new laws for the future; they broach a 
new beginning of history. And yet, such founding is 
always made at the cost of a transgression of a given 
time, of a violence produced against the standards and the 
laws of this time. So that the creator is always ahead of 
14 Here "primarily" does not mean chronologically 
"first." We have just emphasized the fact that the time 
of the origin is precisely such as to transgress all 
chronological determinations and all measurable 
evaluations. Its primacy is rather to be understood in 
historical (in the sense of Geschichte) terms. 
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it: 
But ,if someone audaciously thrusts high above his own 
time, the today of which is calculable. if. like the 
poet. he is forced to thrust and to come into the free 
(das Freie), he must on the other hand become a 
stranger to those to whom he belongs in his lifetime. 
He never knows his people and is always a scandal to 
them. He questions true time for his own time. and 
each time places himself outside the time cf the 
today (GA 39, 50). 
Because of his very nature. the creator cannot be 
'at home' in the time of his today. He is always beyond, 
ahead. in a time that opposes and negates the present 
time. Hence the situation of the creator is a situation 
of exile. of unfamiliarity. of Unheimlichkeit. even though 
his creation is precisely such as to found a new and more 
proper dwelling for the people to come. The very 
possibility of an authentic dwelling presupposes an 
absence of dwelling, a thrownness out of the familiar into 
the vertjginous abyss of the uncanny. In other words, the 
very possibility of a place in which a people's Dasein 
will become historical--i.e., the very possibility of a 
polis--presupposes an absence of place. a radical 
displacement. Hence, in his throwness out of the time and 
the space of his epoch, in his essential Unheimlichkeit. 
the creator is also necessarily unheimisch, i.e., strange. 
uncanny, obscure: monstruous. A certain monstrosity is at 
play in each creator, for what is broached by the creators 
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is cisely such as to exceed and threaten all the 
standards and the measures with which we define 
"normality". 
What is. then. Holderlin's specific monstrosity? 
What is the abyss with which it confronts us and in front 
of which we are to stand if we wish to be with a future? 
What is the specific character of Hol lin's creation? 
W11at must be the character of his founding if it is such 
as to reveal the essence and open the future of an entire 
nation? 
The abyss that Holderlin opens beneath our feet is 
the abyss proper to our time. The a.byss is the absence of 
Gods. To stand before the abyss. to endure the vertigo 
that such a situation implies is the "grandeur" and the 
"mission" of the German historical Dasein. For to endure 
the flight of the Gods or the "distress" is not to 
renounce the possibility of a future. It is not to 
renounce the possibility of the divine. But it is to 
renounce the Gods that have fled. And this is by no means 
a "pessimistic" or "nihilistic" attitude. On the 
contrary: 
The true renunciating, i.e., the renunciating that is 
carried and granted by a fundamental tone that 
authentically unfolds. is creative-generative (GA 39, 
94) . 
To experience the absence of the Gods is already in a way 
to prepare oneself for the coming of new Gods. To wait 
is to free the space f cr 
coming of the Gods. Such waiting is what Holderlin calls 
the "sacred mourning" (das Heilige Trauern). and it 
constitutes the fundamental tone (Grundstimmunq) of the 
poem "Germanien". The mourning refers to the Gods that 
have fled, which does not mean that it consists in a 
"nostalgic attachment to the nast." Rather. it J.~ ",:::, 
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standing-fast-within-ones~lf (ein In-sich-fest-stehen) and 
a Bestehen of the 'there' and the here." (94) Hence the 
fundamental tone is not only specific to the poem, but it 
also stands as a fundamental attitude that the people's 
Dasein must take up in its 'there' and its 'here'. 
Rather, it stands in the poem as that in which "the time 
of the people" unfolds and the "world-destiny 
(Weltgeschickl of the earth of the homeland'' is at issue. 
Whenever the earth is "prepared for the Gods." it is 
sacred. And the sacred earth is what Holderlin calls the 
Vaterland. Ultimately, then, Holderlin would provide the 
earth on which he dwells with a sacred dimension. In 
other words, it is a matter of turning Germany into a true 
Vaterland. It is a matter of politics--if politics is 
indeed the way to provide the polis with Gods. 
What is the Vaterland? It is the Land der Vater. 
the land of the fathers, "the historical Being of a 
people" (120). Such Being, Heidegger says, "is poetically 
instituted, assembled by thought, placed in a knowing and 
in the activity of the State founder." 1 !!5 I-Iere 
triad. the tryptic or the triangle of the creators is 
mentioned once again: the poets, the thinkers and the 
statesmen. Hence the Vaterland or the homeland (what 
could also be called the polis, if the Dasein at stake 
here were not the Dasein of the West at the end of 
mataphysics but the Anci Greek Dasein), that wh~ch 
would ground the political in its essence. is the result 
of a threefold activity. the first of which alone is said 
to be truly "instituting". As has been already pointed 
out, the privilege or the primacy of poetry over the two 
other founding activities cannot be thought of as merely 
"chronological". Rather, it is to be thought as 
"logical", if what is meant thereby is that the Vaterland 
can be posited as such only in logos. only in language 
essentially determined as poetry. In other words, the 
very possibility of history, the Vaterland, the political 
in its essence can originate solely in and through 
language. 
What is the Vaterland? What is the essence of 
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Germanness? In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger comments 
on the word Vaterland in Holderlin's "Heimkunft" in the 
following way: 
The word is thought here in an essential sense, not 
patriotically or nationalistically but terms of the 
1!5 GA 39, 120. 
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history Being. The essence of the homeland. 
however. is also mentioned with the intention of 
thinking the homelessness of contemporary man from the 
essence of Being's history .... when Holderlin writes 
"Homecoming" he is concerned that 'his coutrymen find 
their essence. He does not at all seek that essence 
in an egoism of his nation. He sees it rather in the 
context of a belongingness to the destiny of the West 
[my italics) . 16 
This passage is extremely dense and very illuminating with 
regard to the question of the political. In a way. it 
does not say precisely what the homeland consists in. 
Rather, it seems to repeat what has already been said with 
respect to the Greek polis in its relation to Being. 
Indeed. both the Greek polis and the homeland are to be 
thought according to their essence. and that is according 
to their relation to the history of Being. Both the polis 
and the homeland escape the traditional political 
determinations. that is. the Roman determinations: like 
the polis, the homeland is neither a natio nor a patria. 
And if man today is homeless, i.e., without a home or a 
homeland that would correspond to his essence, it is not 
because of a loss of national identity, because of wars of 
division or, on the contrary, because of factical 
reunifications of different people. Rather, it is cause 
of the lack of an essential relation to ing. Heidegger 
insists on the essential difference between a level of 
discourse that would be merely ontic and historisch, on 
16 "Letter on Humanism" in Basic Writings, 217. 
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the one hand. ontological and geschichtlich on the other 
hand. To a patriotic discourse that would sing of the 
homecoming in the horizon of a national egoism. and that 
~ould be grounded in a metaphysical. Roman and historical 
conception of the political, Heidegger wishes to oppose a 
discourse that would point to the essence of the homeland, 
i.e .. a discourse that would be grounded in the 
historical-destinal dimension of Being. To a homeland 
conceived in terms of "a mere space delimited by external 
borders. a natural region. a place as the possible scene 
of such or such event that would take place", 17 Heidegger 
opposes what he takes to be the essence of the homeland. 
The question, now, is to know how the essential 
homelessness of our time can give way to a homecoming--
how, in other words, there can be such a thing as a 
homeland. 
What is this essence? When is there a homeland 
(Vaterland)? When, Heidegge.r says, "the earth" (die 
Erde)--i.e., "the earth of the homeland" (die heimatliche 
Erde)--is "prepared (erzogen) for the Gods." 18 In other 
words. what is essential to the homeland. i.e., that 
without which there cannot be such a thing as an authentic 
history and a historical Dasein--that without which there 
would be no political life--, is the element of the 
17 GA 39, 104. 
18 Ibid. 
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divine. The opening of the earth to powe1- of the 
is "the same" as the emergence of the homeland. In 
greeting within itself the coming of the Gods. the earth 
becomes "holy". But such holiness is not to be understood 
in Christian terms. In the holiness of the earth it is 
not a matter of peace and tranquility. The Gods do not 
bri saintliness and serenity to the p le. On the 
con~rary. In becoming holy. the earth becomes the space 
of the "storm" of the Gods. and is hence "torn open in i 
grounds and abysses [in ihren Grlinden und Abgrlinden 
aufgerissen wird] ."1. 9 To keep the rift open, to endure 
the earth in its abysmal openness, that is to "poetically 
dwell on this earth" 20--such is the historical-political 
possibility and mission of the people: 
The great turns of the time of the people always come 
from out of the abyss. and each time to the degree in 
which a people goes down into it, that is goes down 
into its earth and possesses a homeland (GA 39, 106). 
But there is always the temptation to quiet the storm. to 
turn the uncanny and the monstrous into the familiar and 
the obvious. There is always the temptation to transform 
the homeland into a mere gee-political space, the tendency 
to forget the abyss on which the homeland is grounded. 
But how can .the homeland be grounded on an abyss? 
19 Ibid. . 105. 
2 0 Holderlin, VI. 25. 
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How can an abyss ground at all? Is the abyss not 
precisely the absence of ground. the very impossibility of 
ground? Heidegger poses the following paradox: 
The abyss [isl where the solidity and the 
specificity of all grounds disappear, and yet where 
everything constantly finds itself for the dawn of a 
new becoming (GA 39, 105-106) ... 
The contradiction which we. as an historical Dasein. are 
to take up and preserve as contradiction, can be 
formulated in the following way: the radical beginning or 
the "new becoming" initiated and instituted by the poet--
in other words the basis or the launching of the 
possibility of a future and a history--, insofar as it is 
radical, cannot originate from causal determinations. In 
the temporality proper to the beginning--in historical 
(geschichtlich) temporality--it is not a matter of 
historiography. For the beginning initiated in the poet's 
saying is--by its very nature--such as to exceed the 
standards and the means which render Historie possible. 
In this very excess, poetry opens up the abyss from out of 
which it originates. In the very institution or grounding 
of the beginning, the abyss is broached. The grounding of 
the beginning reveals primarily its own and essential 
absence of ground. 
What Heidegger says of the Anfang in history is 
most akin to what Hannah Arendt says of politics and of 
the radical beginnings in politics--even though, unlike 
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Arendt. by politics Heidegger does not primarily mean the 
occurence and sharing of freedom in a common space.21 
politics, then, exists or does not exist; its emergence at 
a certain time and space is inexplicable; it is the mark 
of a. radical beginning. Moreover, politics originate here 
and there only to disappear without leaving any traces. 
for example, speaking of the Resistance. in the words of 
Rene Char. as a "1 ost treasure," Jl.rend.t writes: 
The men of the European Resistance were neither the 
first nor the last to lose their treasure. The 
history of revolutions--from the summer of 1776 in 
Philadelphia and the summer of 1789 in Paris to the 
autumn of 1956 in Budapest--which politically spells 
out the innermost story of the modern age, could be 
told in parable form as the tale of an old-age 
treasure which. under the most varied circumstances, 
appears abruptly, unexpectedly, and disapears again, 
under different mysterious conditions. as though it 
were a fata morgana. 2 2 
That which H. Arendt suggests could be told in a parable. 
in a mythos is taken more literally by Heidegger. For 
such mysterious emergence appears indeed through mythoi, 
through poetry--through Holderlin's poetry, for example. 
What is most striking in Arendt's statement, with respect 
to Heidegger. is that it asserts the same radical--and 
21 But even this is not obvious: it could be argued 
that the polis or the Vaterland in Heidegger is indeed the 
sharing of freedom in a common space. but that such space 
would first need to be made common through the sharing of 
a common relation to the forces of Being. a relation 
centered around the presence of common Gods. 
22 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future .(London: 
Penguin Books. 1961), p. 5. 
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11.ence uncanny, mystericus--power of the beginning. 
It also asserts the same fragility of the 
beginning, the beginning's tendency to vanish into 
oblivion. Still interpreting the words of Char. 23 Arendt 
suggests that the "inheritance" is most often left without 
a "testament", i.e., without a tradition--"which selects 
and names, which hands down and preserves, which indicates 
where the treasures are and what their worth is." 24 In 
other words, most often. the time--or the future--opened 
up by the beginning is suddenly closed off. Whenever we 
do not move ourselves within the time broached by the 
radical beginning, whenever we do not "remember" the 
origin, history only becomes the "sempiternal change of 
the world and the biological cycle of living creatures in 
it." 2 !5 "Remembrance"--which Arendt. in a most 
Holderlinian (and Heideggerian) way, says is "one of the 
most important modes of thought"--is not only that without 
which there would be no past for a people. and hence no 
true political community, but also. paradoxically, that 
without which there can be no future. Without 
remembrance, there can be no will for a future. Still 
speaking of the Resistance, Arendt writes: 
23 Notre heritage n'est precede d'aucun testament--
"our inheritance was not preceded by any testament." 
24 Between Past and future, p. 5. 
Ibid. 
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Thus the treasure was lost not because of historical 
circumstances and the adversity of reality but because 
no tradition had foreseen its appearance or its 
reality, because no testament had willed it for the 
future. The loss, at any rate, perhaps inevitable in 
terms of political reality, was consummated by 
oblivion, by a failure of memory ... 2 6 
The "treasure"--the origin or the forgotten 
beginning: the homeland--. according to Heidegger. would 
be heralded in poetry. But i~ would be of 
responsibility of the historical Dasein to live under the 
power of such a beginning. A demand, a certain ethics. 
perhaps. would be at issue in keeping the origin alive, in 
remembering the past. No politics--no political programs 
or theories--would actually unfold from such remembrance. 
but a certain tradition could indeed unfold from it. 
Through remembrance, a political community would exist as 
such. 
For the past, in the words of Faulkner, "is never 
dead, it is not even past." Likewise, for Heidegger, the 
ancient Gods--without which the earth would not be the 
homeland--are not merely gone. They are still 'there' in 
a way. They are in a way present--but in a mode of 
presenc~ that remains decisively absent. They are not 
actually present, and yet they remain as the Gods which 
may no longer be called upon. They remain in the mode of 
a having been (Gewesenheit), which Heidegger 
26 Ibid., p. 6. 
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differentiates from the mere past (Vergangenheit). What 
Heidegger says of the having been is remarkably close to 
what Arendt says of the past. Heidegger writes: 
What is past is irremediably closed off. impossible to 
bring back; it lies firmly in the past which, as 
language adequately says, is a space-time [Zeitrauml. 
and a lumber room as it were, in which everything that 
has passed by, that has gone away is piled up .... What 
is past lies before the door of the present and can 
never come back in it nor enter it.. The having been, 
however, continues to be, and we ourselves are this 
having been in the way in which. in placing it before 
us, in saving it. in bringing it forward or also in 
rejecting it and wanting to forget it, we let it 
come to stand within our Da-sein. The shadows of 
those that have been come to visit us again, come to 
us, are to come [sind zu-kilnftiq] (GA 39, 108). 
Arendt, in a commentary on a text by Kafka27 , writes: 
... not only the future--"the wave of the future"--but 
also the past is seen as a force, and not, as in 
nearly all our metaphors, as a burden man has to 
2 7 The text--a parable--reads as follows: 
He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind. 
from the origin. The second blocks the road ahead. He 
gives battle to both. To be sure, the first supports him 
in his fight with the second, for he wants to push him 
forward, and in the same way the second supports him in 
his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But 
it is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two 
antagonists who are there, but he himself as well, and who 
really knows his intentions? His dream. though, is that 
some time in an unguarded moment--and this would require a 
night darker than any night has ever been yet--he will 
jump out of the fighting line and be promoted. on account 
of his experience in fighting, to the position of umpire 
over his antagonists in their fight with each other. 
The story is the last of a series of "Notes from the year 
1920," under the title "HE." Translated from the German 
by Willa and Edwin Muir in The Great Wall of China. New 
York, 1946. 
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shoulder and of whose dead weight the living car: c.:.---
even must get rid of in their march into the future ... 
This past, moreover, reaching all the way back into 
the origin, does not pull back but presses forward, 
and it is, contrary to what one would expect, the 
future which drives us back into the past. 28 
What is most striking about these two texts is that they 
are engaged in a reworking of the traditional conception 
of history through a radical re-thinking of time. More 
specifically, both texts tend to literally dismantle the 
linear conception of history, in such a way that the 
notions of past and future no longer function as moments 
of a chronological sequence. In such a radical 
dismantling, the past--and what is meant by past is the 
origin or the beginning which is so decisive, abrupt and 
sudden, so abysmal, that most often the mere actuality of 
the time is not in a position to recognize it as what it 
is and hence to free the space for its own actuality--
becomes that which remains ahead, that which is still 
decisive for our future. that which actually discloses the 
historical and political future. 
In such time, which Heidegger cal ls "authentic'", 
it is a matter of hearing the echo of the origin. It is a 
matter of recovering the "lost treasure"--the homeland: 
the very possibility of a history and a political 
community gathered in its essence--which was once 
instituted in Holderlin's poetry and which is still 
28 Between Past and Future. p. 10-11. 
preserved in it. Specifically, it is a matter of 
renouncing the ancient Gods, and in this very 
renunciation, of preparing the way for the coming of the 
new Gods. In other words, it is a matter of entering the 
fundamental tone. For the fundamental tone is that in 
which the homeland is preserved, that in which "the 
destiny of a people and the relation to its Gods is taken 
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further and brought together in unity. "29 But such unity--
-the unity of the origin: the original or originary unity-
-is not a quiet, peaceful and strifeless unity. On the 
contrary: 
The fundamental tone is original primarily because it 
does not artificially assemble the uttermost 
oppositions, the decided renouncement and the 
unconditional expectation, but lets them rather 
unitarily spring from the most original essence of 
temporality (GA 39. 117). 
Such "original holding together" (ursprlinqlich 
Zusammenhang) is, according to Heidegger, what will later 
be called--specifically in the poem "der Rhein"--
"Innigkeit." It is of the utmost importance to grasp the 
true meaning of this word, for it will appear to be 
decisive for the understanding of the political. In this 
word the most active and original forces of Being in their 
connection with an historical Dasein are named. In order 
to unfold the meaning of the word, it is necessary to 
29 GA 39, 117. 
refer to "der Rhein" and to Heidegger's comrn.entary in §19 
of the 1934-35 lecture course. even though the indications 
provided in § 10 are already decisive. Innigkeit 
ordinarily has a plurality of meanings: ardour, fervour, 
cordiality, sincerity, tenderness, all of which seem to be 
related to feelings, specifically to intimate feelings. 
Hence it also has the meaning of "intimacy". In his 
reading of Holderlin. however. Heidegger is very c ious 
not to read in the word Innig}~ei t the determinations that 
define it in ordinary German: 
Now a misunderstanding first needs to be avoided: 
'Innigkeit' does not mean the mere 'inner life' 
[Innerlichkeit] of an emotion in the sense in which a 
'lived experience' would be shut up in itself [im 
Sinne des Bei-sich-verschlieBens eines 'Erlebnisses'). 
Nor does it mean a particularly high level of 'feeling 
warmth' ('Geflihlswarme'J. Nor is Inniqkeit a term 
appropriate to the 'beautiful soul'and to the way it 
is situated in the world. The word in Holderlin has 
no flavour of dreamy or inactive sentimentality (GA 
39, 117). 
Hence all the traditional meanings are set aside, so as to 
gain a more originary access to what is at stake in the 
word. The word is actually opposed to its ordinary 
determinations. The passage continues: 
Quite the contrary. It means primarily the supreme 
force of Dasein. Second: this force is asserted in 
its thorough confrontation with the most extreme 
contradictions of Being. 
The Dasein which is spoken of here is the historical 
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oasein of a people. 30 What is decisive in this passage is 
the essential connection drawn between "the supreme force" 
of a historical Dasein or a people and "the most extreme 
contradictions of Being." In other words, the 
decisiveness of the passage lies in the essential 
belonging together of a people as historical on the one 
hand and Being as contradiction on the other. The 
historicity or the very possibility for a people to a 
history lies in the proper dwelling of the people within 
the essential unfolding of Being. The Inniqkeit, then, is 
the very holding together of Being in its contradiction, 
the very holding together of what is most held or torn 
apart. Inniqkeit inscribes the possibility for a people 
to in access to its own history through an essential 
relation to the contradictory and strifely unity of Being. 
Hence Innigkeit is most akin to the gathering or the 
legein proper to Being. Innigkeit is a form of logos. a 
form of gathering that gathers in poetry the fundamental 
and originary polemos. Inniqkeit is what the Ancient 
Greeks called harmonia, the harmony of the forces of Being 
30 Heidegger quotes the two following passages from 
Holderlin, both of which essentially relate the Inniqkeit 
to the Dasein of a people: 
" ... with the Ancients, where each of them, with their 
senses and their souls, belonged to the world which 
surrounded them. much more Inniqkeit could be found in 
certain characters and relations. as in us Germans, for 
example." (Letter to his brother, Jan. L 1799: III. 366) 
Still speaking of the Greeks: 
" ... das -Innige Volk, vom Gottergeiste ge:r:listet." 
(IV, 91, V. 90) 
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in ir opposition. The most appropriate translatio::. of 
Jnnigkeit would then perhaps be "harmony," if one could 
still hear the echo of the Greek harmonia. 
The reference to the Greeks. and specifically to 
Heraclitus, is not, of course, an accident. Holderlin's 
poetry is a constant reference to the world of Ancient 
Greece. not as an object of romanticism or of p0etic 
inspiration. but as the origin that remains decisive for 
our future. Hence to say--as Heidegger does--that 
Holderlin's understanding of Being is closest to 
Heraclitus' is not to acknowledge a mere transhistorical 
coincidence. Rather, it is to draw an essential 
connection between the dichtendes Denken of Heraclitus and 
the denkendes Dichten of Holderlin. It is to point to 
Hol lin's greatest proximity to the origin. 
Like the harmonia Heraclitus speaks of31 , the 
Inniqkeit is not a "tensionless accordance, nor a 
concordance that would occur through a compensating 
withdrawal of the oppositions; rather, the opening of the 
authentic contradiction opens up the harmony, which means: 
provides the antagonistic powers with their respective 
31 For example in Fragment 51: "They do not 
understand that--and how--what is for itself opposed to 
itself is in itself in accordance with itself: 
antagonistic harmony [palintoporos harmonie]. Or fragment 
54: "The harmony which is not revealed is more powerful 
than the one which is revealed." 
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1 imi ts. "32 In other words. the harmonia is the space c,.f 
the essential unfolding of the originary polemos. Or--put 
in Holderlinian terms--: the Innigkeit (harmony) is the 
space of the essential unfolding of the Feindseliqkeit 
cenmi ty). 33 
Heidegger expresses the activity proper to the 
feindseligkeit in the following way: 
In their opposition, it is not only one power that is 
posited against the other [in other words. in the 
vocabulary of "der Rhein." not only the "origin" Cder 
Ursprung) against the "purely sprung up" (das 
32 GA 39, 124-25. 
3 3 The German notion of Feindseligkeit enables us 
to think something that is not immediately present in the 
Greek notion of polemos. Seliqkeit means beatitude or 
felicity. Thus it has a strong connotation of peace, of 
serenity and tranquility. Feind. on the other hand. means 
the ennemy. the person to whom one is attached by a link 
of antagonism. The Feind-Seligkeit, the enmity. then. 
would name a relation .which would bring together different 
elements even while holding them seperate. In such a 
relation. each element would require the opposing 
antagonism to be what it is. The latin inimicus. from 
which the French inamical and inimitie. as well as the 
English enmity are derived. would perhaps be the closest 
translation. The in- of the inimicus or the en- of the 
enmity would name the impossibility of the tranquil 
friendship, the opposition to it. But it would also name. 
simultaneously, the belonging together of friendship with 
its opposition. The Feindseliqkeit would then be most 
akin to the way Heidegger interprets the Greek philein. 
And yet. Holderlin's Feindseliqkeit. as well as his 
Innigkeit, say perhaps more than the Greek philein and 
polemos. Holderlin's poetry is not the mere translation 
or equivalent of the Greek saying. but rather a dialogue 
with the origin--a dialogue the ultimate purpose of which 
is the possibility of a future for the Germans: "Holderlin 
is not Greekhood but the future of the Germans." (GA 39, 
255) 
Reinentsprungene)J 34 ; each power [the "birth", the 
"ray of 1 ight". the "need", the "breeding"] tries to 
take the other's power away from itself in a will to 
displace it and put itself before it, to hide it and 
conceal .it. Thus the enmity is a reciprocal 
concealing [ein wechselweises Verberqen], the 
happening of a concealment that rules in itself (GA 
39, 249). 
The contradictory essence of enmity can be formulated 
thus: in a way, enmity is that which is most active and 
productive. that which is most actual--that in which 
contradictory and most extreme forces of Being are 
articulated; and yet. at the same time, because of its 
very nature, enmity essentially withdraws from actuality. 
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Like Heraclitus' physis. H6lderlin's Feindseligkeit ''likes 
to hide." In the very unfolding of its contradictory 
forces. enmity essentially unfolds as concealment. as 
sheltering. as withdrawal. To be engaged in the originary 
fight of Being is to be engaged in its withdrawal. It is 
34 Heidegger is commentating the fourth stanza of 
"der Rhein." The stanza reads: 
A mystery is the purely sprung up. Even 
Song may hardly unveil it. 
For as you began. so you will remain, 
And much as need can effect, 
And breeding. of still greater power 
Is capable birth 
And the ray of light 
That meets the new-born infant. 
But where is anyone 
To remain free 
His whole life long and his heart's desire 
To fulfil alone, thus, 
From propitious heights. like the Rhine. 
And from so wholy a womb 
So happily born. like him? 
to be eng.:iged in what Holderlin calls the "sec::-et" 
(Geheimnis) 3 !5 or the "mystery" (Rathsel) 36 : "harmony 
essentially unfolds as secret." 37 To be engaged in the 
secret is to be engaged in a relation that will let the 
secret be as secret. Hence it involves a specific 
relation to language. It involves a language the nature 
of which will be the same as the nature of the secret. 
Such is the poetic language: 
The bringing-to-understanding [das Zum-Verstehen-
bringen] of the secret is indeed an unveiling, but an 
unveiling which, at most, is allowed to be completed 
in the song, in poetry <GA 39, 250). 
Both poetry and Being involve concealment and withdrawal 
. 3!!5 
36 
37 
O drink the morning breezes 
Until you are opened up 
And name what you see before you; 
No longer now the unspoken 
May remain a secret 
Though long it has been veiled; 
For modesty behoves us mortals 
And most of the time to speak thus 
Of gods indeed is wise. 
But where more superabundant than purest 
wellsprings 
The gold has become and the anger in heaven 
earnest. 
For once between day and night must 
A truth be made manifest. 
Now threefold circumscribe it. 
Yet unuttered also, just as you found it. 
Innocent virgin. let it remain. 
--"Germanien," VI. 
A mystery are those of pure origin. 
Even song may hardly unveil it. 
--"der Rhein," IV. v.46 f. 
GA 39. 250. 
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as their specific modes of truth or manifestation. 
secret proper to Being--or, in Holderlin's words, to 
Lnniqkeit--is most preserved in poetic language. But to 
say this is not enough. For poetry is the very 
institution of Being, the very way by which Being comes to 
be as what it essentially is, viz. as withdrawal. To 
reveal and institute Being in its essentially withdrawing 
dimension is the essence of poetry: "The unvei 1 ing of t 
secret is the only and proper task of poetry in general 
and as such." 38 Holderlin is the poet who reveals the 
essence of poetry. He is the poet of the poets. As such, 
he does nothing but institute Being in language. And yet, 
he is also said to be "the future of the Germans." What 
. . 
is specific to Holderlin. then, is his historical-
destinal--his political--dimension: Holderlin would be the 
true Flihrer of the Germans. His poetry would shelter the 
essence of Germanness. But at the same time, it would do 
nothing more than reveal the essential concealment of 
Being. How, then, can Holderlin simultaneously be the 
poet of the poets and the future of Germany? How can he 
be the future of Germany--and that is the poet of the 
"homeland"--in the very instituting of Being? How. in 
other words, do the poetic and the political belong 
together? 
The two belong together because they are 
38 Ibid. 
129 
essentially the same: 
The "homeland" is Being itself. which fully bears and 
assembles the history of a people as a Dasein: the 
historicity of its history. The homeland is not an 
idea in itself. abstract and supratemporal. Rather, 
the p0et sees the homeland historically in an original 
sense. The proof of this lies in the fact that from 
the outset the poet's fundamental metaphysical 
attention to the Being and the staying instituted by 
the poets. who thus resist the decline. is related to 
the "homel.:rnd" ... The Being of the homeland.. i.e .. of 
the historical Dasein of the people, is ienced as 
the true and only Being from which the fund.a.r:1e11ta. l 
position can arise and gain its joint [GefUqeJ in 
beings as a whole (GA 39, 121-22). 
The homeland, and that is the very possibility of a 
history and a destiny--what we have come to call the 
essence of the political--is Being itself. This sameness 
implies that the homeland be "enclosed in the secret. 
essentially and forever." 39 The homeland is the very 
condition of possibility of historicity. And yet it is 
that which essentially withdraws. It is that which allows 
history and the political in its very withdrawal. Its 
actuality essentially unfolds as withdrawal. The homeland 
is what is most proper (das Eiqenste) and most original 
that which is closest. But the proper is also that which 
is most withdrawn and concealed--that which is furthest. 
Holderlin's "Homecoming"40 is perhaps the poem 
that best expresses this paradox. The poem is the journey 
39 GA 39, 120. 
40 See Appendix for full quotation of the poem. 
that brings Germany back to its essence. It is the long 
march to the origin and hence to that which. in a way, 
never ceased. to be closest. In other words, the paradox 
lies in the fact that never before were "we"--and that is 
primarily the Germans--more remote from what is closest. 
What you seek, it is close and is already coming 
to you. 41 
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But this paradoxical structure belongs to the very essence 
of proximity: 
The essence of proximity is manifest in that it brings 
close what is close in keeping it afar. The proximity 
to the origin is a mystery. 4 2 
The return to the origin or the homeland is not merely a 
matter of recovering something forgotten or hidden. 
Rather, it requires that one engage oneself in the secret 
of the origin, and that is primarily in its essential 
withdrawal. Such is the task of the poet. The elegy 
"Heimkunft" is the return to the origin, and not merely 
the narrative of the journey. It is the journey by which 
Germany is made sacred, the journey by which Germany 
becomes the land for the coming of the new Gods. But in 
order to return to the homeland, to experience the origin 
41 Friedrich Holderlin, "Heimkunft--an die 
Verwandten," IV, v. 56. 
42 Martin Heidegger, Erlaliterungen zu Holderlins 
Dichtung (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1971). 
23. Henceforth EHD. 
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in its essence, the poet first needed to leave the soil of 
the v.3.ter 1 and. The exi 1 e was necessary to grasp the 
origin in its essence. There can be no home or no 
familiarity (no Heim, Heimat, or Heimischkeit), and hence 
no unfolding of what is most proper to a historical 
Dusein, without the experience of exile (Unheim, 
Unheimischkeit): 
The love of exile [Unheimischsein] with a view to 
finding oneself at heme (Heimischwerdens] in what is 
proper is the essential law of destiny through which 
the poet is destined in the founding of the 
"homeland's" history.43 
Or perhaps even more explicitly: 
The historicity of history has its essence in the 
return to the proper, a return which can be completed 
only in the form of a journey abroad [das Fremde44 ] .4~ 
What Heidegger here calls the proper (das Eigene) 
is what Holderlin also calls "the national" (das 
Nationelle). without which there would be no homeland. 
Both notions serve to name the major stake of Holderlin's 
poetry. Also the major difficulty: "We learn nothing with 
more difficulty than the free use of the national ... the 
43 Ibid .. 83. 
44 As Heidegger emphasizes it, one should hear the 
experience of difference in das Fremde. The journey 
abroad is the experience of the uncanniness and 
unfamiliarity of the radically other, of the non-_proper. 
4 !5. EHD. 90. 
~ use of the proper is the most difficult."4s 
What is most proper to the Germans? And how is it that 
that which is most proper is so difficult to use freely'? 
In the same letter, Holderlin writes: "I believe that it 
is precisely the clarity of representation that is 
originally as natural for us as the fire from heaven is 
for the Greeks."47 The "clarity of representation" and 
the "fire from heaven" are the two elements by which a 
land can become sacred. Such was the Greek polis, which 
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combined its natural and most proper element (the fire 
from heaven) with what was most foreign to it and most 
remote from it (the clarity of representation). The polis 
occured as the space of poetry, of thinking and of art. 
As such, it rendered the encounter with the Gods possible. 
But the fire from heaven is that which is most foreign to 
the Germans. As long as the Germans have not experienced 
this uncanniness and strangeness, as long as they have not 
undergone the long journey, they will not exist as such. 
Their existence as a people involves their appropriating 
the un-proper, and in this very appropriation, their 
becoming themselves. Without such a double movement, 
there can be no future for the German people: "the absence 
46 Letter to Bohlendorf (Dec. 4, 1801) 
47 Ibid. 
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g_estiffL. dysmoron is weakness. " 48 On the otl-;er 
hand, the clarity of representation is what is most proper 
to the Germans: 
The ability to conceive. the art of the project, the 
construction of scaffoldings and enclosures, the 
placing of frames and compartments, the carving up and 
the regrouping--this carries [the Germans] along. Yet 
this natural trait of the Germans is really not what 
is proper to them before this ability to conceive is 
aubmitted to the test of conceiving the 
inconceivable ... 4 9 
The Germans. then, need to prepare the land for the coming 
of the Gods. It is primarily a matter of experiencing the 
fire from the Gods in letting oneself be thrown out of the 
familiar into the uncanny. It is a matter of letting 
oneself drift away into the monstrous, into the realm of 
the unfamiliar where the lightning of the Gods might 
strike. It is only in his travels to the south of France. 
where he is reminded of Ancient Greece. that Holderlin can 
actually experience the fire from heaven: 
Der Nordost wehet, 
Der liebste unter den Winden 
Mir, weil er feurigen Geist 
Und gute Fahrt verheiBet den Schiffern.~0 
The "navigators" are, according to Heidegger, the poets on 
46 Friedrich Holderlin, "Remarks" on the translation 
of Antigone, V. 258. 
49 EHD. 84. 
~ 0 "Andenken," L v. 1-4. See Appendix for 
translation of the poem. 
their way to the far off country. And the north-east 
wind--the wind that blows in the direction of the south-
west and that clears the skies so that everything shines 
in its full manifestness--is the promise of the encounter 
with the fire from heaven in the foreign country. If the 
poet can withstand the test of the burning fire, then he 
will be ready to return to the homeland and found a new 
historical beginning under the skies where the clarity of 
representation is sheltered. 
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Hence the proper or the essence is proper only 
insofar as it is confronted by and combined with the non-
proper or the non-essence. The proper emerges as such 
only in being thrown out of itself, only in being 
expropriated in the non-proper. In a way the non-essence 
or the non-proper is more essential to the proper than the 
proper itself. The non-essence is more proper to the 
proper than the proper. That which is most remote and 
most uncanny--in other words the non-essence--is more 
essential to the essence than the essence itself. To be 
in the essence--in the homeland--is to be thrown out of 
the essence, without an essence. But the non-essence of 
the essence--and that is the essence of the essence--is 
almost always covered up, forgotten. From the very 
outset. The homeland, the origin, is always already 
withdrawn from itself. The origin (Ursprung) is a 
springing up (Entsprinqen). But in its springing up, the 
or-i·;;rin closes itself off fsich verschlieBtl: it manifests 
itself as that which it is not. Or rather: in what it 
shows of itself. it does not show itself. It conceals 
itself (sich verbirqt) and withdraws (sich entzieht) 
behind what is freed from it. For the most part, then, 
one is not situated in the dimension and the power of the 
origin: 
... We are the forgotten--of destiny [Geschick]; nee 
we are no longer granted a fate [Schicksal] but we 
must wander among the events and fly loosely before 
our own essential origin.oi 
Or again: 
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... We never come spontaneously before the locY.ed door 
that would bring us to the homeland; spontaneously, we 
wander here and there. 5 2 
As has already been shown. the key to the door c.:tn 
only be found in poetic language, specifically in 
Holderlin's poetry. For Holderlin's poetry is the poetry 
that institutes the homeland in its essence (in its 
withdrawal), i.e., the poetry that frees the space for the 
coming of the Gods and that thus provides the Germans with 
the possibility of a destiny. 
What is most decisive about Heidegger's reading of 
Holderlin is that it forces the reader to radically 
EHD, 89. 
Ibid. 
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rethink history and the pol it i ca. l. For if the e sence of 
a people--and that is also its future--is heralded only in 
poetry and is articulated in a concealed manifestness, 
then the usual approaches to the historical and the 
political are radically undermined and interrupted. 
History and politics would no longer be a matter of 
concrete facts and decisions ~ased on a linear 
understanding of time and on an understanding of fully 
manifest actuality. Nor would any "disccurse" about 
history or politics gain an originary access to what is 
essential to--and decisive for--a given people at a given 
time. This does not mean that such discourses are idle 
talk. Nor does it mean that there is no historiographic 
truth: 
There is a historiographic truth [historische 
Wahrheit]. But to conceive it as such, the ones who 
conceive it must themselves first be under the power 
of history [GeschichteJ (GA 39, 197). 
Thus. when Heidegger says that Holderlin is "the 
poet of the future of the Germans", or when he says that 
we have to "open up the actuality"03 of Holderlin's 
poetry. one might suspect that the notions of "future" and 
"actuality" mean something other than what is usually 
meant by such words. 
03 GA 39, 197. 
( c) 
Only a god can still save us. 
The only possibility with which we are 
left is to prepare in thinking and 
poetry a disposition for the arrival 
or the absence of the god in our decline. 
For me Holderlin is the 
poet who points to the future. 
the poet who awaits the god ... 
Martin Heidegger--"Interview" with Der Spiegel. 
What kind of future is Heidegger speaking of? 
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What does it mean to free the actuality of a poetry? What 
needs to be done so that Holderlin's poetry becomes 
actual? The question of the relation between Holderlin's 
poetry and its actuality is of the utmost importance. It 
is even considered by Heidegger as "the task" and the 
"ultimate goal" of the 1934-35 lecture course. The 
prescriptive task, in which poetics and politics are most 
explicitly entangled, is defined in the following terms: 
1. Holderlin is the poet of the poet and of poetry. 
2. Holderlin is also the poet of the Germans. 3. 
Because Holderlin is all this in a concealed and 
difficult way, poet of the poets as poet of the 
Germans, he has not yet become the power in the 
history of our people. Because he is not yet that, he 
must become it. To contribute to this is 
"politics" in the highest and most proper sense, to 
such an extent that whoever achieves something in this 
.domain need not discourse about the political (my 
italics) (GA 39. 194). 
How can Holderlin become the power in the history of the 
German people? What kind of politics would unfold from 
such a demand? What does such a demand dictate? What is 
the urgency that lies at the heart of this demand? These 
questions, which naturally unfold from Heidegger's 
statement, will remain, for the most part. unanswered. 
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Not because Heidegger would have failed to answer them, 
but because the very raising of these questions involves 
an understanding of time and actuality which Heidegger is 
precisely attempting to put into question. As we shall 
see, the question of knowing how and·when Holderlin's 
poetry could become actual, how and when a politics could 
unfold from it, will not appear as a question. Or rather, 
it will appear as an impossible question. At the point at 
which poetry and politics are most explicitly related, in 
what could be interpreted as a· desire or a possibility to 
build g_ politics. the very ideas of "building" and of 
"politics" are disrupted. 
Heidegger's analysis in §15 unfolds in two parts 
that gather in a very condensed way what has been said so 
far. Heidegger first shows that insofar as poetry 
institutes Being, it "is what is actual [das 
Wirkliche] ."54 But what does it mean to "institute"? It 
means to bring to language that which is not yet actual, 
to bring it to the very heart of a Dasein's people and 
hence to ground this Dasein in history. But it also means 
to keep this grounding open, i.e., to keep the abysmal and 
54
• GA 39, 217. My italics. 
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uncanny relation to Being open. in such a way that the 
people would gain a knowing of itself in this very 
gesture. It is the people's responsibility to keep such a 
relation open. There is perhaps a certain ethics at issue 
in maintaining alive what was originally opened up by the 
saying of the poet, viz. the very essence of the people. 
Heidegger points to Sophocles' Antigone as an 
example of such op.~ning. To be sure. this "example" is 
not merely innocent, since the "great Greek beginning"--
and that is the origin of the West--is what is at issue. 
To what extent is "Antigone" grounding? 
Sophocles' poem entitled "Antigone" is, as a poem, an 
instituting of the whole Greek Dasein, for the poem as 
the project (rooting and salvation) of Being grounds 
the Dasein of human beings on earth before the face of 
the Gods. Poetry as institution obtains the ground of 
the possibility for which man in general settles on 
earth in between earth and the Gods, i.e., becomes 
historical, that is, can become a people (GA. 39. 216). 
In other words. poetry opens up the space. the place or 
the site within which man can become historical. i.e., 
essentially unfold in the dimension of the historico-
political. The political life is grounded on the 
emergence of its place, of its there,--on what the Greeks 
called the polis--which is itself opened up by the mythos 
or the Sage of the poet. 
Second, Heidegger shows how Holderlin is the "poet 
of the future German Being." There lies perhaps the 
essential difference between Holderlin and the institution 
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of the Greek sein in Sophocles' poetry. For lderlin 
is both the poet that poeticizes the Germans and the poet 
whose saying remains to :Le taken up by his people. Unlike 
Sophocles' poetry, Holderlin's Dichtung arises from the 
urgency felt before the flight of the gods. In contrast 
to the time of the Greeks, the time of Holderlin is a time 
of distress and abandonment. :Because the "t:da.y" ci- tr;e 
"now" Holderlin is involved in is diff0ren:. the 
"today" of the Greeks. it cannot simply be for Ger:na.ny's 
future a matter of a return to the Greek origin. Rather, 
it is essentially a matter of enduring the distress of the 
time in accepting to renounce the ancient gods. Only in 
the renouncement of what has passed can man hope to 
encounter new gods and hence institute a new historical 
beginning. But the renouncement does not guarantee the 
coming of the gods. Holderlin's poetry is not messianic. 
To follow its power only means that we are put in a 
position in which a space can be freed for the coming of 
the gods. But the actual coming of the gods does not 
depend on man's will. No praxis, no politics can actually 
save us from distress. Only the gods can allow the 
emergence of a new historico-political site. 
In a way, then. the future does not belong to us. 
The future is not ours. We cannot say "when" the gods 
will visit anew. To say that Holderlin's poetry is still 
ahead of us, that it still belongs to the future of the 
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Germans is to say that it will perhaps always remain ahead 
of us. For there would be no date. no precise event that 
could actually correspond to Holderlin's poetry: 
For the "Now" of his poetry there is no calendar date. 
Neither is there any need for a date. For this called 
and self-calling "Now" is itself a date in an 
originary sense, that is--something given. a gift. 0~ 
The "now" of the tirr.e that will save us does 
a date . For i t i s i ts e 1 f a datum . a g i ft . It i s 
something that gives itself, something that never ceases 
to give itself, to send and destine itself. It is, 
literally, a present--that is both something that never 
ceases to come and a gift, both something that comes to 
us. always already, in the way of a gift. and yet 
something that will perhaps never be ours. It is. as it 
were. the promise of a gift that always remains a promise. 
Hence an Ere i gnis. In the "now" of the poet, then, it is 
not a matter of defining a precise instant. Rather. it is 
a matter of seeing how both future and past are gathered 
in the present. in a kind of anterior future in which what 
is happening has long since been sent. and hence decided, 
and which thus opens up the future: 
The 11 Now come" shines from out of the present to speak 
into the future. And yet it first speaks in what has 
already happened [in das schon Geschehene]. "Now"--
0~ GA 53, 8. Heidegger is commenting the first line 
of the hymn "der Ister", which reads: "Jetzt komme, 
Feuer!" 
that means: something is already decided. And this 
precisely, that which has already occured [was sich 
schon "ereiqnet" hat]. alone sustains all the 
Y:-elations to what is coming. The "now" names an 
Ere iqn is., ~ 6 
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The future is impending, and yet always postponed, for it 
is always already coming. The future is passivity, for it 
is already past. Hence, in the end, to be open to 
lderlin's poetry as th.::,t which remains ahead ,.)f us. as 
that which belongs to our future. does not mean that this 
poetry would need to be put to work or ",3.ctualized" in the 
outside world. For it is actual. From the very outset. 
And yet, at the same time, it cannot be said to produce 
any effects or dictate any commandments, for. as Heidegger 
puts it, the "knowing" within which it is caught "is 
useless and has no 'value', is worthless and cannot be 
simply accepted as a modality of the activities currently 
underway."~7 Holderlin's poetry is actual in a non-
actual way, i.e .. in a way that resists the determination 
of actuality as the actualization of something 'abstract' 
or merely possible. The actuality of the poetry demands 
that we wait for the decisive hour, that we be open to the 
coming of the gods. Such waiting, however. is not passive 
or idle. It is not a move away from wha~ is happening. 
~ 6 Ibid. , 9. 
~7 Martin Heidegger. Beitraqe zur Philosophie (Vom 
Ereignis), Gesamtausqabe 65 (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1989), p. 396. Henceforth GA 65. 
on the contrary. It is. according to Heidegger, t 
highest and most difficult ability by which to face 
history: 
warten-konnen. however. is not an inactive and blind 
letting-off and letting-happen of the events; it is 
not a closing one's eyes before the destruction [viz. 
the destruction of the West, and specifically of 
Germany]. Warten-kor.nen is the standing that has 
already leaped ahead to the indestructible. to the 
proximity of which the destruction longs. l the 
valley to the mountain.~ 8 
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In such Warten-konnen, then, it is essentially a matter of 
letting what is be. To let something be, for Heidegger. 
means to let it unfold according to its essence. Here. 
then, it is a matter of letting the homeland be as what it 
is. and that is as Being. In other words, it is a matter 
of a letting be in the way of a letting Being be. Of a 
Gelassenheit as Seinsverlassenheit. Such letting be would 
exceed the all too simple categories of "pessimism" and 
"optimism" in terms of which the comportment of 
Gelassenheit would tend to be considered. As Heidegger 
puts it in the Beitraqe. the ones involved in 
Gelassenheit--and that is the "future ones" [ 
ZukUnftigen]--"know neither the dark 'resignation' which 
no longer wills, for it has no future, nor the noisy 
'optimism' which in spite all assurances does not yet will 
GA 53, 68. 
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truthfu 11 y ... "!5 9 In the openness to the future. it is net. 
a matter of moods but of an essential relation to Bei 
which determines the possibilty of the new encounter with 
the Gods. 
Such letting-be dictates no politics and no 
praxis. And yet "politics in the highest sense" is at 
issue--1.e .. politics as the possiblity of a pclis: t~e 
space. the p 1 ace or the site in which t11ie new god3 ca.'.; D'::: 
encountered. 
!!59 GA 65, 397. 
CHAPTER THREE 
AWAY FROM THE ESSENCE 
(A) 
In his attempt to link essentially the poetic to 
the political, in his effort to phrase the essence of the 
political in terms of poetry, Heidegger merely confirms a 
tendency that runs throughout the history of philosophy. 
The entire history of Western thinking seems to be 
sustained by the poetic "temptation"--unless it be a 
"demand"--of (and one must hear the double genetive) the 
political. In other words, the entire Western political 
discourse is a discourse about art, and specifically about 
poetry and myth. The specificity of Western political 
discourse would lie in its unavoidable reference to art. 
In this respect. the text that would mark the beginning of 
political thought would also be the text in which the 
question of poetics would emerge as such. The 
~hilosophical text that would first break into the 
question of politics would also be the text that would 
broach and delineate the basic concepts of what will later 
come to be called "poetics." Such a text Heidegger would 
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have himself identified in its originality, though not to 
criticize it, but to confirm and pursue its fundamental 
tendency. 
In this description, one recognizes Plato's 
Republic. Indeed, it is in the Republic that a discourse 
-
about the essence of the polis first emerges and, 
146 
strangely enough, in close connection with the question of 
the poets and of the mythoi or "stories" the poets should 
be allowed to relate in the polis. The scene of the 
Republic seems to have been paradigmatic for the entire 
history of political thought, to the extent that in the 
Republic the question of the poets and the poetic or the 
mythic appears in its full problematicity: the poets who 
tell false stories about the Gods and the heroes should be 
excluded from the polis, and yet the poetic or the mythic 
is essential to the constitution of the polis both in 
words and in deeds: 
"Come, then. says Socrates, like men telling tales 
in a tale and at their leisure, let's educate the men 
in speech ... " 
"Shall we so easily let the children hear just any 
tales fashioned by just anyone and take into their 
souls opinions for the most part opposite to those 
we'll suppose they must have when they are grown up?" 
"In no event will we permit it," says Adeimantus. 
"First, as it seems, we must supervise the makers of 
tales; and if they make a final tale, it must be 
approved, but if it's not, it must be rejected. We'll 
persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales 
to their children and to shape their souls with tales 
more than their bodies with hands. Many of those they 
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now tell must be thrown out."1 
Lacoue-Labarthe calls this scene "the primitive 
scene of philosophy," i.e .. the political scene in which 
philosophy emerges in its essential relation with what 
Plato calls mythopoiesis. 2 This scene marks the way in 
which poetry comes to be decisive for the political, the 
way in which "true" poetry must ground the political and 
"false" poetry must be radically separated from the 
political order. The decisive thing. therefore, is not so 
much to trace poetry's effects in politics but rather to 
know how and why the political as such is affected by art 
or poetry. In other words, the question is: how is it 
that the political is driven towards the poetic? What 
about the poetic drive or Zug to the political? 
Such a question. of course, can be addressed to 
the Platonic text. But it could also be addressed to 
Aristotle, whose Poetics may have very much to do with the 
political order, to Rousseau, Kant, Holderlin. Schelling, 
a certain Hegel, Nietzsche or Wagner, all of whom, at a 
certain point. in one way or another, felt the necessity 
to appeal to art or poetry so as to as to disclose the 
essence of the political. Throughout, then, the reference 
to poetry and to its founding myths would have been 
l. Republic, 377a-377c. 
2
• Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe. L'Imitation des Modernes, p. 
176. 
unavoidable. Heidegger himself--he perhaps more than 
others, in the radicalization of the gesture--would have 
answered such a necessity. 
To trace out the return of the myth in its long 
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history, one would need to engage oneself in what could be 
called a genealogy of Western mytho-polito-logy. One 
would need to inquire into what seems to be the mythic 
necessity of the political, if by myth one indeed 
understands the story or the narrative (whether strictly 
poetic or "artistic" in any other way) that would 
constitute the political in its essence. The question 
would be: How is it that. in the very constitution of its 
essence, the political must have recourse to the mythic? 
This task as a whole would of course extend beyond the 
limits of this work. Yet it remains decisive and to a 
certain extent necessary with respect to Heidegger, if it 
is true that Heidegger's thinking will have been the last 
representation or enactment of the mytho-poetic scene, and 
so the mark of the end or the closure of the political as 
such. 
For that which defines the political as such is 
indeed the myth. And Heidegger is right to say that 
"history [and that is also the political for Heidegger] 
is, if it is anything at all, mythology." 3 To inquire 
into the political is primarily to inquire into the myth 
3 EM. 119. 
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through which the political as such is founded. The myth-
-and that is the expression, the communication and the 
sharing of the myth--is the opening and founding gesture 
of the political. For the myth is essentially 
communitarian. It is that which brings a people together. 
Even more: it is that which defines the very existence of 
a people. It is not surprising. then, that the greatest 
effort of modernity to produce myths and to constitute a 
mythology occurred in Germany, from the end of the 
Seventeenth to the middle of the Twentieth Century, in a 
country and at a time where the truly political stake was 
precisely--and still is in a way--the question of the 
identification and the constitution of Germany as Volk and 
as Sprache. This crucial political problem came to focus 
on the question of language, and specifically on the 
question of poetry and mythology. The essential move at 
the end of the Seventeenth Century toward the great Greek 
beginning and toward the power of its mythology has played 
a decisive role in the delimitation of the horizon from 
which the political was envisioned and thought. In that 
respect, there is a certain continuity between "The Oldest 
Systematic Program of German Idealism" (attributed to 
Schelling, but written under the influence of Holderlin in 
1796), which calls for a "new mythology," and specifically 
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for a "rational mythology;" 4 Wagner, for whom "the myth 
contains the common poetic power of a people;" 5 Nietzsche 
(at least the Nietzsche of the Wagner period) or 
Heidegger. for whom the political remains decisively 
attached to the poetic or the mythic in an essential 
sense. 
The myth, then. is that which lies at the very 
heart of the community. It is the narrative through which 
the community can be identified, articulated, communicated 
and hence perpetuated. In other words, the myth is that 
through which the community is revealed to itself . 6 For, 
as Nancy puts it, the myth is "neither a dialogue nor a 
monologue, but the unique word of many who thus recognize 
each other, who communicate and are united [communient] in 
the myth." 7 To that extent, communism. in its effort to 
4 Schel 1 ing (?) writes: "Before the Ideas are made 
aesthetic, i.e., mythological, they are of no interest to 
the people; and vice versa. a mythology is shameful for 
the philosopher before it has been made rational." To 
Schelling and Holderlin, one would need to add the 
founders as well as the other "members" of the Atheaneum, 
the most important of which are: August Wilhelm Schlegel, 
Friedrich Schlegel, Caroline Michaelis, Schleiermacher, 
Novalis, Tieck. 
5
• Quoted by Manfred Franck in Der kommende Gott 
(Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1982), p. 229. 
6
• This general statement also applies to the more 
concrete and detailed works of sociologists such as Emile 
Durkheim. Claude Levi-Strauss, Mircea Eliad, Marcel 
Detienne. all of whom emphasize the social function of the 
myth. 
7 Nancy, CD, p. 128. 
r opriate the "true" or "objective" essence of man as a PP 
l·a1 man and in its desire to center the life of the eoc 
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community around such essence would perhaps constitute one 
of the most rigorous enactments of the myth. 
What is also essential to the myth is that it is 
meant to initiate a radical beginning. The mythic 
temptation always appears in times of distress and crisis, 
and the "new mythology" is always appealed to with a view 
to replacing the "old" and "dead" mythology, the no longer 
functioning mythos. The new myth will provide another 
historical beginning, it will found the community anew. 
And yet, in this very founding, it is always a matter of 
recapturing the lost or forgotten origin. It is always a 
matter of bridging the gap that separates us from the 
origin. For the knowing of the origin opens up the 
possibility of a future and asserts the power of the 
people. Here again, Heidegger will have allied himself 
with the logic of the myth, even though his reading of 
Holderlin can be said to function at the very limit of 
myth. Indeed, the god which is spoken of in the mythos is 
perhaps never to come, and in a time of "distress" marked 
by the absence of gods, it can only be a matter of freeing 
the space for the hypothetical coming of a new god. But 
the very appeal to the god remains as the only political 
alternative ("Only a god can save us"): the new humanity 
can arise only out of a relation to the divine, and this 
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can be done only under the condition that the people be 
ordered to the founding saying of the poet. The scene 
remains fundamentally mytho-theo-teleological. 
That which Heidegger would have failed to 
acknowledge. thus rendering his own political misadventure 
possible, would have been the political danger inherent to 
the myth. Specifically, Heidegger would have failed to 
acknowledge that his time was living the greatest and most 
destructive perversion of the myth in Nazism. What our 
time will have demonstrated and the general horizon from 
which it compelJs us to think would be the extreme 
radicalization--and also perversion--of the myth. whether 
of Reason and Socialism in most Communist countries. or of 
Man as Ubermensch in Nazism.a The latter will not have 
been totally foreign to Heidegger. even though the 
thinking of the mythos he was engaged in had nothing to do 
with the Nazi myth. But even though Heidegger remained 
withdrawn from such a myth, he never quite put himself in 
a position to criticize the essence of the political as 
art. On the contrary. His political move toward art in 
general, and specifically toward Holderlin's poetry was 
indeed a radical move away from the metaphysics of the 
a From the standpoint of the myth, which directs and 
governs, excludes and punishes, Nazism and, let us say, 
"Stalinism" are the same. The difference, of course, 
would lie in the fact that whereas with Nazism the end of 
the Reich also meant the end of the myth. the end of 
Stalinism did not mean the end of Communism as such. 
Nazi myth. But it was at the same time a decisive move 
into the mythos as the essence of the political, a move 
into the "truly" or "authentically" mythic. 
In that respect. Heidegger's political engagement 
in 1933 as well as his political problematics of the 30's 
and 40's compel one to think the comb-ined closure of the 
mythic and the political. Heidegger's own political 
errancy forces one into the question of the myth in its 
connection with the political. Heidegger suggests that 
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the saying of a new mythos or Dichtung discloses the space 
for the coming of new gods. But the real question one 
needs to ask is whether the main political task today is 
not to think the end of the myth and hence also of the 
political as it never ceased to be considered since Plato. 
In other words, against Heidegger. but also because of 
Heidegger, one needs to think what J. L. Nancy calls "the 
interrupted myth." 9 One needs to think the end of the 
narrative that constituted the political in its essence. 
Hence also the end of the political as such. 
Heidegger failed to acknowledge the myth of the 
myth, and that is also the myth of the political. 
Heidegger failed to acknowledge the myth of the 
politically founding saying. Or--to put it differently--
he failed to acknowledge that as soon as the myth is 
9 Jean-Luc Nancy, "Le mythe interrompu" in La 
communaute desoeuvree (Paris: Christian Bourgois Editeur, 
1986). Henceforth CD. 
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formulated, as soon as it becomes a stake as myth, it is 
already interrupted, already absent, already separated 
from its essence. The "myth", i.e., "the poeticity of the 
political and the politicity of the poetic," 10 in its 
formulation of myth as myth--is itself a myth, i.e., a 
poetizing and fictitious projection. Surely. this does 
not mean that Heidegger's conception of the myth can be 
reduced to fiction, for the mythos Heidegger is speaking 
of is essentially related to thinking, and that is 
precisely to the difference between poetry in the sense of 
fiction (what Heidegger would call Poesie) and thinking 
poetry (i.e. Dichtung). Nonetheless, the very appeal to 
the myth as the historical and political founding of a 
people is itself a myth in the sense of a fiction. 
Indeed, to will to live under the power of the 
myth is already to express its death. To appeal to the 
myth as myth, to appeal to its necessity as myth is 
already to formulate the impossibility of its presence. 
As soon as the mythic becomes an object of thought and 
debate, as soon as it appears as a "solution" to a 
historico-political "crisis," it can no longer operate as 
myth. The power of the myth cannot be anticipated. It 
can only be looked at and thought once it is no longer 
operative. To that extent, the creation of a myth is 
itself a myth: the myth lives only in the affirmation of 
10 Nancy. CD, p. 142. 
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itS own death. In that sense. our modernity (or post-
modernity) is nothing but the assertion of the impossible 
myth, the assertion of the absence of relation to the 
myth, in spite of the plurality of the appeals to the myth 
and to its inititating power. Today we are left with the 
will to the myth and with the impossibility of its 
achievement. But, as Nancy puts it: 
... we are neither in the life nor in the invention nor 
in the word of the myth. As soon as we speak of 
"myths," of mythology. we mean this negation at least 
as much as the affirmation of something. That is the 
reason why our [mythological] scene and our discourse 
about the myth. the whole of our mythological thinking 
composes a myth: to speak about the myth has always 
been to speak about its absence. And the very word 
"myth" designates just as well the absence of that 
which it names (CD 132). 
Hence the myth is a myth. Yet nothing was more 
"concrete," more monstrously concrete than, say, the Nazi 
myth. What is expressed in this tautological formulation 
("the myth is a myth"), then, is the very essence of the 
myth. Indeed, the myth as the founding gesture of the 
political is itself a myth in the sense of a fiction. But 
this f iction--and that is the fantasmatic projection of 
the essence and the destiny of a people--is in turn 
actual. The myth is essentially paradoxical to the extent 
that its utterance is always the designation of the 
absence of that which it names, and yet it is in the name 
of such absence that actuality is transformed. 
Heidegger's reading of Holderlin does not escape this 
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logic: there is something fictitious (and something 
politically dangerous) about the way in which Heidegger 
sees in Holderlin's poetry both the origin and the future. 
both the essence and the destiny of the German people. 
There is something politically dangerous (and also 
inadequate, as will later be shown) in the affirmation of 
the essence of the political as poetry, in the 
'mythification' of the political. In his attempt to 
phrase the political in terms of a poetic essence. 
Heidegger may have provided the most radical thinking of 
the myth, even though the myth as such is hardly ever 
considered in the Heideggerian text. Heidegger's thinking 
is exemplary not so much because of the analyses of the 
mythic he would have provided, but rather because of the 
rigorous effort he made to bring the poetic and the 
political together. 
What remains of the myth today is its own 
interruption. The proliferation of discourses about--and 
temptations of--the myth which invade our modernity is 
precisely the mark of the impossiblity of a mythic 
humanity. The myth--the poetic and the political united--
has lived its end. What remains of the myth is the desire 
for its actualization. and such a desire constitutes its 
very interruption. From Plato to Heidegger. that which 
defined the political in its foundation. and that is the 
poetic. is now interrupted. One is now left with the end 
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of the political. To live the end of the political is to 
acknowledge and assert the interruption of its myth. This 
implies both the acknowledgment of a fact and the 
assertion of a demand, viz. that the myth does not return 
so as to found the political anew. The myth is 
interrupted. and yet one must not cease to interrupt it. 
For 
... the very idea of the myth resumes perhaps by itself 
what could sometimes be called the total 
hallucination. sometimes the total imposture of the 
self-consciousness of a modern world that exhausted 
itself in the fabulous representation of its own 
power. In the idea of the myth is perhaps 
concentrated the whole of Western pretension to 
appropriate its own origin, or to steal its secret 
from it, so as to identify itself, finally, 
absolutely. around its own utterance and its own birth 
(CD 117) . 
And Nancy adds: "In that sense. we no longer have anything 
to do with the myth." One cannot oppose to the nazi myth 
(which according to Nancy reveals the essence of the myth) 
another myth, a new mythos or narrative that would 
initiate a new beginning. Unlike what Thomas Mann wrote 
to Kerenyi in 1941, the task is not to "take the myth away 
from intellectual Fascism so as to invert its function in 
a human sense." 11 Rather, the myth needs to be 
"interrupted". And one needs to think and live at the end 
Of the myth. 
11 Quoted by J. L. Nancy in La Communaute 
Desoeuvree, p. 116. 
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(B) 
What does all this imply? Can the political be 
thought separately from the mythic or the poetic? Or does 
it cease to be the political as soon as the myth is taken 
away from it? What remains of the political when the 
political has come to an end? How is the political 
articulated in its very interruption? 
What, then, if the political were to be thought 
away from the poetic? What if the essential thing about 
the political today were precisely to think it without the 
myth? Is there anything. in the history of Western 
thinking, that would enable us to think the political 
order without ever appealing to the poetic? What if the 
polis or the community were not the place of a common 
mythos that would reveal the polis in its essence, but 
rather the space of the many (oi poloi). the space within 
which the other would be disclosed as other and not as the 
same? What if there were something in the political. 
'something' for which there would perhaps be no adequate 
name, but that would nonetheless resist the mythic and 
hence totalizing tendency of the political? 
If it is true that the history of "political" 
thought is indeed sustained by a tradition that runs from 
Plato to German Romanticism and Idealism, up to Heidegger. 
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there is also another tradition for which the artistico-
poetic tendency to phrase the political is--if not absent-
-at least not central. Such a tradition would be 
represented by a range of thinkers--the most central 
figures being Aristotle, Kant. Arendt, Lyotard, all of 
whom would have put the political emphasis on man's 
ability to deliberate and judge in a world essentially 
shared by others. 
Aristotle would perhaps be the major, or at least 
the initiating figure of such tradition. His writings 
about politics are well known and to a certain extent his 
concern could be said to have been more directly 
"political" than Plato's. Many of these writings are 
actually directed against Plato. It is very surprising, 
then, that Heidegger never turns to Aristotle when his 
analyses come to focus on the meaning of the Greek polis. 
Everything happens as though Heidegger were very careful 
to avoid confronting Aristotle. Whenever Heidegger takes 
up the issue of the polis--whether in the Rectoral 
Address, in Introduction to Metaphysics or in the 
Parmenides volume--he is faced with notions and 
problematics that constitute the very heart of Aristotle's 
meditation: praxis, poiesis, theoria, phronesis are words 
that Heidegger comments upon, yet without ever mentioning 
Aristotle. 
In the Rectoral Address. for example, replying to 
the question "What is theoria for the Greeks?." Heidegger 
writes: 
One says: pure contemplation. which remains bound 
only to the thing in question and to all it is and 
demands. This contemplative behaviour--and here one 
appeals to the Greeks--is said to be pursued for its 
own sake. But this appeal is mistaken. For one 
thing. "theory" is not pursued for its own sake. but 
only in the passion to remain close to and hard 
pressed by what is as such. But. for another. the 
Greeks struggled precisely to conceive and to enact 
this contemplative questioning as one. indeed as the 
highest mode of enerqeia. of man's "being-at-work." 
They were not concerned to assimilate practice 
[Praxis] to theory: quite the reverse: theory was to 
be understood as itself the highest realization 
[Verwirklichung] of genuine practice. For the Greeks 
science is not a "cultural good." but the 
innermost determining center of the people-state 
Dasein. 12 
Now if the understanding of theoria as the "highest 
realization" of praxis is indeed operative in Plato's 
Republic. things seem to be quite different with respect 
to Aristotle. Indeed, from the very beginning of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. and mostly as a reaction against 
Plato. Aristotle is very cautious to draw the distinction 
between theoria and praxis on the one hand, praxis and 
poiesis on the other hand. One recalls that. in the 
Republic, Plato proposes to abolish the distinction 
between poisesis and praxis, so that the fundamental 
ambiguity and fragility of human affairs be done away 
with. In the City built in logos all citizens should 
12
. Ed. Klostermann. 1983. pp. 11-12; eng. transl., 
pp. 472-73. 
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fulfill a very specific activity and correspond to a 
specific demand of the polis. They should be like 
craftsmen: one man. one job. The city itself, as a 
coherent totality. is conceived as a workshop in which 
each citizen is to fulfill a mean defined by the 
rigorously predefined ends of the polis. In reducing the 
organisation of the bios politikos to the one of a 
workshop, Plato wishes to avoid the ambiguity and 
uncertainty inherent to praxis. As Arendt puts it: 
"Exasperation with the threefold frustration of action 
[and that is praxis in Arendt's vocabularyJ--the 
unpredictability of its outcome, the irreversibility of 
the process, and the anonymity of its authors--is almost 
as old as recorded history.":1 3 As a matter of fact. it 
started off with Plato. But the univocity of poiesis is 
itself ruled by what Plato considers to be the highest 
form of univocity. and that is the univocity of 
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theoretical life. Theoria is nothing but the unobstructed 
view of fully present and unambiguous Ideas. And since 
the activity of theoria is itself a praxis. indeed the 
highest form of praxis, there is a certain kinship between 
the activity of the philosopher, the activity of the 
statesman and the activity of the craftsman, although 
there are differences of level between the three. But the 
:1 3 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 1958). p. 220. 
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important thing to know is that the statesman must 
necessarily be a philosopher. and that he must rule the 
QOlis as a craftsman. In the Republic, as Arendt puts it. 
"the philosopher-king applies the ideas as the craftsman 
applies his rules and standards; he 'makes' his City as 
the sculptor makes a statue." 14 The ultimate purpose of 
such a reduction is to dismiss the role of doxa or opinion 
in the political life: it is to take the ambiguous and 
very often 'useless' essence of praxis away from the 
political order. 
Now Aristotle's political thought is directed 
against such a view. Unlike what Plato says, Aristotle 
thinks that praxis differs essentially from both poiesis 
and theoria. and that doxa alone--the right doxa. viz. 
phronesis--is to rule the political life. And if one is 
to agree with Arendt, one will have to say that in 
deliberately setting "the insight [this is Arendt's 
translation of the Greek phronesis] of the statesman 
against the wisdom of the philosopher, Aristotle was 
probably following. as he did so often in his political 
writings, the public opinion of the Athenian polis."H5 
Such a statement, if it is true. would radically call into 
14 Ibid .. p. 227; Arendt is refering to the Republic 
420. 
1 !5 Hannah Arendt. "The Crisis in Culture" in Between 
Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books. 1977). footnote 
n° 14. 
question what Heidegger says about phronesis in the 
farmenides volume. To the following statement in Plato's 
~public: "Those who are not rescued by phronesis drink 
beyond any measure" (621 a). Heidegger provides this 
comment: 
phronesis means here the insight of that in-seeing. 
which has a sight into what is authentically seeable 
and unconcealed. The seeing which is alluded to here 
is the seeing of the essential sight, i.e .. of 
Philosophy. Phronesis means Philosophy and the word 
says: having an eye for the essential (GA 54. 178). 
Now if this is indeed an adequate comment on Plato's 
understanding of phronesis. the clear distinction that 
Aristotle draws between phronesis and sophia in the sixth 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics would tend to put 
Heidegger's comment into question. 16 Whereas theoria 
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corresponds to the part of logos "by which we perceive the 
kinds of things whose principles cannot be other than they 
are," phronesis and praxis in general correspond to the 
part of logos "by which we investigate the kinds of things 
whose principles may be other than they are." 17 The first 
part Aristotle calls "scientific" (epistemonikon); the 
second he calls "calculative" or "estimative" 
( loqistikon). 
16 Our comment only applies to the Ethics. for in 
the Metaphysics (book M) and On the Heavens phronesis is 
used in a very Platonist sense and is synonymous with 
science (episteme or gnosis). 
17
• Nicomachean Ethics, 1139 a 5-10. 
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The issue, however, is not to know whether 
Heidegger provided an adequate explanation of what 
QJ1ronesis 'really' meant for the Greeks. In other words, 
it is not a question of knowing whether Aristotle was 
•closer' to what the Greeks 'really' thought about praxis. 
Rather, it is a matter of wondering why, in a discussion 
about the polis, and specifically about a notion as 
politically determined as the notion of phronesis. 
Heidegger exclusively turned to the Platonic text and 
deliberately avoided the confrontation with Aristotle 
whose political thought was so much opposed to Plato's. 
In other words, it is a matter of knowing whether 
Heidegger's philosophical choice is not also--and perhaps 
primarily--a political choice. Would the absence of 
reference to Aristotle's political text constitute a 
political rather than a philosophical lack? 
How, then, does Aristotle's text resist 
Heidegger's analyses of the polis and of praxis? As we 
suggested earlier. the answer is to be found in 
Aristotle's effort to clearly distinguish between praxis, 
poiesis and theoria, so as to delineate a space that would 
be proper to praxis itself and hence to define the 
specificity of the political life. These distinctions are 
perhaps most clearly traced out in the fifth chapter 
("Action") of Arendt's The Human Condition. To briefly 
recall her analysis: There are four major differences 
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between poiesis (or "work") and praxis (or "action"), one 
of which is a general distinction, the other three 
distinctions being more specific. Generally speaking, 
then, the process of working or producing is definite. It 
has a definite arche or beginning: the project of the 
product. and a definite telos or end: the completion of 
the product. It requires definite means and definite 
skills. Unlike the univocity of working, action is 
essentially ambiguous. It is ruled by principles that 
cannot be as definite and as rigorous as the rules 
governing poiesis or theoria. and it is always caught 
within a pre-existent set of relations with others. Hence 
it involves much "difference of opinion and uncertainty," 
and for this reason. its investigation cannot reach the 
exactness which "must be expected in other departments of 
philosophy." 16 The three specific distinctions follow 
from this general determination. First, unlike working, 
the process of which can be started all over again in case 
of failure. the process of action is irreversible. Or, as 
Arendt puts it: 
Whereas men have. always been capable of destroying 
whatever was the product of human hands and have 
become capable today even of the potential destruction 
of what man did not make--the earth and earthly 
nature--men never have been and never will be able to 
undo or even to control reliably any of the 
processes they start through action (The Human 
Condition, 222-23). 
16 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 1094 b. 
second. whereas predictability rules the activity of 
working, the outcome of action is unpredictable: he who 
acts knows that he never quite knows what he is doing, 
that he can become 'guilty' of consequences he never 
intended or even foresaw--in short. that he is just as 
much the patient and the victim as he is the doer of his 
action. Finally, whereas working appears as an anonymous 
activity, i.e., as an activity through which the working 
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agent merely appears as the representative of a working 
process, action reveals the agent as 'who' (and not 'what' 
he is) he is. Praxis discloses the life of the agent in 
its very 'whoness.' 
Now that praxis has been distinguished from 
theoria and poiesis, it is a matter of bringing to light 
the very specificity of the bios politikos. What is 
praxis? And in what sense would the Aristotelian 
understanding of the political life call into question 
Heidegger's conception of the polis as the poetic space in 
which the disclosure of Being would occur? Once again, 
Arendt's analyses are most useful. 1 9 
19 In the context of this work, it is not a matter 
of Aristotelian exegesis. Much of what Arendt says with 
regard to Aristotle could be nuanced or even put into 
question. But Arendt's reading of Aristotle is of great 
help for whoever wants to think of the polis as a space 
within which the sharing of words and deeds would be 
privileged over a Platonist or Heideggerian conception. 
For us, then, it is a matter of thinking the polis in 
'horizontal' terms--in terms of interaction and exchange--
According to Arendt, for the Greeks of the polis . 
. 
.Qfaxis seems to have primarily designated the sharing of 
~ords and deeds in a common realm. It is the sharing of 
speech and action. and not the walls or the laws of the 
QOlis. that constituted the polis as such: 
Of all the activities necessary and present in human 
communities. only two were deemed to be political and 
to constitute what Aristotle called the bios 
politikos, namely action (praxis) and speech (lexis), 
out of which rises the realm of human affairs (ta ton 
anthropou praqmata, as Plato used to call it) (The 
Human Condition, pp. 24-25). 
Speech is therefore essential to the very constitution of 
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the political life. But by speech one must not understand 
the mvthos (what Heidegger would call the Dichtunq) 
through which the essence of a people would be disclosed. 
On the contrary, speech was promoted as the manifestation 
of a plurality of opinions and as a means of exchange and 
persuasion. In a way, to belong to the polis was nothing 
more than to talk to each other. Such is the reason why 
Aristotle's 'definition' of man as zoon politikon can be 
understood only insofar as it is related to the other 
definition according to which man is a ~ logon ekhon. 
As Arendt puts it: 
In his two most famous definitions, Aristotle only 
more than in terms of a common relation to Being. We are 
engaged in a thinking that would attempt to privilege the 
plurality of opinions and actions over the univocity of a 
people gathered around its common mvthos or Dichtunq. 
formulated the current opinion of the polis about man 
and the political way of life. and according to this 
opinion, everybody outside the polis--slaves and 
barbarians--was ~ logou, deprived. of course, not 
of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in 
which speech and only speech made sense and where the 
central concern of all citizens was to talk with each 
other (The Human Condition, p. 27). 
In the polis, then, individuals are related to other 
individuals through words and deeds, and such a relation 
discloses the citizens as 'who' they are. In this sense, 
"action" is essentially inter-action. The polis is the 
place in which the plurality of speakers and doers is 
disclosed. It is the place of the many (oi poloi). In 
other words, speech and action reveal the otherness and 
the distinctness of the other. In speech and action, 'I' 
appear to the other as 'who' I am, i.e., as the doer of 
such actions and the speaker of such words. It is of the 
utmost importance to emphasize the fact that Arendt 
defines this ability to act and speak as a "setting 
something into motion," as an ability to begin. In the 
activity of praxis, men (all men) are "newcomers" and 
"beginners." The power to begin belongs to the very 
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nature of the human condition as vita activa. One recalls 
that Heidegger reserved the privilege of the beginning to 
the founders, and specifically to the poets of the polis, 
and not to men qua men. Action, origin and beginning--
that is arche--are in the hands of the citizens 
themselves. The members of the polis do not appear as 
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such through the communion in the beginning initiated by 
the poet. Rather, each citizen, insofar as he speaks and 
acts, is himself a beginner. And so the polis is not the 
space disclosed by the mvthos (or the Dichtunq) of the 
poet on which the people as a whole would hinge. Rather, 
the polis is the space of the many disclosed through a web 
of words and deeds. Arendt writes: 
The fact that man is capable of action means that the 
unexpected can be expected from him. that he is able 
to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this 
again is possible only because each man is unique, so 
that with each birth something uniquely new comes into 
the world. With respect to this somebody who is 
unique it can be truly said that nobody was there 
before. If action as beginning corresponds to the 
fact of birth, if it is the actualization of the human 
condition of natality, then speech corresponds to the 
fact of distinctness and is the actualization of the 
human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a 
distinct and unique being among equals (The Human 
Condition, p. 178). 
Everything Arendt says here seems to radically oppose 
Heidegger's conception of the political. In Aristotle's 
view, what .we have come to call the essence of the 
political is irremediably bound to a notion of plurality. 
The polis is essentially the sharing of a common concern 
for a common realm through communication. The polis is 
nothing but the space within which people are essentially 
with others and appear as such through action and speech. 
But the action is the action of one specific agent. and 
the speech is the speech of one specific speaker. As soon 
as the speech and the action become the speech and the 
action of an entire people. then the citizens are no 
longer disclosed in their individuality and no longer 
appear as who they are. Again, such conception of the 
political life is most remote from Heidegger's discourse, 
whether in 1933-34, when the identity of the people was 
being sought in the qeistige Flihrung, or later, when the 
'whoness' of "Germany" was tailored to the Dichtung of 
Holderlin. Never did Heidegger even consider the 
possibility of a political life that would depend on the 
sharing of a plurality of deeds and speeches. For action 
and speech are in constant contact with what Arendt calls 
the "web" of the acts and the words of other men. Each 
man is always already caught within this web of 
relationships. so that his actions and his words are 
always part of a larger scene and a larger text. The 
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polis is like a web in which the acts and the words of men 
would be woven together. Action and speech would mark the 
limit at which men would appear together as who they are. 
Hence the polis would be nothing but the disclosive 
exposure of the limit, nothing but the space that would 
articulate men together in an inter-textuality. The polis 
would then perhaps be the spacing of differences and 
particularities. This is perhaps how one could understand 
and reinterpret Arendt when she writes that 
the polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in 
its physical location; it is the organization of the. 
people as it arises out of acting and speaking 
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together. and its true space lies between people 
living together for this purpose, no matter where they 
happen to be. "Wherever you go, you wi 11 be a po 1 is" : 
these famous words became not merely the watchword of 
Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that 
action and speech create a space between the 
participants which can find its proper location almost 
any time and anywhere. It is the space of appearance 
in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space 
where I appear to others as others appear to me, where 
men exist not merely like other living or inanimate 
things but make their appearance explicitly (The Human 
Condition, pp. 198-99). 
The plurality of actions and opinions is primarily 
expressed in what is perhaps the most important feature of 
praxis, viz. phronesis. As has already been shown, 
Heidegger's obliteration of the meaning this notion 
conveys in the Aristotelian text is most remarkable, and 
politically certainly not innocent. What, then. is the 
threat inherent to phronesis? What is so remarkable about 
Aristotle's phronesis that Heidegger would have 
deliberately failed to take it into account? And is this 
political notion crucial to the point that no political 
thinking could do without it? 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, phronesis designates 
the "virtue" (arete) of the calculative (loqistikon) or 
opinative (doxastikon) part of the soul. It is defined as 
"a practical disposition with true logos concerning human 
goods (1140 b 20) ." Phronesis is neither an art (its aim 
is not production or poiesis) nor a science (its object is 
not necessary) but a practical disposition aimed at the 
deliberation about what is good or bad for man. Hence 
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prudence is strictly human or anthropic: it is a virtue by 
which man knows how to act according to what is good or 
bad for man.· But what is essential about phronesis is 
perhaps its origin. viz. the phronimos. Whereas very few 
people know how to define phronesis, anyone can recognize 
a prudent man. Phronimos is immediately identifiable 
whenever it occurs. For that re~son Aristotle suggests 
that "we might arrive at the nature of prudence by 
examining the nature of those whom we call 'prudent' (1140 
a 24)." Through the mere observation of prudent men, 
then, one can get to the heart of what prudence is. But 
what is perhaps most striking is that the whole of praxis-
-and hence also the whole of the political life--be 
exclusively a matter of a true deliberation and a true 
judgment that results in a true action. The 'essence'--if 
one can still speak in such a way--of the political would 
be nothing more and nothing less than the practice of a 
virtue difficult to define and yet easily identifiable. 
Without prudence, there can be no praxis and no political 
life, if by "political life" one understands the web and 
the frailty of relationships within which men are caught 
and with which they are compelled to cope. This 
understanding of the political life, in turn, would 
perhaps put into question the very search for an 
"essence." The political life is perhaps that which would 
most resist the move to the essence, that which would 
endanger its life in the very move to its essence. In 
that regard, it is crucial to note that Aristotle sees no 
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other possibility of defining, or rather circumscribing 
what is proper to praxis than the mere observation of the 
Qlurality of occurences of phronesis. To live together in 
a common space primarily means to let the members of the 
polis practice a certain disposition by which they live 
well together. 
Heidegger would have failed to acknowledge this 
essential feature of praxis and of the political matter as 
a whole. In moving from the political life and its 
plurality of opinions and comportments to what he thought 
to be the essence of such a life, Heidegger w~uld have 
left aside the basic demands and prescriptions of the 
polis. In refusing to take the question of phronesis in 
its relation to praxis seriously, both in his engagement 
in 1933-34 and in his later writings, Heidegger became 
unable to think what was politically so threatening and 
destructive about Nazism. The philosophical elision was 
politically overdetermined. Heidegger himself lacked 
phronesis, that is essentially. judgment in the face of 
the events. Like Pythagoras or Parmenides, whom Aristotle 
says are indeed respectable and admirable "philosophers," 
Heidegger would have lacked practical sense. And this 
sense--which Kant will merely designate as "judgment"--has 
nothing to do with the greatness and the subtlety of the 
174 
mind. It is nothing other than common sense or true doxa. 
And this, in turn, is a kind of political excellence, that 
is, a "virtue" that arises from out of the political realm 
and that is exercised in the realm of human affairs. In 
that respect, Aristotle would not be far from saying, with 
Callicles, that philosophy (as the highest activity of the 
intellect) drives man away from "all the things that need 
to be known so as to become an accomplished and 
distinguished man;" he is not far from considering that 
philosophers "know nothing of the laws in their cities, or 
of the language they should use in their business 
associations both public and private with other men, or of. 
human pleasure and appetites" and that, "in a word, they 
are completely without experience of habits (ethon) ." 20 
• That is the reason why Aristotle chooses Pericles rather 
than Pythagoras. Parmenides or Anaxagoras as the example 
or the type of the prudent man. Pericles and "others like 
him" are prudent because "they are able to perceive 
Ctheorein) what is good for themselves as well as for 
other men." 21 Theorein means to see. Hence prudence is a 
kind of seeing. But as distinguished from what Heidegger 
seems to suggest. it does not mean to "have an eye for the 
essential," and that is for Being. In the context of 
20 Gorqias, 484 ed. 
2:1. Nicomachean Ethics, 1140 b 8. 
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m:axis. this particular seeing is aimed at the management 
of human affairs and directed toward the others with which 
the prudent man lives. The absence of prudence or 
judgment, then, would be a kind of blindness that would 
result in the obliteration or the covering-up of the 
political realm, and that is of the web of relationships 
within which each man is caught. 
Since prudence is aimed at the management of human 
affairs. and since the opinions as well as the actions of 
men are always caught in an already shared world, prudence 
necessarily results in a common deliberation in which each 
citizen is to participate. Deliberation (bouleusis) is 
what most reveals the plurality of opinions: it designates 
the very hinge on which the bios politikos turns. What is 
crucial about the polis or the community is that everybody 
be able to formulate his opinion. that everybody be able 
to speak about the polis itself. Such would perhaps be 
the best definition of demokratia. a definition that 
indeed refuses to privilege the efficiency and the 
univocity of the polis over its plurality and its 
plurivocity. The unity and the subsistence of the polis 
would be guaranteed only through the plurality of its 
speeches and of its deeds. The community would exist only 
through the expression of its own explosion, through the 
diffusion of its multiple voices. i.e. through the 
unceasing exchange of words and deeds between its members. 
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Hence the community would be most remote from the unifying 
mvthos or discourse of the Flihrung, whether such Flihrung 
-
be "spiritual" or "poetic." The submission to or the 
recognition of a unique voice in the political realm marks 
the impossibility of deliberation and the death of 
judgment. The political life is most endangered when it 
is centered around a common discourse, when it grounds its 
essence on a unifying myth. To inscribe deliberation and 
judgment at the very heart of the political, on the other 
hand, is to prevent oneself from the totalitarian closure 
inherent in the mythic temptation; it is to resist the 
myth of the poetic voice that opens up the future of an 
entire people in the disclosedness of its concealed 
origin. 
Arendt never ceased to react against the covering-
up of the essential role of judgment in the political 
realm. At the end of the final lecture of the course on 
"Basic Moral Propositions," in a very Aristotelian 
passage, Arendt denounces the evil implicit in the 
inability or the refusal to judge: 
In the last analysis ... our decisions about right and 
wrong will depend upon our choice of company, with 
whom we wish to spend our lives. And this company [in 
turn] is chosen [and this choice involves much of what 
Aristotle calls bouleusis and proairesis] through 
thinking in examples, in examples of persons dead or 
alive, and in examples of incidents. past or 
present... Morally and even politically speaking, 
indifference, though common enough, is the greatest 
danger ... Out of the unwillingness or inability to 
choose one's examples and one's company, and out of 
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the unwillingness to relate to others through 
judgment, arise the real skandala, the real stumbling-
blocks which human powers cannot remove because they 
were not caused by human and humanly understandable 
motives. Therein lies the horror and, at the same 
time. the banality of evil. 22 
For Arendt, this "evil" is perhaps most proper to our 
century and was best revealed in.its epitomized version, 
viz. in Nazism. The absence of judgment, and that is to 
say primarily the absence of critical thinking, is what 
enabled Nazi propaganda to spread as quickly and as easily 
as it did. The absence of judgment is the manifestation 
of a politically desubstantiated life. 
The problematic of judgment is perhaps what 
constitutes the very center of Arendt's political 
thinking. This problematic arises mainly from a retrieval 
and an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Judgment in 
conjunction with his more directly historical and 
political writings. In Arendt's writings, judgment first 
appears as a condition for acting, and in close connection 
to the Aristotelian phronesis. One finds different 
accounts of judgment in connection with the vita activa in 
the texts from the 60's, whether in "Freedom and 
Politics," 23 in "Truth and Politics," or in "The Crisis of 
22 Course given at the University of Chicago. The 
last session was entitled "Some Questions of Moral 
Philosophy" (Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress, 
Container 40, p. 024651). 
23
• "Freedom and Politics," in Freedom and Serfdom: 
An Anthology of Western Thought. ed. Hunold, 1961. 
cu1ture." 24 Like phronesis, judgment is rooted in common 
sense. which "discloses to us the nature of the world 
insofar as it is a common world;" like phronesis too. 
judgment "enables man to orient himself in the public 
realm. in the common world." Political judgment is also 
the result of the gathering of other people's opinions 
with whom one lives. Such gathering is in itself both a 
debate in which everybody tries to be persuasive and 
convincing and a deliberation with oneself. The activity 
of judgment is aimed at the formation of opinions and at 
the performance of actions in the political realm. Hence 
"judging is one, if not the most, important activity in 
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which this sharing-the-w9rld-with-others comes to pass." 2 l5 
Yet if one turns to Arendt's writings of the 70's, 
one sees a shift in intonation. Indeed, judgment no 
longer appears as a faculty operative in the vita activa. 
It is now on the side of the vita contemplativa. Judging 
is now decisively aligned with thinking. In the act of 
judging it is no longer a matter of a deliberation between 
political actors with a view to acting. The emphasis has 
shifted from the actor on the stage of the world to the 
spectator in the hall. It is now a matter of judging 
24 
"Truth and Politics" and "The Crisis in Culture: 
Its Social and Its Political Significance," in Between 
Past and Future (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
1961). 
:a!S Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 1977), p. 221. 
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events that have already occurred. In other words, it is 
a matter of judging appearances. At this point, Arendt 
turns to Kant's Critique of Judgment. Now what is most 
striking about Kant's analysis of judgment is that it does 
not arise from a discussion about the political but from 
the examination of the phenomenon of taste and hence from 
an aesthetic concern. The question, then, becomes to know 
how Arendt can retrieve a theory of political (and not 
aesthetic) judgment from the third Critique. What about 
the relation between aesthetic judgment and political 
judgment? 
For Arendt, politics is essentially a matter of 
phenomenality or manifestation as self-disclosure in a 
space of appearances. Political things. whether words or 
deeds, shine forth in the midst of beings, but in a world 
essentially shared with others. Just like works of art. 
For both art and politics are rooted in common sense, 
i.e., in what Kant calls the sensus communis. This 
"common sense" is no longer the good sense 26 of phronesis, 
but rather the sense by which our strictly private and 
"subjective" five senses are adjusted to a nonsubjective 
and "objective" world which we share with others. Both 
art and politics "are phenomena of the public world."27 
They both reveal a world which, from the very outset, is 
26 
27 
What the French ca 11 "bon .§.fill§.. " 
"The Crisis in Culture," p. 218. 
shared with others. Therefore the phenomenality of 
politics is analogous to the phenomenality of art. 
To say that the relation between art and politics 
is analogous, however, is not tantamount to saying that 
they are the same, nor, unlike what Heidegger suggests, 
that the essence of art as "poetry" is itself the very 
essence of politics. Nor does it amount to what Walter 
Benjamin denounced in Nazism, viz. "the aesthetization of 
politics." It is to draw the attention to a certain 
kinship between the phenomenality of art and politics in 
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connection with the eyes of the spectator. From this very 
specific perspective, one can draw the analogy: as in 
aesthetic taste, the political judgment of the spectator 
involves "universality" (it involves the idea of humanity 
as a whole) and "disinterestedness" (he is merely a 
spectator and not an actor) . The best and most famous 
formulation of such a political judgment can be found in 
Kant's commentary on the French revolution in Part II of 
The Contest of Faculties. Kant stresses that he is not 
concerned with the actual deeds of the actors but only 
with 
the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals 
itself publicly in this game of great revolutions, and 
manifests such a universal yet disinterested sympathy 
for the players on one side against those on the 
other, even at the risk that this partiality could 
become very disadvantageous for them if discovered. 
OWing to its universality, this mode of thinking 
demonstrates a character of the human race at large 
and all at once; owing to its disinterestedness. a 
moral character of humanity, at least in its 
predisposition [my italics] .2a 
Judgment in the face of events, and specifically 
of extraordinary events like the French Revolution or the 
National-Socialist revolution, is unavoidable and 
irreplaceable. For judgment, like thinking, entails a 
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withrawal from the actual deeds of men in order to reflect 
on the meaning of what they do. There is a certain 
political responsibility of the spectator, and 
specifically of the thinker. But what if the thinker 
refuses to consider. the problematic of judgment as 
philosophically and politically relevant? What if the 
thinker refuses to see in the rise of events, in the daily 
deeds and words of the plurality of the members of the 
community the essential stakes of the political life, and 
prefers to focus his political discourse on "the spiritual 
destiny" of a people as a whole and on the mythes around 
which this people would be gathered? 
Heidegger's political misadventure may have 
revealed the necessity--and that is the political demand--
to think the community in terms of plurality of words and 
deeds. of opinions and actions. It may have also revealed 
the resistance that politics (the political life) puts up 
28 Kant, On History, ed. Lewis White Beck, trans. L. 
W. Beck, R. E. Anchor, and E. L. Fackenheim, Library of 
Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 143-
44. 
against the political. and that is to the move into the 
essence of politics. Heidegger's political misadventure 
may have revealed the necessity of bringing politics back 
to itself, back to the immediacy and the spontaneity of 
its factuality. And politics as factuality is precisely 
the interruption--fracture, displacement, disturbance--of 
the political constituted in the univocity of its myth. 
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But what if the possibility of such a community 
were already at play in Heidegger, and specifically in the 
text which marked the outbreak of his thought, viz. Being 
and Time? What if the project of fundamental ontology 
could give way to an unsuspected and promising thinking of 
the political, a thinking, moreover. that would work 
against Heidegger's later texts? 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Being, Time and Community 
Personne ne pense plus que la 
realite d'une vie commune--ce 
qui revient a dire de l'existence 
humaine--depende de la mise en 
commun des terreurs nocturnes et 
de cette sorte de crispation 
extatique que repand la mort. 
Georges Bataille--L'experience interieure 
Of the possibility, then. as slight as it may be, 
but also as decisive as it could be, of the political in 
Being and Time. Of the possibility of what has often been 
considered as an impossibility. 1 Of a reading of Being 
and Time in which, to a certain extent, it will be a 
matter of reading Heidegger against Heidegger, 
specifically against certain of his later writings. Of a 
reading of Being and.Time that would in a way resist that 
in the name of which Heidegger engaged himself 
politically. In such a reading. it will be a matter of 
putting the emphasis on thematics and analyses of 
1 Mark Blitz's Heidegger's Being and Time and the 
Possibility of Political Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Pr~ss, 1981), however, would be a remarkable exceptic 
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Heidegger's that are usually set aside or considered as 
merely derivative. Specifically, it will be a matter of 
carrying these analyses to their most extreme 
possibilities, to the point. perhaps, at which the very 
center of Being and Time would get displaced, if not 
radically disrupted. Hence of a disruptive accent. 
But on what does such an accent bear? On death. 
Specifically, on the death of the Other and on the 
connection of such a death with the very possibility of 
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the conununity: on death in its connection with Being-with-
one-another. The task that would follow from such an 
emphasis is often considered. as we suggested earlier, as 
an impossible task. For indeed, death. as my ownmost 
possibility. is most remote from the innerworldly world of 
equipment in which other Daseins are first encountered. 
Being-towards-death, and that is relating oneself to one's 
ownmost possibility, is the very possibility that undoes 
all other possibilities. the relation that undoes all 
other relations, whether to beings that are present-at-
hand. to beings that are ready-to-hand, or to beings that 
are in the world in the same way I, as a Dasein, am in the 
world: 
Dasein's death is the possibility of no-longer-being-
able-to-be-there [die Moglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-
dasein-konnens]. If Dasein stands before itself as 
this possibility. it has been fully assigned to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before 
itself in this way, all its relation to any other 
Dasein have been undone [my emphasis]. This 
ownmost. non-relational [unbezligliche] possibility is 
at the same time the uttermost one (250). 
In other words. Dasein itself to the extent that it 
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runs ahead to its death. It is death, its own death, that 
throws Dasein back entirely upon itself. Insofar as death 
is "essentially my own" (240). it not only cannot be 
experienced by the Other but. as the "ownmost," it is also 
the most nonrelational possibility. In projecting myself 
against my own self, death interrupts my relation to the 
Other. To be one's ownmost self is to be cut off from the 
Other as Other. For in the relation to the Other. 
Dasein's ownmost Being is not what is at issue. 
It would seem. then. that when the question gets 
down to determining the ownmost Being of Dasein, and that 
is Dasein's essence, any reference to Dasein's being in 
the world with other Daseins, 2 to the nature of Dasein's 
2 Daseins: The use of the plural form attached to 
the word Dasein might strike as not being Heideggerian. 
Indeed, Heidegger never speaks of Daseins, but always of 
Dasein, and in such a way that it would seem that there 
would be no space for difference in Dasein or between the 
plurality of Daseins--whether the difference be a matter 
of sex (is Dasein a male or a female? Could it be both? 
And what about the sexual or the erotic in Being and 
Time?) or a matter of merely pointing to the Other Dasein, 
to the multiplicity of entities which have Dasein's kind 
of Being in the same way I do. and which are nonetheless 
different from me as well as from one another. In only 
speaking of Dasein, and in focusing on the ontological 
difference, Heidegger would have repressed the very 
possiblity of thinking the difference that would space the 
plurality of Daseins. Even though such a thesis is to a 
certain extent legitimate. we shall be engaged in a 
reading that will attempt to show how the space of 
difference and alterity can indeed be articulated in Being 
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relation to other Daseins, is inevitably misleading and 
necessarily irrelevant. The investigation into Dasein's 
essence would be most remote from any political or 
communitarian concern. Dasein's ownmost Being and 
essential structure, its Being-towards-death, would 
actually interrupt the moment of the political and 
undermine its very essence. Does this mean. then. that 
there is no space for an authentic Being-with-one-another? 
Does this mean that the Other is, from the outset and 
inevitably. nothing but the anonymous "they" which my own 
Dasein. in its everydayness, gets identified with? Can 
the Other be something else than the very threat of my 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being? 
(A) 
Before attempting to think the relation between 
the Miteinandersein and death. it is necessary to 
delineate the context within which the analysis of the 
Being-with-one-another first arises. For such context is 
that which later in Being and Time determines the thinking 
of the Other as well as what we believe to be the very 
possibility of a retrieval of the question of the 
community. 
The Other first appears in the context of 
and Time. 
innerworldly equipmentality. Dasein is always already 
engaged in a world constituted by ready-to-hand entities, 
but it is also engaged in a world within which other 
entities relate themselves to the entities ready-to-hand 
in the same way Dasein is related to these very entities. 
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In other words, Dasein is, from the very outset, caught up 
in a world shared by other Daseins: 
Thus along with the work, we encounter not only 
entities ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein's 
kind of Being (71). 
Hence the Other first appears in a derivative or mediated 
way: Other Daseins appear only insofar as they too are 
related to the equipmental world I am involved in. It is 
important to note that, at this point, Heidegger calls 
this other entity "Dasein" only insofar as it too relates 
itself to the world as a user. The Other is essentially 
(and not temporally. hence not in a Hegelian way) that 
which is mediated by equipment. In other words, the other 
Dasein is not Other as Other, but is only an other Dasein 
among other Daseins caught up in the same world. The only 
relation I, as a Dasein, have with other Daseins. is a 
relation mediated by the world of equipmentality, and 
hence mediated by our "concernful" mode of being in the 
world: Between the Other and "me," the world is always 
already interposed. It is perhaps for this reason that 
Heidegger, at this point, does not refer to the other 
oasein as the Other. 
But this does not mean that the other Daseins I 
encounter in the world are merely "added on in thought to 
some Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand" 
(118). Dasein is not with other Daseins in a merely 
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derivative way. Dasein is not first in the world and then 
with others. Rather, its Being-in-the-world necessarily 
implies. as a mode of its Being. its Being-with- others. 
In other words, Dasein is "essentially in itself Being-
with" (Mitsein) (120). Being-with, to which being with 
the Other is terminologically and ontologically connected, 
as well as Dasein-with, are already given with the Being-
in-the-world of Dasein. The chapter in which Heidegger, 
for the first time, explicitly enquires into being-with-
one-another "leads to structures of Dasein that are 
equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: Being-with and 
Dasein-with (Mitdasein)" (114). With respect to Being-
with, this does not mean that it arises with equal 
originality alongside Being-in-the-world. Rather, it 
means that "the Being-in-the-world of Dasein is 
essentially constituted through Being-with" (120). Being-
with is an essential mode of Being of Dasein's Being-in-
the-world. Without this "with-like" (mithaften) way of 
being in the world Dasein could not be what it is: 
By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the 
world is always the one that I share with Others. The 
world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in 
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is Being-with Others <118). 
But what does it mean for Dasein to be essentially 
with? Specifically. what does it mean for Dasein to be 
.------
essentially with other Daseins? What does it mean for 
Dasein to live in a world always already shared with 
Others? In Heideggerian terms. the question amounts to 
knowing what the mode of Being of Dasein in its relation 
to other Daseins is. Heidegger calls Dasein's relation to 
the Being of entities present-to-hand that do not have the 
mode of Being of Dasein "concern" [BesorgenJ. On the other 
hand. Dasein's relation to Others. in its being with 
Others. is one of Flirsorge. of "solicitude". It is 
important to note that both concern and solicitude. "as 
essential structures of the constitution of Dasein. belong 
to the condition of possibility of existence in general" 
(263). At the same time, it is precisely for this reason 
that "Being alongside the ready-to-hand belongs just as 
primordially to Being-in-the-world as does Being-with-
Others" (181). In other words. Being-with-Others is just 
~ constitutive mode of Dasein alongside other 
constitutive modes. It can in no way be privileged over 
or isolated from the other modes of Being. because the 
Other. who, in this respect, does not differ from the 
ready-to-hand. is aligned with "me": "He is the projected 
of my project." so that "Being-with-one-another is 
essentially represented by the model of my relation to the 
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other and not by the relation of the Other to me."3 
Yet, for the purpose of this analysis, I shall 
henceforth focus exclusively on the Being-with-one-another 
and on the "solicitude" towards--or the "caring for"--the 
Other. In this regard. it is essential to note that the 
only section explicitly devoted to the problematic of the 
Miteinandersein in Being and Time. viz. S 26, is only 
developed by Heidegger with a view to answering the 
question concerning the "who" of everyday Dasein. In 
everyday life, Dasein encounters other Daseins "at work" 
in the world. For the most part, the life of Dasein is a 
"concerful" life in which other Daseins, who are also 
involved in a concernful relation to the world, are 
encountered. Hence the everyday life of Dasein in its 
relation to other Daseins is a life mediated by the world 
of entities present-to-hand in which it is involved. So 
that, proximally and for the most part. the relation of 
Dasein to other Daseins. viz. Ftirsorge, is a "deficient" 
and "indifferent" mode of Being-with-one-another: 
Being for. against or without one another, passing one 
another by. not "mattering" to one another--these are 
possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely 
these last-named deficient and indifferent modes that 
characterize everyday, average Being-with-one-another 
3 Michael Theunissen: The Other: Studies in the 
Social Ontoloav of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber, 
trans. Christopher Macann (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1986), p. 
179. As we shall see later in our analysis, such 
statement can be challenged if thought from the 
perspective of the death of the Other. 
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(121). 
In other words, because of the average, everyday life in 
which Dasein is involved, the Others, with which Dasein is 
from the outset. are considered in terms of Man. of 
the "they", and thus form the horizon within which the 
others. as Dasein-with, are thematized. 
But if Heidegger mentions the deficient modes of 
solicitude, he also mentions, in an anticipatory way, 
i.e., in a way that anticipates the analysis of "Care as 
the Being of Dasein." the positive modes of Ftirsorge. 4 
Solicitude, in its positive mode, has two extreme 
possibilities. The first possibility is. for the most 
part, linked to our concern with the ready-to-hand, and 
thus constitutes an inauthentic possibility of solicitude. 
Such a possibility consists in Dasein's taking the Other's 
care away from itself in taking over its concern. In such 
a possibility. Dasein puts itself in the position of the 
Other. so that the Other is "thrown out of his own 
position" (122). In taking the place of the Other, Dasein 
throws the Other away from its place, displaces it in such 
a way that the Other remains without a place, and hence 
completely dependent on Dasein: "In such solicitude the 
4 Both the analysis of Besorqen (the "taking care 
of") and Ftirsorge (the "caring for") are, in a way, 
anticipatory, for both will eventually have to be 
elucidated from the analysis of Sorge ("care") as "the 
Being of Dasein". 
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other can become one who is dominated and dependent. even 
if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from 
him" (122). Hence in Dasein's "leaping in for the Other" 
[flir ihn einsprinqen] there is a danger of not letting the 
Other be what it is, of not letting the Other be other. 
Here is perhaps the first indication of a possibility of 
radical alterity in Being and Time, a possibility that 
will be confirmed and radicalized further on in the text. 
In contrast to the leaping in for the Other, 
Heidegger suggests that authentic solicitude consists in a 
"leaping ahead of him" [ihm vorausspringen]. In such a 
possibility, it is a matter for Dasein of giving the 
Other's care back to itself, of "leaping ahead of the 
Other in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being," so that 
the Other becomes free for its own care. In this mode of 
solicitude, it is the very existence--and hence the very 
Being--of the Other that is involved, and not only some 
concern of his. All of a sudden, my relation to the Other 
in authentic solicitude appears as essential to the very 
problematic of existence. In one short paragraph, 
Heidegger broaches what can be considered as the 
possibility of an authentic Being-with-one-another, and 
even, as we shall attempt to show, of the possibility of 
the community. Specifically, he broaches the space that 
enables us to think the Other in its alterity, i.e., in a 
way that enables Dasein to render the Other free for 
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itself. To have an authentic relation to the Other is to 
comport oneself in such a way that the very existence of 
the Other becomes an issue for the Other. To comport 
oneself in such a way is to enable the Other to become 
free for itself. and that is to be engaged in its ownmost 
existential possibilities. "Freedom" and "existence" are 
essentially to be thought together:~ Dasein is always free 
f.Qr. something, precisely because Dasein is an ek-sisting 
being, i.e., a being whose Being consists in its very ek-
sistence. Dasein ek-sists in its being free for--whether 
for care, for the call of conscience, for death or for any 
existential possiblity. Freedom is not a property of man, 
but rather a mode of Being: in engaging itself into its 
very own ek-sistence, Dasein becomes free for it. 
But what must be the nature of authentic 
solicitude so that it can free the Other for itself? What 
kind of comportment does this imply? What kind of Being-
with-one-another is at stake? Such questions lead us to 
the threshold of the issue already broached, viz. the 
question of the community. But it is precisely at this 
~ In order to think the belonging together of ek-
sistence and freedom, one would need to turn to Vom Wesen 
des Grundes and to the fourth section of Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit. where freedom gets identified with ek-sistence: 
in engaging itself into the world, in standing outside 
itself into the open [das Offene), into the space of 
Unverbogenheit in which beings can come to presence, 
Dasein is engaged into a letting-be [Seinlassen] of 
beings. Such letting-be is what Heidegger calls 
"freedom". 
point that Heidegger closes off the discussion: 
Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself 
between the two extremes of positive solicitude--that 
which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps 
forth and liberates [vorspringend-befreinden]. It 
brings numerous mixed forms to maturity; to describe 
these and classify them would take us beyond the 
limits of this investigation (my emphasis) (122) . 6 
Hence it is perhaps beyond the limits of 
Heidegger's investigation that one would want to venture. 
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Not. however, by way of completing a Heideggerian analysis 
that would have remained uncompleted in Being and Time or 
elsewhere. It is not a matter of pursuing and completing 
a predefined program. Rather. it is perhaps, at this 
point, i.e .. at the threshold of the question of the 
community, a matter of thinking beyond Heidegger. And 
yet, everything that will be said henceforth will remain. 
in a way. Heideggerian, for it will arise from out of a 
reading of certain passages of Being and Time. 
Specifically. it will arise from out of a certain 
interpretation of death, of the death of the Other. and of 
Dasein's transcendence. So that our question. viz. the 
question of the nature of the relation of Dasein to the 
Other in authentic solicitude, needs to be postponed once 
6 Rather. Heidegger proceeds to describe the 
Miteinandersein of everyday Dasein, for, "proximally and 
for the most part," the Others are encountered in the 
world of Dasein's concern. In such Being-with towards 
Others. Dasein is never itself. But then who is Dasein in 
everyday Being-with-one-another? The answer is: das Man. 
the "they". 
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again. 
CBl 
Why death? Because death, as we suggested 
earlier. is Dasein's ownmost possibility. the possibility 
that threatens and undoes all other possibilities. the 
horizon within which each Dasein lives and ek-sists as a 
being for which its own Being is an issue. Death is the 
mark of Dasein's Eigentlichkeit, that is the mark of its 
authenticity and its ownness. Hence death, as the mark of 
Dasein's transcendence, can appear as the very 
impossibility of the community. Death, which is alway ffiY 
death. will always remain withdrawn from the political 
life. It resists the being-in-common, to the point that 
it would become impossible to think something like an 
authentic Being-with-one-another, i.e .. a Being-with-one-
another at the very center of which Dasein's transcendence 
could be situated. a Being-with-one-another of which the 
essence would precisely be the death of the Other. Yet it 
is this impossibility that Heidegger invites us to think, 
or rather provokes us to think. For his analysis of death 
in its connection to the Being-with-one-another remains at 
the level of inauthenticity. 
What. then. about the relation between death and 
Being-with-one-another? Is the Miteinandersein void of 
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any understanding of death? Not quite, as S 51 seems to 
show. But the understanding of death that publicness has 
is a deficient understanding expressed in "idle talk." 
Indeed, for the "they" death is not Dasein's ownmost 
possibility. It is not even a possibility. Rather, it is 
an event, and a rather usual and meaningless one: 
People who are no acquaintances of ours are "dying" 
daily and hourly. "Death" is encountered as a well-
known event occuring within-the-world (253). 
To the "they" death is a mere Vorhandene. Even though it 
happens to everyone, it never destabilizes the "they" 
which remains unaltered by this very common event. People 
die, everybody will die, eventually: death is "obvious." 
But the life of the "they" never stops, it is never 
threatened. In other words, when taken over by the 
"they," "dying, which is essentially mine in such a way 
that no one can be my representative, is perverted into an 
event of public occurence which the "they" encounters" 
( 253) . 
Hence any attempt to think the death of the Other 
would be inauthentic thinking. Such a thinking would 
express itself in a deficient mode of discourse, viz. idle 
talk. Indeed, such a thinking does not consider death in 
its dimension of possibility, but rather as an inevitable 
and hence trivial event. In other words, the thinking of 
the death of the Other is inauthentic insofar as it fails 
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to acknowledge the uniqueness or the irreducible 
"mineness" of death. The thinking of death in general 
leaves the essence of death aside. It is an anonymous 
thinking for an anonymous death, a thinking for which 
"people" die: 
Factically one's own Dasein is always dying already; 
that is to say. it is in Being-towards-its-end. And 
it hides this fact from it.::;elf by recoining "death" as 
just a "case of death" in Others--an everyday 
occurence which, if need be, gives the assurance still 
more plainly that "oneself" is stil 1 "living" (254). 
But what kind of "living" is at stake here? What are the 
essential features of a living-together which has an 
inauthentic understanding of death? What is the 
connection between a Being-in-common and death? If Being-
with-one-another is thought from the "they," and that is 
from an abstraction within which all Daseins are 
interchangeable and replacable; if the "they" refuses to 
Dasein its transcendence and its uniqueness. of which 
Being-towards-death is the mark, then a certain conception 
of the community, and a certain conception of the 
political life is already under way: a community as unity, 
as totality, as communion and as fusion--in other words, a 
community which represses the essential transcendence of 
Dasein, a community turned towards its own immanence: an 
imploded community. If, on the other hand, Dasein is 
defined in terms of its Being-towards-death, and that is 
of its mineness. then the space of the Being-with-one-
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another will no longer be the space of the "they," but the 
space of the co-appearance of each Dasein in its 
transcendence, without any possibility of fusion or 
communion. 
What would need to be recognized. then, in the 
thinking of Being-towards-death as Dasein's ownmost 
possibility, is Dasein's transcendence. Insofar as the 
very structure of Dase in is a structure of e:<cess,. of 
tn1nscendence. of a possibility that is always the 
possibility of one specific Dase in. the Other will always 
remain Other. The Other cannot be brought back to the 
Same (to myself. to the community). It always already 
exceeds the communion. the totality in which the "they" 
would entangle it. What is at stake here is indeed the 
ontological possibility of an ethics and a politics, a 
possibility grounded in Dasein's transcendence. 
Heidegger considers such possibility of an 
authentic Being-with-one-another in § 60. This section is 
the last section of the second chapter of the second 
division. The chapter as a whole is devoted to the 
question of "Dasein's Attestation of an Authentic 
Potentiality-for-Being. and Resoluteness." In this 
chapter. then, it is a matter of knowing whether there is 
an authentic potentiality-for-Being of Dasein that will be 
attested in its existentiell possibility by Dasein itself. 
In chapter I. Heidegger revealed the ontological· 
possibility of such a potentiality-for-Being in Dasein's 
Being-towards-death. But the question is now: 
Does Dasein ever factically [my emphasis] throw 
itself into such a Being-towards-death? Does Dasein 
demand ... an authentic potentiality-for-Being 
determined by anticipation [Vorlaufen]? (266) 
So here, in chapter II, Heidegger inquires into the 
authentic possibility of Dasein's existence, a possiblity 
that would be the result of Dasein's own demand. Such is 
"resoluteness" [Entsclossenheit], at which Heidegger 
arrives in § 60. Entsclossenheit is the word Heidegger 
uses to name Dasein's authentic disclosedness 
[ErschlossenheitJ attested in Dasein itself by its 
conscience. Entschlossenheit, then, is the authentic 
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truth of Dasein, and, as such, it is the most "primordial" 
one. Entschlossenheit, along with its attestation in 
conscience, involves the three determinations of Being-
there in the world, viz. the "state of mind" 
[Befindlichkeit], "understanding" [VerstehenJ, and 
"discourse" [Rede]. along with their authentic modalities, 
viz. "anxiety" [Angst], "Being-guilty" [Schuldigsein] and 
"reticence" [Verschwiegenheit]. Each of these modes of 
Being have the characteristic of individualizing Dasein in 
its conscience. of cutting Dasein off from the "they" in 
which Dasein is involved, proximally and for the most 
part. 
One would think. then, that Dasein's 
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"resoluteness" is nothing but a cutting itself off from 
the world. an interiorization of its self in its 
11 conscience 11 • It is actually quite the opposite. For 
"resoluteness" is Dasein's authentic mode of 
disclosedness, and that is its authentic way of projecting 
itself into the possibilities into which it is thrown. So 
that the "conscience" in which Dasein's "resoluteness" is 
attested is not to be thought in terms of the conscience 
or the interiority of a "subject" withdrawn from the 
world. Dasein's conscience is never mx. conscience for "I" 
am--is--not a suject. The conscience of Dasein is rather 
the interruption of any self-consciousness. for the inner 
life of self-consciousness is. according to Heidegger. 
always already outside of itself. thrown into the world. 
Dasein's conscience points to the very engagement of 
Dasein into the world. and to the possiblity of its being 
free for this world. Dasein's conscience is the "call" to 
its own self (as opposed to the "they-self") that arises 
from out of the world and that engages Dasein within the 
world, along with the world. And that is precisely the 
reverse of interiority and isolation: 
When the they-self is appealed to. it gets called to 
the Self. But it does not get called to that Self 
which can become fqr itself an 11 object 11 on which to 
pass judgment, nor to that Self which inertly dissects 
its "inner life" with fussy curiosity, nor to that 
Self which one has in mind when one gazes 
"analytically" at psychical conditions and what 
lies behind them. The appeal to the Self in.the they-
self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it 
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can close itself off from the "external world". The 
call passes over [Uberspringt] everything like this 
and disperses it. so as to appeal solely to that Self 
which, notwithstanding, is in no other way than Being-
in-the-world (my emphasis) (273). 
What Entschlossenheit primarily does, then, is to take the 
they-self away from itself. to "leap over" it and 
"dispers" it. so that each Dasein is left with its own 
Self. and with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. 
But does this mean that insofar as "resoluteness" 
individualizes Dasein and undoes inauthentic Being-with-
one-another, it also renders impossible any kind of 
authentic relation to the Other? Or does it mean. on the 
contrary. that insofar as it discloses Dasein 
authentically into the world, it becomes at the same time 
the very condition of possiblity of an authentic--and that 
is to say free--relation of Dasein to the other Daseins 
with which it is in the world? Heidegger is quite clear 
if brief on this issue: 
Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first 
makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 
"be" in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being. and to 
co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which 
leaps forth and liberates (vorspringend-befreiendenJ 
(298). 
This passage not only points to the possibility of an 
authentic Being-with-one-another, but also determines the 
nature of the relation of resolute Dasein to the Other. 
To that extent, it provides an answer to the question that 
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we raised in discussing S26 7 and that remained unanswered 
at that time. The difficulty with which the question of 
the authentic relation to the Other has to cope can be 
formulated in the following way: to relate oneself 
authentically to the Other is to relate oneself to the 
Other in such a way th~t the Other's ownmost potentiality-
for-Being will be revealed to it. But how can Dasein help 
the Other relate itself to what is most proper to it? 
Surely. if what is at issue is the Other's ownmost and 
proper potentiality-for-Being, then Dasein, as the Other 
of the Other, will have no access to such owness. Were 
Dasein able to do so, what it would relate itself to in 
the Other would no longer be the Other's ownmost Be1ng. 
but rather something that could be pointed to or even 
taken up by Dasein itself. It would seem, then, that the 
relation of Dasein to the Other would be nothing but a 
relation of disowning, of dispropriation, of alienation. 
Such would indeed be the case if the very nature of the 
relation to the Other were not a relation of "letting-be". 
What Heidegger understands by a "letting-be" of the Other, 
and what we ourselves understand by it after Heidegger. is 
what needs to be clarified. For such understanding will 
be crucial to the question of the community. 
In authentic Being-with-one-another. it is a 
matter of letting the Other be in its ownmost 
See above, p.9. 
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potentiality-for-Being. Hence it is not a matter of 
pointing to that ownmost possibility, of showing it as 
that which has to be taken up by the Other. For that 
possibility, as the Other's ownmost possibility, is not 
something that can be pointed to. Nor is it a matter of 
remaining passive, withdrawn from the Other's ownmost 
Being. not concerned by the Other. It is not a "selfish" 
attitude. Rather, it is a matter of engaging oneself with 
the Other, for the sake of the Other, in such a way that 
the Other gets thrown back to itself, and that is to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, to its death as its 
ownmost and uttermost possibility. Such throwing back, 
however, is not the work of Dasein. Nor is it an order or 
an injunction that the Other would take upon itself. 
Rather, it is a withdrawal that calls the Other upon 
itself, a kind of active passivity or passive activity by 
which the Other would be faced with its ownmost Being. 
But insofar as this ownmost potentiality-for-Being is the 
Other's and essentially not mine, I can in no way tell the 
Other what this potentiality consists in. Nor can I. for 
the same reason, i.e .. because of the transcendence of the 
Other. appropriate or reappropriate its ownmost Being with 
a view to insribing it within a larger project, a work or 
a program. In my authentic relation to the Other. I am 
related to it in a way that radically excludes any 
teleological undertaking, even if this undertaking were to 
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be done for the sake of the Other. In resolutely 
comporting myself to the Other. I do nothing but primarily 
acknowledge the infinite transcendence of the Other, a 
transcendence that I, as resolute Dasein, can only 
acknowledge because of my own transcendence, because of my 
Q!ffi. awareness of Dasein's existential excessive structure. 
In resolutely comporting myself to the Other I do nothing 
but acknowledge and mark the impossible communion or 
fusion of the Others under a common program or a common 
end that would realize the Others' ownmost Being. 
Even though this acknowledgment does not 
constitute rules for a praxis. and least of all for a 
politics, it perhaps points to the very essence of what it 
means to live within a common space, and hence it points 
to the horizon from which any authentic politics could 
unfold. This. to say the least, suspends and interrupts 
the praxical and political notions with which we are daily 
involved, viz. notions such as "nation," "people," 
"class," "State," etc., all of which conceive of men as 
subjects that can be brought together under larger 
universalities which, in turn, are themselves thought as 
subjects. In revealing Dasein's essential transcendence 
as the very heart of authentic Being-with-one-another, 
Heidegger radically puts into question these subjectal 
universalities, in such a way as to engage anew the 
question of our Being-together. So that now it would be a 
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matter of asking whether something essentially other is at 
issue in our Being-with-one-another. This other thing, 
following the thinking of Jean-Luc Nancy, can be called 
the community. 8 We thereby wish to point to something 
that never ceases to come to us (insofar as it constitues 
what is common to us) and which remains nonetheless 
withdrawn from what we usually call the society or the 
political life, yet allowing it from its very retreat. 
( c) 
Mourir sans but: par la 
(ce mouvement d'immobilite), 
la pensee tomberait hors 
de toute teleologie ... 
Maurice Blanchot--L'ecriture du desastre. 
Being-with-one-another, Being-there-with-others, 
what could be called the community, cannot be thought of 
in terms of comm.munion .. of fusion. For Dasein, in the 
mineness of the Being-towards-death which marks its 
authenticity, manifests its transcendence with regard to 
the "others" considered as an anonymous mass (as "they"). 
e Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, La communaute desouvree, 
Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1986. The remaining part of 
this chapter is engaged in an attempt to show how 
Heidegger's text can open the way to analyses that perhaps 
exceed Heidegger's "intentions," but that in any case 
reveal the unsaid of the text. Even though Nancy situates 
himself at a certain distance from Heidegger, we believe 
that most of what he says can be unfolded from out of 
Heidegger's text. 
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Indeed. the community is interrupted, fractured by the 
uniqueness or the singularity of Dasein. a uniqueness that 
it would not be able to include or to reappropriate in a 
fusional totality. Such would be the community: a 
tactical Being-with-one-another that would take Dasein's 
transcendence, i.e., Dasein's ownmost possibilities, upon 
itself. In other words, the community would not present 
itself as a coherent whole within which each Dasein would 
have its "place" or "function" 9 --in other words. not as a 
performative totality functioning on the basis of an 
individual or atomistic understanding of man. a totality 
which would actualize the essence of man, but rather as a 
"rapport" which would ex-pose Dasein in its Being-with-
other-Daseins, according to its existential structure. 
Because of its existential-ecstatic structure, 
Dasein cannot be thought of as an individuality, since 
this (political) notion presupposes for Dasein the 
possibility of its being an atom, an immanent substance 
that would stand for itself. The ecstatic existence of 
Dasein is precisely the impossibility of what Nancy calls 
an "immanence." By immanence Nancy means any thinking or 
ideology which thinks of itself and of the world as a 
9 Such conception runs throughout the entire history 
of metaphysics, from Plato to Hegel, and lies at the very 
heart of our contemporary political regimes. whether 
"capitalistic" or "communist". In such conception, the 
political community is thought as a signifying totality, 
as a living organism. 
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work, and hence as something which has to bring an essence 
into being, specifically the essence of man. 
"Immanentism'' is a humanism. In it, man--a certain 
conception of man--is both arche and telos, both the 
origin and the end. In that sense, Nancy means by 
immanence nothing else than what Heidegger means by 
humanism. We shall nonetheless keep Nancy's vocabulary. 
for the notion of immanence is opposed to the 
transcendence of Dasein and is a more directly political 
notion in Nancy10 • Dasein is the being whose death cannot 
be put to work: it can neither be appropriated nor 
recuperated nor superseded in a organic totality, in a 
communion of bodies and souls that would live on and 
through its dead. As such, death is the very interruption 
and the very impossibility of an organic totality which. 
in turn, is nothing but the idea of a universal immanence. 
of a plural unity which functions as a Subject. 
What Being and Time teaches us, implicitly but 
insistently, is that our Being-with-one-another cannot be 
dissociated from.our implicit understanding of death, or, 
as Nancy puts it, that "death cannot be dissociated from 
the community, for the community is revealed in death--and 
10 The word "immanence" is actually substituted for 
the word "totalitarianism" which Nancy had used previously 
on certain occasions. See, among other texts, the 
"Opening Remarks" in Rejouer le politigue (Paris: Galilee, 
1981) and "Le retrait du politique" in Le retrait du 
politique (Paris: Galilee, 1982). These two texts also 
bear the signature of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. 
reciprocally." 11 Death. or rather the way in which we 
comport ourselves to it. commands a certain conception of 
life. and specifically of our living-with-one-another. A 
community which does not understand death as a 
possibility, and as one's ownmost possibility, is a 
community which allows itself to put its dead to work. 
i.e .. a community whose dead do not die "for nothing". 
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The death of the members (and here the organic vocabulary 
is adequate) of the community is not a "useless" death, 
for insofar as the excess and the absolute loss in the 
Other's death is denied, death can be superseded, and the 
community of the dead becomes that upon which the 
community of the living can be elevated, justified. The 
living community can speak and act in the name of the 
dead, and that is always, sooner or later, more or less 
violently, more or less obviously, in the name of death 
itself, i.e., in the name of an impersonal death. of an 
immanent death. In the name of death and of its deads, 
which are conceived.both as arche and telos, the conununity 
can require of its members that they not only die, but 
also kill for the community's sake. that their death be 
turned into something usefull, something creative: Into a 
work--whether a "work of art" (Goebbels). a work of Reason 
11 Ibid .. p.39. 
or of Spirit.12 
Authentic community, i.e .. the community that is 
revealed in the death of the Other. suspends and 
interrupts the community of immanence, the community of 
what chapter three revealed as the myth. It is attached 
to death as the very possibility of its existence. but to 
death as the very impossibility of its being put to work. 
The death to which the community is attached does not 
bring about the transition of the dead being to some 
communial intimacy. The community. on the other hand, 
does not bring about the transfiguration of its dead in 
some substance or subject--whether Nation. State. native 
Soul or Blood, Humanity. The community is precisely that 
which takes this impossibility upon itself. It is a 
community of what Nancy. after Blanchot, calls the 
"desoeuvrement." i.e .. a community that undoes and 
undermines the finalities at play in a work. and which 
does so by revealing itself as that which is workless. 
12 Spirit, Geist. from Hegel to Heidegger (at least 
to a certain Heidegger), is the word which signified the 
collectivity as project and the project as collective. 
Geist is the word for the arche-teleological principle 
that guides men in their deeds and in history. How can 
Heidegger have put to work such a notion in his political 
engagement. after having shown in Being and Time the 
necessity of avoiding [vermeidenJ it? To what extent the 
introduction of such a vocabulary and its use in 
connection with the notion of Volk dismissed and denied 
the possibilities laid out in Being and Time, and 
specifically death as Dasein's ownmost possibility, is 
something that still needs to be thought. On the use of 
Geist in Heidegger's texts, see J. Derrida, De l'Esprit: 
Heidegger et la question, Paris: Galilee, 1987. 
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that which consumes itself in a pure loss--death--, in an 
excess that will not let itself be superseded: 
Ne comptez pas sur la mort, la v6tre, la mort 
universelle. pour fonder quoi que ce soit, pas meme la 
realite de cette mort si incertaine et si irreelle 
qu'avec elle s'evanouit ce qui la prononce. 13 
In other words, the community does nothing but reveal to 
its members their finitude. along with the excess by which 
this finitude is marked: death as the ownmost and 
uttermost possibility. Or. as Heidegger puts it in Being 
and Time, it does nothing but reveal this being in which 
"death. guilt. conscience. freedom and finitude reside 
together equiprimordially [qleichursprlinglich 
zusammenwohnen]" (385). Such residing- together Heidegger 
also calls "fate" (Schicksal), and it is also identified 
as the very condition of possibility of Geschichtlichkeit. 
Hence the community would be the space within 
which I, as a resolute Dasein. would be conscious of the 
necessary f initude and the absolute transcendence of the 
death of the Other. The community would be nothing but 
the ex-hibition or the ex-position of the limit at which, 
on which and from which I would appear with--and relate 
to--the Other as Other. It would be the space within 
13 Maurice Blanchot, L'ecriture du desastre, Paris: 
Gallimard, 1985, p. 143. 
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which singularities (and not individuals)i4 would appear 
together. How is this ex-position articulated? What kind 
of discourse, what kind of praxis unfolds from such a 
community? To what extent am I "consciously" attached to 
or involved in this articulation? 
To the extent. precisely. that resoluteness is 
attested by Dasein's conscience. Conscience is said to 
"the cal 1 [Ruf] of care" (§ 57). Now the cal 1 is a mode 
of discourse [Rede). and discourse "is a primordial 
existentiale [Existenzial] of disclosedness" (161). 
Insofar as disclosednes is primarily constituted by Being-
in-the-world, discourse too must have a specifically 
worldly kind of Being. Discourse's way of Being-in-the-
world is language [Sprache]. Insofar as language 
expresses Dasein's thrownness into the world, and not 
Dasein's "inner life," it is essentially Mitteilung. 
Mitteilen, in German, or at least in Heidegger's German. 
means both to communicate and to share. One does not 
share that which is communicated. Rather, communication 
itself is a sharing. Communication is not the 
transmission of an interiority into an exteriority. but 
rather the expression of the fact that the inside is 
14 Unlike individuals or individualities. 
singularities are precisely that which calls for division, 
that which is always already shared among the others. 
Singularities are unique in their transcendence, but such 
transcendence is never withheld from the world. Rather. 
this transcendence is the mark of Dasein's authentic 
engagement into the world. 
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always already outside, in the world and with the ot 
"Communication is never anything like a conveying of 
experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior 
of one subject into the interior of another" (162). For 
Dasein is essentially not a subject, i. e., not an 
immanent and self-sustaining structure with an 'inner. 
life' of its own that would eventually unfold into the 
external world. Rather. in communication, "the 
articulation of Being with one another understandingly is 
constituted." so that through it "a co-state-of-mind 
[Mitbefindlichkeit] gets 'shared'" (162). Insofar as 
Dasein is not a subject. communication is essentially a, 
sharing--the sharing of a space within which Daseins 
appear togethe~ in their ec-static ex-istences. And the 
community would be the space of such Mitteilung, the space 
of the communication that shares and of the sharing that 
communicates. Mit-teilen: to communicate, to share. to 
share a common space in the very communication of this 
space. But how is this space being communicated? What 
kind of communication is at play in such sharing? 
Since Dasein is not a subject, since communication 
is not the expression of the inner life of Dasein. but 
rather the expression of its always already being involved 
with others in a common space. language cannot have the 
meaning, the use and the effects it usually has. In 
communication as Mitteilunq, it cannot be a matter of 
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communicating one's own experiences, of defining programs 
or projects: of putting language to work in such a way 
that it would produce works around which and in which a 
community would communicate--as in a communion. In such 
communication, it is rather a matter of acknowledging the 
worklessness of ianguage in its essential dimension of 
sharing. The language of the Mitteilunq produces nothi 
It is rather that which inscribes Daseins in their 
differences and their singularities. that which ex-poses 
them to one another and marks this exposition as the very 
limit at/on which they co-appear. But this co-appearing 
itself is constituted by the sharing: the Mitteilung is 
the very distribution and the very spacing of Daseins 
whereby Daseins become other for one another in a common 
space. Hence the Mitteilung privileges the articulation 
of Daseins in their differences over the organization of 
the community; it privileges the ex-plosion of Daseins in 
their multiplicity over their implosion in society. 
Communication inscribes--ex-cribes--the sharing: 
it writes it. It is a kind of writing, a writing that 
writes the desoeuvrement of the community--in thinking. in 
language, and perhaps most of all in literature (precisely 
not as a whole of literary works. not as "books" 1 l5, but as 
1.l5 The community cannot be articulated like a Book .. 
Like most political societies, Books function as self-
enclosed and self-sustained identities: as immanent 
structures or Subjects. Hence the end of the Book would 
also signify the possibility of the community. In the 
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a writing that inscribes the sharing of singularities, a 
writing that inscribes the limit of our co-appearing). As 
such, it is perhaps most remote from the techno-social and 
perform.ative language of society. the language that 
results in "ambiguous and jealous stipulations and 
Lalkative fraternizing in the "they" and in what "they" 
want to undertake." 16 The society or Gesellschaft--and by 
society we mean the overstructured space of technology--
would be suspended and interrupted by the Mitteilung of 
the community or the Gemeinschaft. Literature would be 
that which would most resist the efficiency and 
performativity of the Gesellschaft. that which would 
endanger it in revealing itself through another use (that 
would precisely not be a use) of language. But the 
community is not to take the place of society. It is 
rather to interrupt it, in such a way that the society 
would get dis-placed, dis-located in this very 
interruption. But such displacement does not constitute a 
common program or an elaborated project. The community, 
the Mitteilunq is not something to come; it does not 
belong to the future. Nor does it belong to the past, in 
the way of a paradise lost that could be recovered through 
some reconstruction. For the community was never actually 
question of the community. writing itself becomes an 
issue, a truly political issue. 
16
• Sein und Zeit, 298. 
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"there." It never happened; it was never an event. And 
yet it has always already occured; it is constantly 
occuring, constantly coming to us, in the way of a call 
that would never cease to call. It is a call, a call that 
calls for itself, for the actualization of its own 
desoeuvrement. Like Being. And it is perhaps our 
responsibility to hear the call and to comport ourselves 
resolutely to it. There is perhaps a proper (eigentliche) 
political dimension in this call. a dimension to which we 
must not remain deaf. For what is at issue in this call 
is Dasein's authenticity, and that is primarily Dasein's 
transcendence. 
Dasein's conscience, then, the conscience at the 
very extreme of conscience,--since for conscience it is no 
longer a matter of desire and self-recognition. but of 
responding resolutely to the call of its own facticity--
can only happen as the communication of the community, and 
as that which the community communicates: as language, as 
writing--as literature. So here we are, once again, faced 
with the question of literature as the very center of the 
question of the political. It is no longer a matter of 
poiesis as poetry (although it £S!D. be a matter of poetry) 
or myth, but rather of literature as the very inscription 
and articulation of Daseins in their differences, as the 
writing that differs and spaces--as the writing, perhaps, 
of differance. For writing marks the spacing of Daseins 
and articulates them together in such spacing. But 
writing also differs. i. e., postpones, the moment of the 
techno-social, i~ such a way that this moment would 
essentially differ from itself. What this indicates is 
that the demand of the community be perhaps essentially 
scriptural. i. e., that the community be articulated in 
and as writing--which does not mean that the members of 
the community be necessarily involved in the actual 
writing and reading of "books". 17 For the writing 
referred to is not the work of a subject that would be 
communicated to the community. Rather. the community as 
writing indicates that the community must be articulated 
in its own desoeuvrement, and that the language of the 
Mitteilung is such as to respond to such a demand. This 
prescription. of course, does not make a politics. nor an 
ethics--although an insistent and persistent demand never 
ceases to emanate from the community (the community is in 
fact this very demand). It dictates, literally, nothing. 
And yet. it constitutes the limit or the horizon from 
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which a certain politics could unfold. It constitutes the 
1 7 The community as writing would actually be the 
mark of the end or the closure of what Derrida calls the 
"Book." For the Book is itself the expression of a full 
speech, the locus of a logos (or a mvthos) and a voice 
present to itself and to its world, through which history 
as such can happen. The articulation of the community as 
writing would mark the closure of the political understood 
as logo- or rather as mythocentrism. i.e., as the founding 
and living speech in the communion of which the people as 
a whole would be united. 
delimitation of a politics of transcendence and of 
finitude: a politics of freedom. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the very end of this work, Heidegger's 
political discourse can be resumed in its specificity as 
well as in its general cont With regard to the 
latter. the following conclusion can be drawn: in 
addressing the question of the political in terms of art. 
and specifically in terms of poetry as Dichtunq, Heidegger 
allied himself with a problematic that was first 
formulated in Plato's Republic. But above all, he 
situated himself on the horizon of an historical and 
political debate that was initiated in Germany at the very 
beginning of the Nineteenth Century. This horizon was 
marked by a philosophical emphasis on art--and 
specifically on the mythic vocation of language--through 
which the German people was to exist as such. In other 
words. like the discourse of most German philosophers·of 
the past three hundred years. Heidegger's own discourse 
focused on the question of Germany's identity. Is there 
such a thing as Germany? Can one talk of a German 
"people?" Where does the essence of Germany lie? Such 
were the questions that constituted the very heart of 
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Germany's political debate. And to a certain extent. one 
can assert that Germany is still concerned with these 
questions. In order to answer these crucial questions and 
to delineate the possibility of a truly German existence. 
German thinkers turned to the Greek model. Through the 
appropriation or the reappropriation of Ancient Greece, of 
it::; myths and of its art. it was a matter of originating 
something radically new. For the German people. it was a 
matter of identifying itself and of producing its own 
essence through a privileged relation with Ancient Greece. 
Lacoue-Labarthe designates this problem of 
identity and identification as the question of mimesis. 1 
This notion is the political notion par excellence. i.e .. 
the notion in which the whole of the political drama since 
Plato is concentrated. 2 The structure of mimesis is 
complex and can be in no way reduced to the operation by 
which an "original" would be reproduced in a "copy." The 
logic of mimesis is contradictory: the German mimesis of 
1 Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction du politigue. 
chap. 8. 
2
. If this holds true for Ancient Greece and German 
thought. art and literature, it is not self-evident for 
the rest of the West. One might think. of course, that 
the Italian and the French Renaissance constituted the 
mimetic gesture par excellence. Yet the political 
dimension of such a gesture is not obvious. France, for 
example, never suffered Germany's identity and 
identification crisis. The question of language was never 
a central political issue as it was in Germany. The 
political problems were more directly religious and 
representative. 
Ancient Greece is in search of a model by which it would 
itself become a model. autonomous and spontaneous. As 
Lacoue-Labarthe puts it: 
What the German imitatio is in search of in Greece is 
the model--and hence the possibility--of a pure 
springing up, of a pure originality: the model of a 
self-formation. 3 
This model. Lacoue-Labarthe adds. is "explicitly 
Heidegger's in the Rectoral Address." It is still 
Heidegger's in 1967: 
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It is necessary to take the step back. Back to where? 
Back to the [Greek] beginning ... But this step back 
does not mean that the world of Ancient Greece would 
need to be brought back to life in one way or 
another ... 4 
The contradiction, therefore. lies in the fact that the 
appeal to the model is such as to initiate a radically new 
beginning. i.e .. such as to free the derivative from the 
origi na 1 . 
Heidegger will not have been extraneous to such 
imitation. His entire "political" discourse. according to 
Lacoue-labarthe, will have been governed by the logic of 
imitation. From 1933 to the very end of his life, 
Heidegger never ceased to think the possibility of the 
political from the horizon of the great Greek beginning, 
Ibid., 121. 
4 Lecture held at the Academy of Sciences and Arts 
of Athens on April, 4, 1967. 
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and specifically from an endlessly renewed meditation on 
techne. Through and through, the question of history and 
of the political remained attached to the question of art, 
and specifically to the saying of Holderlin. the major 
stake of which was the possibility of a relation to the 
gods. Till the very end, the only political alternative 
to the distress of the West was located in the essence of 
the political. and that is in art as Dichtung. Heidegger 
never even considered the possibility of another 
problematic. To the following question raised in the 
Athens lecture: "What about art today in the eyes of its 
ancient provenance?," Heidegger replies: 
The ancient gods have fled. Holderlin, who 
experienced this loss more than any other poet before 
and after him, asks in the elegy devoted to the god of 
the wine Dionysos and entitled "Bread and Wine": 
Wo. wo leuchten sie denn, die Fernhintreffende 
Sprtiche? 
Delphi schltimmert und wo tonet das groBe Geschick? 
(IV) 
After two thousand five hundred years, is there today 
an art that stands under the demand under which art 
once stood in Greece? And if not. what is the region 
from which the demand to which modern art in all its 
domains answers originates? The works of art no longer 
spring from the stamped limits of a world of the 
popular and the national [Ihre Werke entspringen nicht 
mehr den pragenden Grenzen einer Welt des Volkhaften 
und NationalenJ. They belong to the universality of 
world civilization. 
The traces of a secret "mimetology" can be 
detected into the very last writings of Heidegger. From 
the very start to the very end, Heidegger's dis.course wi 11 
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have been sustained by the mimetic logic. With the 
exception. perhaps (and this Lacoue-Labarthe would have 
failed to acknowledge), that Heidegger engages this 
imitation in the process of its own completion and 
interruption. For Heidegger's reading of Holderlin does 
not pi-omote a "new mythology": for us Westerners (and 
specifically Germans) it cannot be a matter of creating 
new gods and new heroes with which the entire people could 
be identified. Holderlin's mythos is void of any heroic-
tragic pathos. Rather, it is a matter of enduring a time 
of distress marked by the absence of the gods. But no 
Dichtung, and a fortiori no historico-political will can 
bring the gods back. The coming of the gods does not 
depend on human will. We can only free the space for such 
coming. Now this may very well be historically and 
politically unacceptable. Yet this also designates the 
impossibility of creating or inventing new gods, of 
identifying oneself as a people through a common 
projection of oneself in the myth. It is, in a way, to 
undermine the very function of the myth and to radically 
put into question the very possibility of a mythology. 
The time of distress--the flight of the gods--echoed in 
Holderlin's poetry designates the impossibility of the 
mythic--the appeal to the presence of gods. The relation 
to the gods has now become a relation of impossibility, or 
at least a relation of absence; hence a relation which is 
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exclusive of the myth, for the myth is precisely defined 
in terms of a voice fully present to itself and to those 
who are united in it. The Holderlinian myth operates at 
the very limit of the myth: it is. as it were. a myth 
without myth. a myth about the impossibility of the myth. 
In that sense, Holderlin (and Heidegger) would be freed 
from the Romantic version of the myth. The operation at 
the limit of the myth would mark the specificity of 
Heidegger's discourse on art and poetry in connection with 
the political. 
But Heidegger's discourse also remains decisively 
attached to the mythic temptation, and that is to the 
relation to the gods. Indeed, the relation to the gods 
(as absent gods) remains the central trait of the 
political discourse. The political discourse as a whole 
is ordered to the relation with the gods. The gods are 
the cause of our distress. and yet only they can save us, 
even though they are perhaps never to come. This is 
politically (and philosophically) non satisfying as well 
as unacceptable. For the world in which I (as Dasein) am 
immerged and in which other Daseins are encountered 
forbids me to abstract myself from this decisive 
everydayness and to measure the present of a common life 
from the standpoint of a transcendence and a future which 
will perhaps never be. As Arendt repeatedly pointed out. 
our life is a common life. and that is a web of 
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relationships in which each particularity is trying to say 
who he is through a series of words and deeds. To think 
history and to think politics is primarily to be engaged 
in the articulation of these particularities in their 
differences. Heidegger will have refused to answer such a 
demand. even though Being and Time broached the way for 
the thinking of the community, not in terms of art and 
myth. but in terms of what in chapter 4 is called 
"writing." 
Hence everything seems to happen as though the 
question of the political could not be separated from the 
question of language in the widest sense. whether as 
mythopoiesis in the Platonic sense. as logos or lexis in 
the Aristotelian (and to a certain extent Arendtian) 
sense, or as communication in the sense of writing. It is 
as though a discourse about the political--whether polis. 
State or community--had to be at the same time a discourse 
about discourse--whether understood as logos, mythos. 
Sprache or Mitteilunq. The reason for such belonging-
together lies in the fact that the relation to language is 
constitutive of our very being-with-one-another. To think 
the political under the horizon of the constitutive mythos 
is to prepare the way to a community of immanence. i.e., 
to a community the members of which live in and through 
the communion of the common mythos. To think the 
community as communication and "writing," on the other 
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hand. i.e. . to think of the community as the very limit en 
and at which Daseins appear as who they are, is to render 
radically impossible the gathering of the members under a 
"spiritual mission" or a "destiny." Thus it is also to 
render impossible the closure of the community. 
Heidegger will have perhaps been the ultimate as 
well as the most revealing figure of a metaphysical scene 
born some two thousand five hundred years ago in which the 
drama of the political in its relation to the poetic was 
being enacted. For Heidegger radicalized the poetic or 
mythic tendency already at play in Plato, inverting, as it 
were, the two poles of the mimesis, so that the political 
would come to imitate the poetic. or at least the poetic 
would found and initiate the political as such. Yet 
Heidegger will have also marked the outcome of this scene. 
i.e., its most radical and theatrical expression as well 
the impossiblity of keeping the scene alive. On the one 
hand, Heidegger's political engagement~ and, to a certain 
~ Even though Heidegger's engagement remained 
totally withdrawn from that which constituted the very 
content of the Nazi myth, Heidegger's thinking remained at 
an almost absolute point of proximity to that which 
constituted the greatest perversion--and also the closing 
scene--of the mythic temptation. Willy-nilly Heidegger 
found himself to be in collusion with the extreme (and 
murderous) aesthetization of the myth. Moreover, even 
more so after his breaking-off with Nazism, Heidegger kept 
trying to think the possibility of the political from a 
reflexion on art and on language as myth, without ever 
being able to put into question the political danger 
inherent in the myth. The myth is essentially total: 
totalizing and totalitarian. 
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extent. his reading of H6lderlin. will have served tc mark 
the interruption of this drama, the impossibility of the 
political as such, i.e., the impossibility of its essence 
and of the will to its essence; on the other hand, 
Heidegger's Being and Time gives way to the truly 
communitarian and scriptural demand that unfolds from such 
impossibility. The demand consists in thinking the 
political apart from the poetic or the mythic. It 
consists in thinking the community as writing. i.e .. as 
the limit on which and at which Daseins appear in their 
transcendence. The demand requires that one be engaged in 
the writing and the inscription (or rather in the ex-
scription) of the limit. and that is. simultaneously. in 
the disruption and the destruction of the myth. The 
writing of the community designates the end of the 
political as mythocentrism. 
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APPENDIX 
FIRST CHORUS FROM SOPHOCLES' ANTIGONE 
There is much that is strange, but nothing 
that surpasses man in strangeness. 
He sets sails on the frothing waters 
amid the south winds of winter 
tacking through the mountains 
and furious chasms of the waves. 
He wearies even the noblest 
of the gods, the Earth. 
indestructible and untiring. 
overturning her from year to year, 
driving the plows this way and that 
with horses. 
And man. pondering and plotting, 
snares the light-glidding birds 
and hunts the beasts of the wilderness 
and the native creatures of the sea. 
With guile he overpowers the beast 
that roams the mountains by night as by day. 
he yokes the hirsute neck of the stallion 
and the undaunted bull. 
And he has found his way 
to the resonance of the word, 
and to wind-swift all-understanding, 
and to the courage of rule over cities. 
He has considered also how to flee 
from exposure to the arrows 
of unpropitious weather and frost. 
Everywhere journeying. inexperienced and without issue. 
he comes to nothingness. 
Though no flight can he resist 
the one assault of death, 
even if he has succeeded in cleverly evading 
painful sickness. 
Clever indeed, mastering 
the ways of skill beyond all hope, 
he sometimes accomplishes evil, 
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sometimes achieves brave deeds. 
He wends his way between the laws ofthe ·earth 
and the adjured justice of the gods. 
Rising high above his place, 
he for who the sake of adventure takes 
the non-being for being loses 
his place in the end. 
May such a man never frequent my hearth; 
may my mind never share the presumption 
of him who does this. 
HoLDERLIN'S HYMN "GERMANIA" 
Not them, the blessed, who once appeared, 
Those images of gods in the ancient land, 
Them, it is true. I may not now invoke. but if, 
You waters of my homeland, now with you 
The love of my heart laments, what else does it want, in 
Its hallowed sadness? For full of expectation lies 
The country, and as though it had been lowered 
In sultry dog-days, on us a heaven today, 
You yearning rivers, casts prophetic shade. 
With promises it is fraught, and to me 
Seems threatening too, yet I will stay with it, 
And backward now my soul shall not escape 
To you the vanished, whom I love too much. 
To look upon your beautiful brows, as though 
They were unchanged, I am afraid, for deadly 
And scarcely permitted it is to awaken the dead. 
Gods who are fled! And you also, present still, 
But once more real, you had your time, your ages! 
No, nothing here I'll deny and ask no favours. 
For when it's over, and Day's light gone out. 
The priest is the first to be struck, but lovingly 
The temple and the image and the cult 
Follow him down into darkness, and none of them now may 
shine. 
Only as from a funeral pyre henceforth 
A golden smoke, the legend of it, drifts 
And glimmers on around our doubting heads 
And no one knows what's happening to him. He feels 
The shadowy shapes of those who once were here, 
The ancients. newly visiting the earth. 
For those who are to come now jostle us, 
Nor longer will that holy host of beings 
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Divinely human linger in azure Heaven. 
Already, in the prelude of a rougher age 
Raised up for them, the field grows green, prepared 
Are offerings for the votive feast and valley · 
And rivers lie wide open round prophetic mountains. 
So that into the very Orient 
A man may look and thence be moved by many 
transformations. 
But down from Aether falls 
The faithful image. and words of gods rain down 
Innumerable from it. and the innermost grove resounds. 
And the eagle that comes from the Indus 
And flies over the snow-covered peaks of 
Parnassus. high above the votive hills 
Of Italy, and seeks glad booty for 
The Father. not as he used to, more practised in flight. 
That ancient one. exultant. over the Alps 
Wings on at last and sees the diverse countries. 
The priestess. her. the quietest daughter of God, 
Too fond of keeping silent in deep ingenuousness, 
Her now he seeks. who open-eyed looked up 
As though she did not know it. lately when a storm. 
Threatening death, rang out above her head; 
A better destiny the child divined. 
And in the end amazement spread in heaven 
Because one being was as great in faith 
As they themselves, the blessing powers on high; 
233 
Therefore they sent the messenger. who, quick to recognize 
her. 
Smilingly thus reflects: you the unbreakable 
A different word must try. and then proclaims, 
The youthful, looking towards Germania: 
"Yes. it is you. elected 
All-loving and to bear 
A burdensome good fortune have grown strong. 
Since. hidden in the woods and flowering poppies 
Filled with sweet drowsiness. you. drunken, did not heed 
Me for a long time, before lesser ones even felt 
The virgin's pride, and marvelled whose you are and where 
from, 
But you yourself did not know. Yet I did not misjudge you 
And secretly, while you dreamed. at noon, 
Departing I left a token of friendship. 
The flower of the mouth behind, and lonely you spoke. 
Yet you. the greatly blessed, with the rivers too 
Dispatched a wealth of golden words, and they well 
unceasing 
Into all regions now. For almost as is the holy 
The Mother of all things. upholder of the abyss. 
Whom men at other times call the Concealed, 
Now full of loves and sorrows 
And full of presentiments 
And full of peace is your bosom. 
0 drink the morning breezes 
Until you are opened up 
And name what you see before you; 
No longer now the unspoken 
May remain a mystery 
Though long it has been veiled; 
For shame behoves us mortals 
And most of the time to speak thus 
Of gods indeed is wise. 
But where more superabundant than purest wellsprings 
The gold has become and the anger in Heaven earnest, 
For once between Day and Night must 
A truth be made manifest. 
Now threefold circumscribe it, 
Yet unuttered also, just as you found it, 
Innocent virgin, let it remain. 
Once only, daughter of holy Earth. 
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Pronounce your Mother's name. The waters roar on the rock 
And thunderstorms in the wood, and at their name 
Divine things past ring out from time immemorial. 
How all is changed! And to the right there gleam 
And speak things yet to come, joy-giving, from the 
Yet at the centre of Time 
In peace with hallowed, 
distance .• 
With virginal Earth lives Aether 
And gladly, for remembrance, they 
The never-needy dwell 
Hospitably amid the never-needy, 
Amid your holidays, 
Germania, where you are priestess and 
Defenceless proffer all round 
Advice to the Kings and the peoples." 
HoLDERLIN'S HYMN "THE RHINE" 
To Isaak von Sinclair 
Amid dark ivy I was sitting, at 
The forest's gate, just a golden noon, 
To visit the wellspring there, came down 
From steps of the Alpine ranges 
Which, following ancient lore, 
I call the divinely built, the fortress of the Heavenly, 
But where, determined in secre·t 
Much even now reaches men; from there 
Without surmise I heard 
A destiny, for, debating 
Now this, now that in the warm shade, 
My soul had hardly begun 
To make for Italy 
And far away for the shores of Morea. 
But now, within the mountains, 
Deep down below the silvery summits. 
And in the midst of gay verdure. 
Where shuddering the forests 
And the heads of rocks overlapping 
Look down at him, all day 
There in the coldest chasm 
I heard the youth implore 
Release; and full of pity his parents heard 
Him rage there and accuse 
His Mother Earth and the Thunderer 
Who fathered him, but mortals 
Fled from the place, for dreadful, 
As without light he writhed 
Within his fetters, was 
The demigod's raving. 
The voice it was of the noblest of rivers, 
Of free-born Rhine, 
And different were his hopes when up there from his 
brothers 
Ticino and Rhodanus 
He parted and longed to roam, and impatiently 
His regal soul drove him on towards Asia. 
Yet in the face of fate 
Imprudent it is to wish. 
The sons of gods, though, 
Are blindest of all. For human beings know 
Their house, and the animals 
Where they must build, but in 
Their inexperienced souls the defect 
Of not knowing where was implanted. 
A mystery are those of pure origin. 
Even song may hardly unveil it. 
For as you began, so you will remain, 
And much as need can effect, 
And breeding, still greater power 
Adheres to your birth 
And the ray of light 
That meets the new-born infant. 
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But where is anyone 
So happily born as the Rhine 
From such propitious heights 
And from so holy a womb. 
To remain free 
His whole life long and alone fulfil 
His heart's desire. like him? 
And that is why his word is a jubilant roar, 
Nor is he fond, like other children, 
Of weeping in swaddling bands; 
For where the banks at first 
Slink to his side, the crooked, 
And greedily entwining him, 
Desire to educate 
And carefully tend the feckless 
Within their teeth, he laughs, 
Tears up the serpents and rushes 
Off with his prey, and if in haste 
A greater one does not tame him, 
But lets him grow, like lightning he 
Must rend the earth and like things enchanted 
The forests join his flight and, collapsing, the 
mountains. 
A god. however, wishes to spare his sons 
A life so fleeting and smiles 
When. thus intemperate but restrained 
By holy Alps, the rivers 
Like this one rage at him in the depth. 
In such a forge. then, all 
That's pure is given shape 
And it is good to see 
How then, after leaving the mountains. 
Content with German lands he calmly 
Moves on and stills his longing 
In useful industry, when he tills the land, 
Now Father Rhine, and supports dear children 
In cities which he has founded. 
Yet never. never does he forget, 
For sooner the dwelling shall be destroyed, 
And the laws, and the day of men 
Become iniquitous, than such as he 
Forget his origin 
And the pure voice of his youth. 
Who was the first to coarsen, 
Corrupt the bonds of love 
And turn them into ropes? 
Then, sure of their own rights 
And of the heavenly fire 
Defiant rebels mocked, not till then 
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Despising mortal ways, 
Chose foolhardy arrogance 
And strove to become the equals of gods. 
But their own immortality 
Suffices the gods, and if 
The Heavenly have need of one thing, 
It is of hereoes and human beings 
And other mortals. For since 
The most blessed in themselves feel nothing 
Another, ·if to say such a thing is 
Permitted, must, I suppose. 
Vicariously feel in the name of the gods, 
And him they need; but their rule is that 
He shall demolish his 
Own house and curse like an enemy 
Those dearest to him and under the rubble 
Shall bury his father and child, 
When one aspires to be like them, refusing 
To bear with inequality, the fantast. 
So happy he who has found 
A well-allotted fate 
Where still of his wanderings 
And sweetly of his afflictions 
The memory murmurs on banks that are sure, 
So that this way, that way with pleasure 
He looks as far as the bounds 
Which God at birth assigned 
To him for his term and sight. 
Then, blissfully humble, he rests, 
For all that he has wanted, 
Though heavenly, of itself surrounds 
Him uncompelled, and smiles 
Upon the bold one now that he's quiet. 
Of demigods now I think 
And I must know these dear ones 
Because so often their lives 
Move me and fill me with longing. 
But he whose soul, like yours. 
Rousseau, ever strong and patient, 
Became invincible, 
Endowed with steadfast purpose 
And a sweet gift of hearing, 
Of speaking, so that from holy profusion 
Like the wine-god foolishly, divinely 
And lawlessly he gives it away, 
The language of the purest, comprehensible to the good, 
But rightly strikes with blindness the irreverent, 
The profaning rabble, what shall I call that stranger? 
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The sons of Earth, like their mother are 
All-loving, so without effort too 
All things those blessed ones receive. 
And therefore it surprises 
And startles the mortal man 
Whe he considers the heaven 
Which with loving arms he himself 
Has leaped upon his shoulders, 
And feels the burden of joy; 
Then often to him it seems best 
Almost wholy forgotten to be 
Where the beam does not sear, 
In the forest's shade 
By Lake Bienne amid foliage newly green, 
And blithely poor in tones, 
Like beginners, to learn from nigthingales. 
And glorious then it is to arise once more 
From holy sleep and awakening 
From coolness of the woods, at evening 
Walk now toward the softer light 
When he who built the mountains 
And drafted the paths of the rivers, 
Having also smiling directed 
The busy lives of men, 
So short of breath, like sails, 
And filled them with his breezes, 
Reposes also, and down to his pupil 
The master craftsmen, finding 
More good than evil. 
Day now enclines to the present Earth. 
Then gods and mortals celebrate their nuptials, 
All the living celebrate, 
And Fate for a while 
Is levelled out, suspended. 
And fugitives look for asylum, 
For sweet slumber the brave, 
But lovers are 
What always they were, at home 
Wherever flowers are glad 
Of harmless fervour and the spirit wafts 
Around the darkling trees, but those unreconciled 
Are changed and hurry now 
To hold out their hands to the other 
Before the benevolent light 
Goes down, and night comes. 
For some, however, 
This quickly passes, others 
Retain it longer. 
The eternal gods are full 
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Of life at all times; but until death 
A mortal too can retain 
And bear in mind what is best 
And then is supremely favoured. 
For hard to bear 
Is misfortune, but good fortune harder. 
A wise man, though, was able 
From noon to midnight, and on 
Till morning lit up the sky 
To keep wide awake at the banquet. 
To you in the heat of a path under fir-trees or 
Within lhe oak forest's half-light. wrapped 
In steel, my Sinclair. God may appear. or 
In clouds, you'll know him, since. youthfully, you know 
The good God's power, and never from you 
The smile of the Ruler is hidden 
By day, when all 
That lives seems febrile 
And fettered. or also 
By night, when all is mingled 
Chaotically and back again comes 
Primaeval confusion. 
HoLDERLIN'S "HOMECOMING" 
To his relatives 
1 
There in the Alps a gleaming night still delays and, 
composing 
Portents of gladness, the clouds cover a valley agape. 
This way, that way roars and rushes the breeze of the 
mountains, 
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Teasing. sheer through the firs falls a bright beam, and 
is lost. 
Slowly it hurries and wars, this Chaos trembling with 
pleasure, 
Young in appearance, but strong, celebrates here amid 
rocks 
Loving discord, and seethes. shakes in its bounds that are 
timeless, 
For more bacchantically now morning approaches within. 
For more endlessly there the year expands, and the holy 
Hours and the days in there more boldly are ordered and 
mixed. 
Yet the bird of thunder marks and observes the time, and 
High in the air, between peaks. hangs and calls out a 
new day. 
Now, deep inside. the small village also awakens and 
fearless 
Looks at the summits around, long now familiar with 
height; 
Growth it foreknows, for already ancient torrents like 
lightning 
Crash. and the ground below steams with the spray of 
their fall. 
Echo sounds all around and, measureless. tireless the 
workshop, 
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Sending out gifts, is astir, active by day and by night. 
2 
Quiet. meanwhile. above, the silvery peaks lie aglitter. 
Full of roses up there, flushed with dawn's rays, lies 
the snow. 
Even higher, beyond the light. does the pure. never 
clouded 
God have his dwelling, whom beams, holy, make glad with 
their play. 
Silent, alone he dwells, and bright his countenance shines 
now, 
He, the aethereal one, seems kindly, disposed to give 
life, 
Generate joys, with us men, as often when, knowing the 
· measure, 
Knowing those who draw breath, hesitant, sparing the God 
Sends well allotted fortune both to the cities and 
houses, 
Showers to open the land, gentle. and you, brooding 
clouds, 
You, then, most dearly loved breezes, followed by 
temperate springtime And 
with a slow hand once more gladdens us mortals grown 
sad, 
When he renews the seasons, he, the creative, and 
quickens, 
Moves once again those hearts weary and numb with old 
age, 
Works on the lowest depths to open them up and to brighten 
All, as he loves to do; so now does life bud anew, 
Beauty abounds, as before, and spirit is present. returned 
now, 
And a joyfull zest urges furled wings to unfold. 
3 
Much I said to him: for whatever the poets may ponder, 
Sing, it mostly concerns either the angels or him. 
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Much I besought, on my country's behalf, lest unbidden one 
day the 
Spirit should suddenly come, take us by storm 
unprepared; 
Much, too, for your sake to whom, though troubled now in 
our country, 
Holy gratitude brings fugitives back with a smile. 
Fellow Germans. for your sake! Meanwhile the lake gently 
rocked me, 
Calmly the boatman sat, praising the wheather, the 
breeze. 
Out on the level lake one impulse of joy had enlivened 
All the sails, and at last. there in a new day's first 
hour 
Brightening, the town unfurls. and safely conveyed from 
the shadows 
Cast by the Alps, now the boat glides to its mooring and 
rests. 
Warm the shore is here. and valleys open in welcome, 
Pleasantly lit by paths. greenly allure me and gleam. 
Gdrdens. foregathered. lie here and already the dew-laden 
bud breaks 
And a bird's early song welcomes the traveller home. 
All seems familiar; even the word or the nod caught in 
passing 
Seems like a friend's, every face looks like a 
relative's face. 
4 
And no wonder! Your native country and soil you are 
walking. 
What you seek, it is near. now comes to meet you half-
way. 
Nor by mere chance like a son a wandering man now stands 
gazing 
Here by the wavelet-loud gate, looking for names to 
convey 
Love to you in his poem. Lindau, the favoured and happy! 
Not the least of our land's many hospitable doors. 
Urging men to go out allured by the promise of distance, 
Go where the wonders are, go where that god-like wild 
beast. 
High up the Rhine blasts his reckless way to the plains of 
the lowlands, 
Where out of rocks at last bursts the lush valley's 
delight, 
Wander in there, through the sunlit mountain range. making 
for Como,. 
Or, as the day drifts on. drift on the wide open lake; 
Yet you door that are hallowed, me much more strongly you 
urge to 
Make for home where I know blossoming pathways and 
lanes. 
There to visit the fields and the Neckar's beautiful 
· valleys, 
And the woods. green leaves holy to me, where the oak 
Does not disdain to consort with quiet birches and 
beeches. 
Where amid mountains one place holds me, a captive 
content. 
5 
There they too receive me. Voice of my town, of my 
mother! 
How to your sound respond things that I learned long 
ago! 
Yet they are still themselves! More radiantly, almost, 
than ever, 
Dearest ones, in your eyes joy and the sun are alight. 
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Yes, it's all what it was. It thrives and grows ripe. but 
no creature 
Living and loving there ever abandons its faith. 
But the best thing of all. the find that's been saved up 
beneath the 
Holy rainbow of peace, waits for the young and the old. 
Like a fool I speak. In my joy. But tomorrow and later 
When we go outside, look at the living green field 
Under the trees in blossom. on holidays due in the 
springtime. 
Much of those things with you. dear ones, I'll speak and 
I'll hope. 
Much in the meantime I've heard of him, the great Father. 
and long now 
I have kept silent about him who on summits renews 
Wandering Time up above and governs the high mountain 
ranges, 
Him who soon now will grant heavenly gifts and calls 
forth 
Song more effulgent, and sends us many good spirits. No 
longer 
Wait now. preservers, the year's angels, 0 come now and 
you, 
6 
Angels, too. of our house, re-enter the veins of all life 
now. 
Gladdening all at once, let what is heavenly be shared! 
Make us noble and new! Till nothing that's humanly good, 
no 
Hour of the day without them. them the most joyful!, or 
such 
Joy as now too is known when lovers return to each other, 
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Passes, not fitting for them, hallowed as angels demand. 
When we bless the meal, whose name may I speak, and when 
late we 
Rest from the life of each day, tell me, to whom give my 
thanks? 
Him, the most High. should I name then? A god does not 
love what's unseemly, 
Him to embrace and to hold our joy is too small. 
Silence often behoves us: deficient in names that are 
holy, 
Hearts may beat high, while the lips hesitate, wary of 
speech? 
Yet a lyre to each hour lends the right mode. the right 
music, 
And, it may be, delights heavenly ones who draw near. 
This make ready, and almost nothing remains of the care 
that 
Darkened our festive day. troubled the promise of joy: 
Whether he likes it or not. and often. a singer must 
harbour 
Cares like these in his soul; not, though, the wrong 
sort of cares. 
